



DfID SDG16 Event | 9 December 2015

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Experimental Research

The big idea:

- Understanding social processes is very often rendered difficult or impossible because of **confounding**.
 - For example, perhaps good institutions cause growth, but perhaps it is the other way around, or perhaps other third things cause both good institutions and growth.
- You can essentially **eliminate confounding** concerns by linking research to randomized interventions.
 - This makes sure that (in expectation), treatment and comparison groups differ *only* with respect to the intervention you care about.
- Experimentation is **not** (primarily) a **measurement strategy**, it is an **inference strategy**.
 - It can be combined with quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods measurement.

Illustrations: Countering Vote Buying

- **Question.** Vote buying works by creating an **implicit contract** between buyers and voters. Can characterizing vote-buyers as dishonest break the sense of obligation?
- **Intervention:** Non-partisan radio campaigns used in **India** airing ads in 5 languages on 60 stations
- **Results:** Campaigns results in 7 point drop in vote share of vote buying party (measured using official data)
- **Source:** [Green and Vasudevan \(2015\)](#)

Illustrations: Countering electoral fraud

- **Question:** Can simple ICT technologies reduce the incentives of polling officials to engage in fraud?
- **Intervention:** Letters sent to polling officials in **Uganda** saying tallies would be photographed and compared against official results
- **Results:** The letters:
 - increased the frequency of posted tallies by polling center managers in compliance with the law
 - decreased fraud as measured by the sequential digits found on tallies
 - decreased the vote share for the incumbent president
- **Source:** Callen and Gibson 2015

Illustrations: Preventing participation in Conflict

- **Question:** Can engaging vulnerable youth in economic programs make them less likely to engage in armed conflict?
- **Intervention:** post conflict skills training program administered in northern **Liberia** to a random sample of vulnerable youths.
- **Results:** Along with economic gains, program participants were less likely to make contact with agents recruiting for fighters to go to war in neighboring Cote d'Ivoire
- **Source:** Blattman 2014

Illustrations: Clientelism and Deliberation

- **Question:** Can campaign strategies that employ more programmatic policy platforms benefit politicians and reduce clientelistic campaigning?
- **Intervention:** Town hall meetings discuss candidate platforms in random samples of villages in **Benin**
- **Results:** Turnout unaffected, clientelism reduced, vote share of dominant candidates weakened
- **Source:** Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2015)

Illustrations: Electoral rules & the quality of governance

- **Question:** Do **electoral rules** affect what kind of politicians get elected and how well they perform?
- **Intervention:** As part of **Afghanistan** CDD intervention, there was variation in whether single member or multi member districts were used for electing village representatives.
- **Results:** Representatives elected in elections with a multi-member district are **better educated** and exhibit **less extreme policy preferences**
- **Source:** **Beath et al 2014**

Illustrations: Community monitoring of service providers

- **Question:** Can local oversight improve the quality of health service delivery?
- **Intervention:** Community interface meetings with clinics and communities with goal setting and citizen oversight
- **Result:** Massive reductions in **child mortality** and increases in child weight
- **Source:** Bjorkman and Svensson 2009

Illustrations: Experiments as measurement devices

- Sensitive items, such as support for extremist groups (Pakistan)
- Collective action capacity (Liberia)
- Social Cohesion (Nepal)
- Electoral Fraud (Ghana)
- Discrimination (Many “audit” studies)

But also many negative results:

- There is little evidence that **CDR** programs produce any of the social benefits claimed for them
- Electoral observers **displace fraud** to neighboring unvisited areas
- Although more **information** about political corruption can sometimes result in less support for corrupt politicians, it can also **depress political engagement**
- Participation in decision making may often be only **performative**
- **Many interventions we thought would work don't seem very reliable**

And many areas with very little evidence

- Are **demobilization and reintegration** programs effective?
- When does **decentralization** improve the quality of government?
- **Comparative interventions:** Is CDR more or less effective than empowering the state?

And *very* few areas with consolidation of evidence

- CDR is one of the few areas where multiple RCTs have sought to address the same question.
 - But even these examine different versions using different measures.
- More generally, the lack of replication raises real concerns around **external validity**
- EGAP *metaket*as seek to address this problem

What is a “Metaketa”?

- Strategy to seek generalizable answers to major questions of scholarly and policy importance
- Integrated research programs
- Independent teams of researchers, open calls
- Projects in parallel around the world
- Integrated inferences

What problem does a Metaketa solve?

- Incentives for individual researchers do not necessarily generate the optimal set of studies for knowledge accumulation
 - Publication bias
 - Little replication of existing studies
 - Value of being first
 - Little coordination across countries, even with similar interventions
 - Persistent bias against policy relevance

Five pillars

1. **major themes:** major questions of scholarly and policy relevance
2. **collaboration and competition:** teams work on parallel projects, they collaborate on design but may produce conflicting results
3. **comparable interventions** and outcomes: differences in results attributable to contextual factors and not to differences in design
4. **analytic transparency:** analytic transparency: design registration, open materials, and third-party analysis prior to publication
5. **formal synthesis** based on ex-ante planning and integrated publication to avoid file-drawer bias

Current Round


- Fund and coordinate a series of experimental projects that assess the role of **information** in improving political **representation** in developing countries
- Administered by the Center on the Politics of Development at UC Berkeley
- Fall 2013 through Spring 2018
- \$1.8 million grant

Substantive and Policy Motivation

- **Many practitioners and theorists** emphasize the need for **high quality public information** on the performance of politicians. **An informed electorate is at the heart of liberal theories of democratic practice.**
- But does information **really make a difference** in institutionally weak environments?
 - Does it lead to the rewarding of good performance at the polls or are voting decisions going to be dominated by ethnic ties and clientelistic relations?
- ***Where and when*** is it most likely to make a difference?

Project	Title	PIs	Information on...	Method
Benin	Can Common Knowledge Improve Common Goods?	Adida, Gottlieb, McClendon, &Kramon	legislative performance of deputies in the National Assembly	Legislator performance info provided publicly or privately and a civics message
Mexico	Common Knowledge, Relative Performance, & Political Accountability	Larreguy, Arias, Querubin, & Marshall	corruption and the misuse of public funds by local government officials	Leaflets distr. door-to-door vs. leaflets w/cars using loudspeakers
India	Using Local Networks to Increase Accountability	Chauchard &Sircar	financial crimes against Members of the state assembly	Door-to-door campaigns vs. public rallies
Brazil	Accountability & Incumbent Performance in Brazilian Northeast	Hidalgo, Boas, & Melos	performance gathered from audit reports of the local government	Report cards & an oral message
Burkina Faso	Citizens at the Council	Lierl & Holmlund	service delivery by the municipal government	Scorecard vs. attending local council meeting
Uganda I	Information & Accountability in Primary & General Elections	Raffler &Platas Izama	service delivery by the local government	Recorded candidate statements viewed publicly &privately
Uganda II	Repairing Information Underload	Nielson, Buntaine, Bush, Pickering & Jablonski	service delivery by the local government/ variation in info effect if \$ from foreign donors?	Information sent by SMS to randomly sampled households.

Timeline



Learning and learning about learning

- Bonus:
 - Cross-validation analysis strategy designed to assess what we learn from any subset of studies about the other studies --- provides a strategy to answer whether inferences have external validity
 - Experimental stage to assess whether and what policy makers learn from these studies

Possible Future Metaketas

- **Community monitoring:** Where and when does community monitoring improve local service delivery?
- **Corruption:** What type of auditing strategies are most effective at reducing political corruption?
- **Taxation:** Does decentralization of tax raising authority strengthen local government?
- **Natural Resources:** Can increased scrutiny of resource contracting reduce adverse effects of resource extraction at local or national levels?
- **Post conflict stability:** Do post conflict reintegration programs reduce conflict risks?

Challenges to Implementing Metaketas

- May require complex **partnerships**:
 - Some may be within control of **researchers** (eg Information Campaigns)
 - Some may require coordination with **practitioners** (eg Development Projects)
 - Some require coordination with **governments** (eg tax regimes, bureaucratic reforms)
- Require minimal **homogeneity** of interventions across contexts
- Require minimal “**power**”. Current aims of 6 or 7 are modest---especially give risks of failure of any individual study
- Both social scientists and practitioners have to really care about the answer

SDG 16 & EGAP

- Consciousness of the importance of SDG 16 on multiple levels:
 - Recognition of the **intrinsic importance** of governance outcomes
 - Possible integration of information on governance into **national data systems**
- Consciousness of the challenges:
 - Heightened need to identify **what works** in these areas
 - Heightened need to assess how best to **measure outcomes**