

# Serving and Protecting? Victimization, Citizen Engagement and Policing in Lahore

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
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Policy Note

## How acute is Lahore’s public safety problem?

In Lahore, a city of 11 million people and the capital of Pakistan’s Punjab province, crime has tripled since the early 1990s (Figure 1). Lahore’s crime challenge has also been much more severe than the provincial average. While the rest of the province witnessed a significant drop in per capita crime after 2011, the crime drop in Lahore has been muted.

**Figure 1: Total Crime Trends in Punjab**



**Source:** Punjab Police Crime Data and Punjab Development Statistics (various years), Population Census (1998, 2017).

**Note:** Total crime is an aggregate of registered crimes against persons and property.<sup>1</sup>


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<sup>1</sup> Crimes against property include theft (including vehicles theft), burglary, robbery (including forcible snatching of vehicles), dacoity, and attempts at all these offences (e.g. attempted robbery etc.) and extortion. Crimes against persons include murder, assault, attempted murder and kidnapping for ransom and include attempts at all these offences.

But despite rising crime, Lahore is still safer than cities in India, the United States, and England (Figure 2). Lahore’s victimization rate is 25% less than the rate found in Mumbai, London and the average for U.S. urban areas. It is 15% less than the rate found in Delhi. We also find that citizen perceptions of public safety are much higher in Lahore than these cities. **This suggests that although Lahore’s public safety problem has worsened overtime, it remains manageable in global terms.**

**Figure 2: Lahore’s Victimization Rate in Global Comparison**




**Source:** (1) IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016; (2) Crime Victimization and Safety Perception: A Public Survey of Delhi and Mumbai, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2015; (3) NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool, (<http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nvat>), Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014 ; (4) Crime in England and Wales: Bulletin Tables, Office of National Statistics, UK, 2016.

## The pathology of Lahore’s public safety problem

One of Lahore’s main public safety problems is the high incidence of property-related victimization. The Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives’ (IDEAS) Lahore Crime Victimization Survey (CVS) shows that victimization is dominated by theft, robbery and vehicle snatching. **This suggests that crime against property is the main public safety challenge in Lahore.**

How large is the economic cost associated with property-related victimization? The Lahore CVS calculates the “magnitude of loss” as victim-reported values of appropriated property as a percentage of their monthly earnings (Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Magnitude of Economic Loss Suffered from Victimization**




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: To measure the value of appropriated property from victimization the survey asked respondents the following question: “In case any of your property was taken away during the crime, what was its value?”

Almost half of victims incur a magnitude of economic loss that is at least 60% of their monthly earnings. More than one-third of victims suffer a magnitude of economic loss higher than their monthly income.<sup>2</sup> **This finding shows that the losses associated with incidents of property crime in Lahore are large and involve significant costs for those who suffer from these incidents.**

Different neighborhoods are not equally susceptible to crime and victimization in Lahore. Our survey finds increasing victimization in neighborhoods that are commercialized. From residential to mixed commercial and residential neighborhoods, the victimization rate increases by 5%. Moving from residential to commercial neighborhoods, that rate doubles to 10% (Figure 4). **This suggests that victimization tends to concentrate in commercial neighborhoods, which have emerged as Lahore’s hubs of criminal activity.**

**Figure 4: Local Commercial Density and Victimization Rates**



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.


Notes: (1) The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval. The error bars show that 95% confidence intervals for different locality types do not overlap and hence the victimization rate in mixed and commercial neighborhoods is statistically different from that found in residential neighborhoods; (2) Neighborhoods where a majority of respondents are engaged in commercial activity are classified as “commercial”, neighborhoods where a majority reside are classified as “residential” and the remaining neighborhoods are classified as “mixed”.

<sup>2</sup> Median earnings in our sample are Rs. 30,000 (USD 300) per month.

# The challenge of low citizen trust in the police

The low level of trust reposed by citizens in the police is a major challenge for policing in Lahore (Figure 5a and 5b).<sup>3</sup> Less than one-fourth of our respondents agree that the Lahore police are trustworthy, which doesn't compare favorably to citizen trust in the police in the U.S. and in London (Figure 5a).

**Figure 5a: Citizen Trust in the Police in Lahore, urban U.S. and London**




**Source:** The Lahore rates were calculated from the IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016. U.S. rates can be found in Tyler et. al. (2015)<sup>4</sup>. The London rates are reported by the Mayor of London Office for Policing and Crime Report 2016. Generalized trust was measured in Lahore by asking citizens how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement that “the Lahore police are trustworthy” Respondents in the U.S. and London were asked, “How much confidence do you have in the local police?”

More importantly, trust in the police is much lower among those who have experienced the criminal justice system, i.e. citizens who have suffered victimization and either used the system or considered using it (Figure 5b). **This suggests that trust in the police is lower among prospective users of the criminal justice system compared to the average citizen, which represents a challenge for the police as an institution.**

<sup>3</sup> We measure trust by asking citizens whether they strongly agree or agree with the statement that “the Lahore police are trustworthy”. We use the same question as Jackson et. al. (2014) to measure generalized trust in the police.

<sup>4</sup> Tyler, T. R., Goff, P. A. and R. J. MacCoun (2015) “The Impact of Psychological Science on Policing in the United States: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and Effective Law Enforcement,” *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, 16(3), pp. 75-109.

**Figure 5b: Citizen Trust in Police in Lahore among Victims and Non-Victims**



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) Generalized trust is measured by asking citizens how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement that “the Lahore police are trustworthy”. The data in the figure on the left represents strong agreement or agreement to this question. (2) The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval.

The paradox is that low levels of citizen trust in the police co-exist with citizen perceptions that public safety has improved in their neighborhood during the past year. A majority of Lahore CVS respondents (over 80%) report that public safety has improved over the last year regarding both violent and property victimization in their neighborhood.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, even though Lahore has a lower victimization rate compared to London and U.S. cities (Figure 2), it does much worse on citizen perceptions of trust than these cities.

## What underpins poor citizen perceptions of the police?

The big challenge facing the police is that a minority of our respondents considers it procedurally fair<sup>6</sup> (less than 30%) and an even smaller minority (less than 15%) views it as honest<sup>7</sup> (Figure 6). We also find that citizens’ perceptions of the police in terms of procedural fairness and honesty are worse than their perceptions of police effectiveness (around 50% of respondents).<sup>8</sup> Citizens also have a strong perception that

<sup>5</sup> The IDEAS Lahore CVS asked respondents the following questions: (1) “Think now about violent crime in this area, I mean attacks on people like shootings, stabbings, and rapes. Would you say that during the past year things have been getting better or worse as compared to the previous year?” and (2) “Think now about property crime in this area – crimes involving property like burglary, auto theft, and vandalism. Would you say that during the past year things have been getting better or worse as compared to the previous year?” Respondents were asked to give responses using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1=much better, 3=the same and 5=much worse.


<sup>6</sup> We measure procedural fairness through an index based on respondent agreement or strong agreement with the following statements: (1) “The police treat everyone with respect”, (2) “The police treat people they suspect of breaking the law harshly” (3) “The police respects people’s rights” (4) “The police clearly explain the reasons for their actions”. We also measured victim disagreement with the following statement: “The police enjoy pushing people around and giving them a hard time.” We use a similar set of questions to measure citizens’ perception of procedural fairness as Jackson et. al. (2014).

<sup>7</sup> We measure citizen perception about corruption on the basis of strong agreement or agreement with the statement that “the Lahore police are usually honest.” We use a similar question to measure citizens’ perception of honesty as Jackson et. al. (2014).

<sup>8</sup> We measure police effectiveness through an index based on respondent agreement or strong agreement with the following statements: (a) “The police are well trained to pursue criminals”, (b) “The police responds promptly to calls about crimes”, (c) “The police reach there where you need them”, (d) “The police are always able to provide the assistance the public needs from them”, (e) “The police does well at controlling violent crime” and (f) “The police does well at controlling property crime.” We use a similar set of questions to measure

the police and its procedures are biased in favor of the wealthy and the connected (over 60% of respondents, see Figure 7). This shows that in addition to improving police effectiveness, an important part of the answer of building citizen trust in the police lies in improving citizen perceptions about the police’s procedural fairness and honesty.

**Figure 6: Citizen Views of Police Effectiveness, Honesty and Procedural Fairness in Lahore**




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) The survey measures citizens’ perceptions of police effectiveness through respondents’ strong agreement and agreement with the following statements on a 5-point Likert scale where 1=strongly agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 5=strongly disagree: (a) “The police are well-trained to pursue criminals”, (b) “The police responds promptly to calls about crimes”, (c) “The police arrive where you need them”, (d) “The police are always able to provide the assistance the public needs from them”, (e) “The police does well at controlling violent crime” and (f) “The police is good at controlling property crime.”. (2) The respondents are asked the following question: “Do you think the Lahore police is usually honest?” Responses are coded on a 5-point Likert scale where 1=strongly agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree and 5=strongly disagree. (3) The survey measures procedural fairness through respondents’ agreement with the following statements on a 5-point Likert scale where 1=strongly agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree and 5=strongly disagree: (a) “The police treat everyone with respect”, (b) “The police treats people they suspect of breaking the law harshly” (c) “The police respects people’s rights” (d) “The police clearly explain the reasons for their actions”. Respondents are also asked if they disagree with the following statement: (a) “The police enjoy pushing people around and giving them a hard time”.

citizens’ perception of procedural fairness as Jackson, J., Asif, M., Bradford, B. and Zakar, M. Z. (2014). “Corruption and Police Legitimacy in Lahore, Pakistan”, *British Journal of Criminology*, 54(6),1067-1088.

**Figure 7: Citizen-identified Factors that Inform Police Bias**




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: The survey measures citizens' perception of police bias by asking their views on the qualities belonging to citizens that they think influence how the police treat them.

What is worrying is that perceptions are worse on all three measures – procedural fairness, honesty and effectiveness – among citizens who have suffered victimization compared to citizens who have not suffered victimization (Figure 8). Even more worrying is the fact that perceptions of police effectiveness fall drastically among prospective users of the criminal justice system (victims) than other citizens (non-victims). **This suggests that any attempts to build trust between citizens and the police must be based on real reforms of the criminal justice system, its institutional framework and its processes.**

**Figure 8: Perceptions of Police Effectiveness, Honesty and Procedural Fairness in Lahore among Victims and Non-Victims**



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: See the note of Figure 6.

# Do citizen perceptions correspond to actual outcomes?

The question of whether perceptions of the police correspond with outcomes is important because it would determine if policies should focus on tangible reforms or improving the police's public image. The most important process outcome for victims is the registration of first information reports (FIRs).<sup>9</sup> It is only after an FIR is registered that the police takes up investigation. We find that only 7% of the victimization incidents reported by citizens in our survey are registered as FIRs by the police in Lahore. The FIR registration rate<sup>10</sup> in Lahore is much smaller than the crime registration rate<sup>11</sup> found in the urban U.S. (19%) and in London (42%). However, it is similar to the rate found in Delhi (Table 1).

**Table 1: Registration Rates in Global Comparison**

	Victimization Rate (per 100,000) [1]	Police reported crime rate (per 100,000) [2]	Registration rate ([2] as % of [1])
Lahore	12,100	780	6.4%
Delhi	14,128	843	6%
Mumbai	16,468	127	0.7%
Urban U.S.	15,810	3074	19.4%
London	16,300	6890	42.2%

**Source:** (1) The Lahore rates were calculated from the IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey 2016-17 and the Lahore Police FIR data from 2015. (2) The Delhi and Mumbai rates were calculated based on the report, Crime Victimization and Safety Perception: A Public Survey of Delhi and Mumbai, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2015 and data from the National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Crime in India 2015. (3) The urban U.S. rates were calculated on the basis of NCVS Victimization Analysis Tool, (<http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=navat>), Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2014 and FBI, Crime in the U.S., 2014. (4) The London rates were calculated based on Crime in England and Wales: Bulletin Tables, Office of National Statistics, U.K., 2016 and Office for National Statistics, U.K., Crime in England and Wales, Police Force Area Tables and Annual Trends and Demographics 2016.

**Note:** (1) The victimization rate is calculated by dividing the number of respondents to the Lahore CVS who report being a victim of any category of crime over the 12 months prior to the survey by the total number of respondents of the relevant survey. (2) The police-reported crime rate is the total number of registered crime cases for a relevant jurisdiction divided by the population of the relevant jurisdiction. In the case of Lahore, Delhi and Mumbai this is crime cases registered as FIRs. Both indicators are normalized per 100,000 population.

It appears that low registration is a tenacious problem in South Asian mega-cities. Equally worrying is the fact that approximately 20% of respondents whose complaints were recorded by the police had no knowledge of the outcome of the registration process. **Having the police register crimes and institutionalize a citizen-responsive process of FIR registration is a persistent challenge. This finding suggests reforming criminal justice system must prioritize the FIR registration stage.**

Our survey asked respondents whose complaint did not get recorded to suggest up to three reasons why they thought their complaint was not recorded. The top three reasons relate to: incentives in the current policing system to under-report crime, complexity and ad-hoc nature of the process and general unwillingness in the city police to register cases (Figure 9). **This suggests that fixing the registration process necessitates reforming incentives of police officers involved in the registration process and institutionalizing**

<sup>9</sup> The process from reporting to registration entails two steps: getting a complaint or incident recorded by the police and the registration of a first information report (FIR). An FIR is a written document prepared by the police, pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and Police Rules 1934, after they receive information about the commission of a cognizable offense. An FIR is different from complaints or incident reporting. Complaints or incident reporting implies communicating an allegation that is made orally or in writing, and is meant to be recorded in the daily diary of the Police. Complaints may or may not be converted into an FIR.


<sup>10</sup> The registration rate is defined as registered FIRs (reported by the police) as a percentage of victimization incidents reported in our crime victimization survey.

<sup>11</sup> The rate of crime registration is defined as crime incidents (registered by the relevant police service) as a percentage of victimization incidents reported in the relevant crime survey.



standardized, transparent processes that allow citizens to raise red flags early. Since the registration process is institutionalized at police stations, they will require structural reform.

**Figure 9: Top Reason for Police Failure to Record Complaints**




Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: The IDEAS Lahore CVS asked the following question; "In your opinion, what are the top three reasons the police didn't record your complaint?" Responses were then grouped into different categories. We report the results for the top three categories of responses. The sample size responding to this question is 87, which is 30% of the 289 respondents who attempted to have their complaint recorded.

We also find that complainants (respondents who suffer a victimization incident and whose complaint application was recorded by the police although an FIR may or may not have been registered) face acute post-registration challenges due to pending cases and weak information about case progress. We find that almost 65% of the complainants in our survey have cases that were pending from six months to one year and had not been concluded. We also find that 20% of complainants had no information about the progress of their case. This suggests that a large proportion of complainants are disengaged from the criminal justice process, which can cause considerable uncertainty and frustration. This is also likely to weaken the accountability of police officers to complainants. **Low registration rates and high case pendency remain reform challenges for the police.**

Regarding police honesty, our survey asked respondents the number of times the police demanded unofficial payments from them over the last year. 20% of our sample reports such a demand being made by the police during this period. What is worrying is that over 50% of complainants report having direct experience with unofficial payments (Figure 10). We find that this percentage more than halves for non-complainants (respondents who did not suffer any victimization during this period or suffered victimization and either didn't report the incident to the police or whose complaint was not recorded). This means that citizen exposure to unofficial payments rises significantly as soon as citizens start using the criminal justice process. We also find that the main difference in the reasons for paying unofficial payments between complainants and non-complainants relates to the registration of crime with the police. **Again, these findings suggest that a poor citizen perception of honesty remains a challenge for the police.**

**Figure 10: Direct Experience of Unofficial Payment asked by Police between Complainants and Non-Complainants**



Source: IDEAS Lahore Crime Victimization Survey, 2016.

Note: (1) The survey measured respondents’ direct experience with police corruption by asking, “How many times have the police demanded an official payment from them during the last 12 months?” The sample size responding to this question is 5040, (2) Complainants are victims whose complaint application was recorded by the police during the past 12 months (an FIR may or may not have been registered) and non-complainants are respondents who did not suffer any victimization during this period or who suffered victimization and didn’t report the incident or whose complaint wasn’t recorded by the police, (3) The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval.

**These findings suggest that improving the FIR registration process must be a core objective of police reforms. This will require restructuring the incentives and processes at police stations.** This evidence also points to the fact that recent and often ambitious reform efforts (such as those enacted as part of the Police Order 2002 and the recent interventions centered on information technology) have left the colonial institutional framework intact at the police station level. This is a major hindrance for citizens’ access to the justice system at a time when the need for its services is growing.

## How effective is deterrence in Lahore?

The ability of the criminal justice system to create deterrence is recognized as an important determinant of criminal activity (Becker 1968<sup>12</sup> and Ehrlich 1996<sup>13</sup>). Deterrence is argued to affect crime rates by altering the costs and benefits of committing crime. However, recent literature argues that that urbanization is likely to “lower the costs of crime by lowering the probability of arrest and the probability of punishment conditional on arrest” (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1999)<sup>14</sup>. This argument rests on the assumption that the effectiveness of detection declines in urban areas because greater anonymity in these areas increases the cost of detection and apprehension.

<sup>12</sup> Becker, G.S. (1968) “Crime and punishment: An Economic Approach,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 76(2), pp. 169-217.

<sup>13</sup> Ehrlich, I. (1996) “Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses.” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 10(1), pp. 43-67.

<sup>14</sup> Glaeser, E. L., and Sacerdote. B. (1999) “Why Is There More Crime in Cities?” *Journal of Political Economy*, 107(6), pp. 225-258.

How effective is deterrence in Lahore? We analyze this question in a companion paper<sup>15</sup> that estimates the relative effect of deterrence (proxied by the district-level per capita incarceration rate) on per capita crime rates in urban versus rural districts using a 25-year district-level panel data set. If deterrence is effective, we should find a negative relationship between our district-level measure of deterrence and change in district-level crime. We find that the incarceration rate has a negative relationship with the crime rate for all our district categories except the large city districts like Lahore, where it has no significant effect. This suggests that incarceration isn't having a significant effect on crime reduction in Lahore.

This could be due to factors muting the effect of deterrence in a large city context. It is well-recognized that anonymity is higher in metropolitan cities, and this has consequences for the effectiveness of criminal justice outcomes (Glaeser and Sacerdote 1996<sup>16</sup>, Wilson and Herrnstein 1995<sup>17</sup>). Putnam (1993)<sup>18</sup> and Wirth (1938)<sup>19</sup> argue that community-based sanctions are less effective in cities because people are more transient and anonymous, and in turn the cohesiveness of communities is weaker. An important underlying channel of weak deterrence in urban contexts is the lack of knowledge about perpetrators among victims and communities, which makes it harder to identify and apprehend perpetrators. If this is the case, it would imply a significant challenge for the reactive model of policing.

The IDEAS Lahore CVS provides support for the hypothesis that victims lack information about their perpetrators and that this has adverse effects on deterrence. It finds that only 19% of respondents who suffered victimization had any information about their perpetrator. It also finds that for criminal cases that have been reported and subsequently marked as closed investigations by the police, arrest rates drop when there is less information about perpetrators. The arrest rate is close to 80% in cases where victims have information about their perpetrator and this percentage falls to around 20% in cases where victims did not have any relevant information. **These findings suggest that paucity of information about perpetrators in a large city context – what we call the “urban anonymity challenge” – is an important factor weakening judicial deterrence in large cities like Lahore. These findings suggest that a challenge for public safety policy is to devise innovative strategies to improve deterrence in an urban context where information about offenders is sparse (what we refer to as the urban anonymity challenge) and judicial deterrence is weak.**

## Insights for future reform

### Smart prevention and unleashing the potential of the IC3 technology in Lahore

An important challenge for reformers is to suggest innovative interventions to strengthen deterrence in an environment where information about offenders with victims and the police is sparse. We argue that the police need to innovate and move beyond the traditional model of reactive policing and build the capacity for proactive, preventive patrolling in Lahore that seeks to alter the cost and benefit of criminal activity in neighborhoods with high commercial density.

We recommend that the center piece of this innovative approach should be saturated patrol and hot-spot policing. The criminology literature suggests that the “effectiveness of the hot-spots policing approach has strong empirical support” (Weisburd and Eck 2004).<sup>20</sup> Saturated patrolling and hot-spot policing in Lahore

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<sup>15</sup> Cheema, A.; Hameed, Z. and Naseer, M. F. (2017) “Safeguarding Pakistanis: Punjab’s Crime Problem, its Pathology and Priority for Action,” Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives Working Paper No: 01-17.

<sup>16</sup> Glaeser, E. L., and Sacerdote, B. (1999) “Why Is There More Crime in Cities?” *Journal of Political Economy*, 107(6), pp. 225-258.

<sup>17</sup> Wilson, J. Q. and Herrnstein, R. J. (1985) *Crime and Human Nature*. Simon and Schuster, New York

<sup>18</sup> Putnam, R. (1993) *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton University Press.

<sup>19</sup> Wirth, L. (1938). Urbanism as a Way of Life. *American Journal of Sociology*, 44(1), 1-24.

<sup>20</sup> Weisburd, David, and John E. Eck. (2004) “What can police do to reduce crime, disorder, and fear?” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 593(1), 42-65.

should target local areas with high commercial density. The case for this intervention is strengthened by the fact that crime tends to concentrate in localities with high commercial density. It also makes sense because the challenge of urban anonymity (sparse information about offenders) appears to lower the effectiveness of investigation and prosecution outcomes.

Forward-looking interventions in the city police should leverage the impressive public investment made by the Government of Punjab in PPIC3 Lahore, a global standard technological capability that integrates calls for service, real-time surveillance using CCTVs and mobile cameras and rapid response units tied to a dispatch centre. This has enhanced the Lahore police's capacity for smart preventive patrolling and policing. However, unleashing the true potential of IC3 will require a number of complementary interventions in the absence of which it will simply be acting as a supplier of information to an unreformed institutional system that is struggling to cope with the demands of policing in a rapidly evolving urban context.

These complementary interventions include institutionalizing an automatic registration system for FIRs at the IC3 level in cases of crime against property where no one is nominated. This will reduce the transaction costs associated with registration for a large proportion of victims, enable rapid mobilization of resources and swift response. This solution also addresses conventional concerns that automatic registration will lower the cost of frivolous cases and lead to an abuse of process. Creating a rapid responsive service will require integrating adequate patrolling resources into the IC3 system.

There is a need to formulate and institutionalize a policy of "graded response". The policy should provide a framework for assigning calls to emergency response (which must be attended immediately), incidents where a delayed response in person is appropriate and incidents that only require a response by phone. There is also a need to institutionalize a proactive advisory helpline to guide victims through the criminal justice process, give advice about the most appropriate course of action and connect them to available legal resources.

A performance monitoring and reward system for patrol officers that sets clear objectives must also be a priority. This will require defining measurable targets that are tightly defined, set in context of the area's crime and incident patterns, specify the location and time when problems occur and define the scale of the problem.

Some of these measures have already been introduced by the Punjab Police.<sup>21</sup> The remaining challenge is their effective institutionalization and implementation at scale. However, it is important to recognize that the effects of these measures will be attenuated in the absence of reforms of the registration process and the incentive system at the level of the police station.

## Community policing in criminogenic localities

Our findings suggest that it will be difficult for the police to undertake smart and targeted prevention at scale without working closely with communities that inhabit criminogenic neighborhoods. In our view, community policing in commercial neighborhoods must be central to achieving deterrence and building trust between citizens and the police. The key is to tie the outputs of surveillance and information to a community-informed response system targeting criminogenic areas. To achieve this, we recommend that the Government of Punjab devise a grant system to incentivize coordinated responses between the police and the community.

## Police station reforms to build trust in and legitimacy of the police

Our evidence suggests that unreformed police stations are imposing excessive costs on complainants and could be an important factor underpinning weak deterrence. A first step at reform is institutionalizing a

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<sup>21</sup> For a review of recently introduced interventions see MIT Technology Review Pakistan (2017) *Transforming Policing Through Technology*, ITU, Punjab.

citizen-responsive process of FIR registration will require structural reforms of the police station as an institution. This is because the current system of registration and investigation is embedded in police stations. Feedback from our respondents shows the distortions resulting from poor incentives to register crime and processing cases in a timely fashion as well as the complexity and ad-hoc nature of processes. Feedback from the police highlights distortions caused by inadequate budgets for investigation and human capital challenges. A comprehensive reform of the police station as an institution will require enhanced fiscal support, investment in building human capital, restructuring the performance incentives of station house officers and institutionalizing standardized processes that are transparent, embed citizen feedback and are tied to the performance-based accountability of officers. This large-scale reform requires further diagnostic work – on the adequacy of budgets, distortions in performance incentives and the nature of human capital challenges – to build a consensus on how to best address these challenges.