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Brief 67: The Oversight of Corruption and Inefficiency in Local Public Works in Peru

These 200 districts were randomly assigned to either control or treatment, with half in each category. The districts in the treatment group received a total of four letters over the course of fourteen months. In October 2015, Proética sent the first letters warning that it would be using INFObras to monitor the execution of local public works. Soon after, the Office of the Comptroller General mailed letters of its own to let the mayors know that the anticorruption agency was actively coordinating with Proética on the monitoring of public works.

Brief 56: Reporting Corruption in Nigeria: Testing the Effects of Norms & Nudges

The study was conducted in four states of the Niger Delta (Akwa Ibom, Bayela, Delta, and Rivers). Within those states, sample communities were selected based on the GPS coordinates of mobile phone towers. The study was conducted in 106 communities selected such that they were sufficiently separated to avoid spillovers. Two surveys (baseline and endline) were conducted in each community with approximately 15 randomly-selected individuals.


Brief 26: FDI and Bribery in Vietnam

To test their theory, researchers employed original, firm-level survey experiments, conducted annually for three years starting in 2010. More than 19,000 domestic firms and nearly 4,000 foreign investment enterprises were contacted, all of which had registered after 2000. These firms were randomly divided into two groups: those who’d receive “form A” and those who’d receive “form B”. Both forms contained a list of four common activities related to business registration– “Hired a local consulting/law firm to obtain the license…” being one example.


Brief 17: Corruption in Mexico


The treatment consisted of citizen exposure to information about the use of FISM funding for public goods that was collected by the audit agency in 2007. The audits revealed that mayors did not spend all the money they received from FISM, that they did not spend all of the money in poor areas, and that in average 30% of funds were spent in a corrupt manner. The researchers show that only 10% of voters had been aware of the existence of FISM prior to their intervention.


Brief 16: Spillover Effects of Observers in Ghana

The authors designed and implemented a randomized field experiment to test two hypotheses: first, areas with observers should have smaller increases in registrations than areas without observers. Second, areas without observers located near observed areas should have larger increases in registrations than those that are far away from observed areas. Four of the ten regions in Ghana were selected, including Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Greater Accra, and Northern Regions (see map below), to cover a wide range of constituencies and incumbent and opposition strongholds.


Brief 14: The Truth Behind Anonymous Shell Companies

Overall, the authors found that international policies mandating shell companies collect proof of identity from their customers are ineffective. Half (48%) of all responses to the thousands of emails sent failed to demand proper identification. And half of those (22%) requested no identifying documents of any kind at all. The full results can be found in Table 2 below.


Brief 13: Reducing Clientelism in Benin

In his 2001 experiment, Wantchekon assigned 24 villages to receive one of two kinds of electoral campaigns: a ‘clientelistic’ campaign, with handouts of gifts and promises of material favors in exchange for votes; and a ‘programmatic’ campaign, in which candidates promised to implement broad policy programs that would benefit the nation as a whole. The researchers compared the share of votes obtained by candidates in the treated villages with their results in other villages in which they ran their election campaign as usual.


Brief 11: Election Observers and Fraud in Ghana

The researchers partnered with CODEO and assigned 1,000 of CODEO’s 4,000 election monitors in a randomized saturation experimental design.  The researchers randomly assigned constituencies to receive observers at 30%, 50%, or 80% of their polling stations, and then randomly assigned the observers to the individual polling stations within the constituencies.  This process – randomly assigning both the observers and the saturation rate – allows them to measure two types of effects: 1) whether fraud decreases at the observed polling places compared with control l


Brief 09: Electoral Responses to Corruption Revelations

This study relies on the timing of the audits relative to the October 2004 municipal elections. The treatment group consists of the 205 municipalities that were audited before the election and the control group consists of the 168 villages that were audited between October 2004 and July 2005. The treatment is therefore the exposure of corruption (or lack thereof) within municipal governments before the election.