|Title||The Foundations of Social Policy Support: Experimental Evidence on How Institutional Quality Affects Redistributive Preferences|
|C1 Background and Explanation of Rationale||
We will conduct an experiment in the USA and Russia to see how tax evasion influences individual preferences for redistribution. We have 3 conditions: good institutions (no tax evasion), tax evasion with uniform audit risk, and tax evasion with variable audit risk. In each country, we assign 3 groups per condition for a total of 9 groups in each location. For each session, we anticipate roughly 12-15 students will participate. We will have up to 150 participants in each location meaning a maximum of 300 participants total. We expect that American participants will earn, on average, about $15-20 and that Russian participants will earn about 500 rubles (the equivalent of about $8-10). These are the standard compensation rates for experiments like this in each country.
|C2 What are the hypotheses to be tested?||
Hypothesis 1(Tax Evasion, Uniform Audit): Allowing tax evasion with a uniform risk of audit will lead to high rates of cheating and will undermine support for redistributing wealth from the common pot.
Hypothesis 2 (Tax Evasion, Variable Audit): Allowing tax evasion with a variable risk of audit will lead individuals with a low risk of audit to cheat a lot and support more redistribution and individuals with a high risk of audit to cheat less and support less redistribution.
Hypothesis 3 (Productivity x Risk of Audit): Generally, more productive individuals should prefer less redistribution according to the classic Meltzer-Richard model. We expect that the risk of audit and individual levels of productivity to have an interactive effect which alters this traditional expectation. Individuals who are highly productive and have a low risk of audit should be the most likely to cheat and prefer more redistribution because they benefit from both cheating and redistribution.
|C3 How will these hypotheses be tested? *||
In each session, participants will play 10 rounds (1 practice round and 9 actual rounds). We will follow the procedures described below.
In the good institutions condition,
In the first tax evasion treatment (uniform audit risk) of the game:
In the second tax evasion treatment (variable audit risk) of the game:
Note that it is important for this to be played as a game in which there are real consequences for a person’s compensation depending on how she and other group members play. There is evidence that simply setting up a hypothetical scenario will not produce realistic results. The game is designed to mimic a realistic situation in which there is a risk of unemployment and individuals vary in their productivity.
• Risk aversion (gambling game): asked before any of the other parts of the experiment
|C4 Country||USA, Russia|
|C5 Scale (# of Units)||not provided by authors|
|C6 Was a power analysis conducted prior to data collection?||No|
|C7 Has this research received Insitutional Review Board (IRB) or ethics committee approval?||Yes|
|C8 IRB Number||15-0462|
|C9 Date of IRB Approval||August 28, 2015|
|C10 Will the intervention be implemented by the researcher or a third party?||Researchers|
|C11 Did any of the research team receive remuneration from the implementing agency for taking part in this research?||No|
|C12 If relevant, is there an advance agreement with the implementation group that all results can be published?||not provided by authors|
|C13 JEL Classification(s)||not provided by authors|