

Pre-Analysis Plan:
“Fear and Politics in Divided Societies: Assessing the Foundations of Political Behavior in Lebanon.”

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1. Introduction

Much contemporary research on political behavior in the Middle East and other developing regions emphasizes the role of clientelism in structuring elections and politics. Yet there is good reason to think that other factors beyond clientelist transactions shape political behavior in important ways. In particular, we focus on the political effects of fear in the context of instability, violence and the erosion of political order - a set of conditions that is unfortunately increasingly common throughout the Middle East and North Africa and in other developing regions. In this context, millions of Iraqis, Syrians, Libyans, Yemenis and Lebanese, among others, live in a state of fear and uncertainty. What impact does this state of affairs have on political attitudes and behavior?

At the same time, new political movements and initiatives indicate that citizens across the region are craving an alternative to clientelist politics. For example, in Lebanon, the *Beirut Madinati* list was created to contest the May 2016 municipal elections, developing a comprehensive programmatic platform to offer a serious alternative to the standard sectarian parties that have had a lock on politics for decades (The Economist, 2016). In Jordan, the Ma’an Movement fielded candidates to present a secular alternative to the Islamic Action Front and to candidates who run on the basis of patronage and clientelism while the Shaghaf Movement, a grassroots youth movement, emerged to push for greater attention to programmatic issues in national politics (Plant, 2016).

In this research, we aim to move beyond the current prevailing conceptualization of politics in developing countries as short-term clientelist transactions to consider a range of alternative or additional material and nonmaterial factors that may affect political behavior. The relative importance of fear and promises of protection against threats by violent extremists is then compared to a range of other possible motivations driving support for politicians, including the receipt of distinct levels and types of clientelist

handouts and programmatic policy preferences, among other factors.

We use a conjoint survey experiment in Lebanon to test the influence of these distinct factors on citizen political behavior. In addition, we randomly assign some respondents to an exercise that induces a state of fear in order to test whether exposure to politically dangerous environments compels citizens to prioritize different aspects of a candidate's background and rhetoric. In the conjoint experiment, respondents are then asked to choose between two hypothetical political candidates whose values on a range of theoretically and empirically relevant attributes vary randomly. In each round of the experiment, respondents indicate which candidate they would support in a national electoral contest and how likely they would be to take part in a demonstration in support of each candidate. The data for the research will be derived from a nationally representative sample of approximately 2,400 households. The findings promise to contribute to diverse bodies of research on political behavior, the dynamics of clientelism, and political violence that resonate far beyond Lebanon and the Middle East and help to build a growing research agenda on the role of fear in driving political behavior in developing countries.

2. Hypotheses

Studies of electoral politics in consolidated democracies (Bartels, 1996; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & MacPhee, 1954; Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2004; Popkin, 1994; Rolfe, 2012; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1993) as well as prior research in Lebanon (Cammett, 2014, 12-13, ch. 6; Corstange, 2016a) and elsewhere in the Middle East (Blaydes, 2010; Lust-Okar, 2006) point to a broad range of potential motivations for voting and other forms of political behavior. In general, programmatic policy preferences and ideological predilections have received more attention in studies of the developed democracies while material exchanges or shared communal identity are key motivations highlighted in research on political behavior in the Middle East and other developing regions, as we note below.

In this project, we seek to push the agenda on political behavior in developing countries in several directions. First, we examine a broader portfolio of clientelist benefits than the forms of mobile, inexpensive goods that are distributed during elections and are emphasized in the current literature in order to capture the potential distinct effects of low- versus high-value clientelism. Second, we aim to explore the extent to which less commonly cited motivations beyond clientelism drive political participation in developing countries, and particularly to assess whether some types of citizens are more likely to be swayed by more programmatic appeals than others. Third, we seek to examine the ways in

which political instability and violence affect political attitudes and behavior. Finally, we aim to broaden the focus beyond voting to include participation in demonstrations, which represent a slightly more costly and active form of political behavior than casting a ballot. To advance this research agenda, we plan to test a range of hypotheses, which we detail below.

2.1. The varieties and limits of clientelism

The growing recognition that the holding of elections and the establishment of formal democratic institutions do not necessarily translate into high quality of democracy has led to renewed interest among political scientists in the dynamics and effects of patronage and clientelism in developing countries. Recent waves of scholarship tend to emphasize material exchanges, particularly as short-term or even one-shot transactions around electoral contests (Blaydes, 2010; Corstange, 2016b; Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, & Magaloni, 2016; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005; 2007; *inter alia*). However, this emphasis on the material linkages between politicians and citizens may capture only a truncated slice of factors shaping political behavior (Cammett, 2014; Greene, 2016; Szwarcberg, 2013; Weghorst & Lindberg, 2013), even among the poor, who are generally perceived as the most likely “clients” in the patron-client dyad (Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Weitz-Shapiro, 2014). A key dimension of this project therefore focuses on the political effects of distinct levels and types of clientelism as well as the relative importance of clientelism vis-à-vis other factors in garnering citizen support for candidates.

2.1.1 Levels and types of clientelism

Even if we accept that the receipt of tangible goods and services mobilizes voters, the current literature on clientelism is overly focused on short-term transactions during election cycles. As an earlier wave of research suggests (Auyero, 2001; Gellner, 1977; Lemarchand, 1972; Scott, 1969), clientelism is often more aptly conceived as a continuous relationship structuring social interactions among patrons and clients (Szwarcberg, 2012). When public welfare regimes are underdeveloped, parties and politicians can play a key role in assuring access to basic needs, including through programs and services that are ostensibly citizen entitlements but in practice operate more like club goods (Buchanan, 1965) or even private goods. Communal elites, too, can facilitate access to services or provide social assistance, either directly through ethnic or religious associations or by brokering access to benefits.

What impact, if any, do different types and levels of clientelist goods have on citizens? Are different categories of partisans swayed by different kinds of goods and services? For

example, prior research on Lebanon shows that ardent and loyal supporters enjoy relatively comprehensive social protection and higher value and more continuous services such as jobs, scholarships, housing, or medical care from sectarian parties and politicians. More marginal supporters or the politically uncommitted in electorally competitive districts are more likely to receive low value, one-shot goods such as fuel vouchers, cash and food boxes (Cammett, 2014; Corstange, 2016b) LCPS 2012). (See Table 1.)

Table 1: Citizen profiles and levels and types of benefits

	Low value benefits	High value benefits
Goods	Cash Telephone recharge cards Fuel vouchers Food or food vouchers Electricity supply <i>Non-supporters/swing voters</i> <i>Low-income supporters</i> <i>Potential voters with low social influence</i>	Payment of medical costs Educational scholarships <i>Low-income supporters</i> <i>Potential voters with high social influence</i>
Services	Passage through traffic checkpoints or cancellation of tickets Army post relocation <i>Middle and upper-income voters</i> <i>Supporters with high social influence</i>	Favorable judicial decisions Employment <i>Party activists</i> <i>Middle and upper-income voters</i> <i>Supporters with high social influence</i>

Table 1 depicts an array of goods and services that vary both in terms of their value and, in some cases, their distributional time horizons - that is, whether they are allocated on a one-time basis or continuously. The upper-left quadrant depicts the most low-value, short-term items, which we expect to sway marginal supporters or potential voters in the context of elections but will have less impact on established loyalists, who are already committed and may not need benefits to gain their support. In addition, only low-income individuals and families are likely to be moved by such minimal payouts. Conversely, the lower-right quadrant includes high value items with longer-term payoffs that, in some cases, may entail continuous interactions with party activists and institutions. Ardent loyalists or partisan activists with high social influence, who can mobilize broader support from their communities, are more likely to respond to these kinds of items, which tend to come in the form of services rather than goods or direct payments for benefits. In addition, middle- and upper-income citizens are more likely to respond to higher-value and continuous benefits. In short, we anticipate that citizens with distinct political profiles and socioeconomic

backgrounds will offer political support for candidates in response to different levels and types of goods and services.

These observations give rise to the following hypotheses:

H1a: Low-value, short-term clientelist distribution is more likely to affect electoral behavior than willingness to take part in demonstrations, while high-value, more continuous clientelist distribution should affect both outcomes.

H1b: In general, clientelist distribution is more likely to sway citizens with low socioeconomic status, but high-value clientelist distribution has broader effects.

H1c: Material benefits are less likely to influence core co-partisans but are more likely to move marginal activists and even non-partisans.

H1d: Core co-partisans are more likely to be moved by high-value material benefits.

2.1.2. Programmatic appeals

In studies of political behavior in the Middle East and in other developing regions, programmatic considerations do not seem to drive voter behavior. In general, parties are weak or nonexistent, legislatures tend to have little influence on actual policy-making, and platforms and policy stances do not figure prominently in campaign rhetoric across the region (Albrecht, 2008; Brown, 2002; Langohr, 2004; Lust-Okar, 2005). As a result, programmatic issues, such as attitudes towards redistribution or other general policy preferences, are not likely to drive political behavior. Nonetheless, it is worth investigating whether programmatic issues account for voting patterns at least among some citizens, as approaches to electoral politics in other contexts hold (Downs, 1957; Iversen, 1994; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Indeed, the results of the recent Beirut municipal elections, in which the newly created *Beirut Madinati* list captured 40 percent of the vote and posed a real challenge to well-entrenched sectarian elites (The Economist, 2016), indicate that more voters than expected are swayed by party and candidate positions on bread and butter issues such as employment, environmental issues or economic policies.¹ This is more likely to be the case among middle- and upper-income voters, who are less targeted by and

¹ *Beirut Madinati* was a volunteer-led electoral campaign developed to field candidates for the Beirut municipal elections held in May 2016. The premise behind the campaign was explicitly aimed at presenting a programmatic alternative to the major electoral lists fielded by established sectarian parties, which rely heavily on clientelist exchanges during elections for turnout and vote buying. The strong showing for the Beirut Madinati list, which won about 40 percent of votes and a victory in one electoral district within the city, indicates that there is significant support for candidates who run on programmatic rather than clientelist or other lines.

susceptible to material benefits offered by parties during electoral cycles, but programmatic appeals are likely to be more broadly resonant.

H2a: Respondents are more likely to vote for candidates with a detailed plan to address salient policy issues (such as job creation or waste management).

H2b: High SES respondents, who are less likely to be swayed by and integrated in clientelist networks, are more likely to vote for candidates with a detailed plan.

2.1.3. In-group protection

An emphasis on the exchange of economic and social benefits as a foundation for voting behavior may also obscure less overtly material motivations for political behavior, especially those that have emerged in the context of state breakdown and political violence. Since at least 2005, when the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri ushered in a period of intense political polarization and periodic waves of violence, Lebanon has been experiencing prolonged instability. The civil war raging in neighboring Syria has brought these tensions to new heights, at times threatening to engulf Lebanon in its own wave of full-scale violence. Given deep economic, political and social connections across the two countries, and a legacy of Syrian occupation, at times developments in Syria have spilled over into Lebanon via increased incidents of ostensibly sectarian political violence, massive refugee inflows, and cross-border movements of fighters (Cammett, 2013). Lebanon is by no means unique with respect to rising security threats. In other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and in parts of South Asia, Africa and Latin America, chronic political violence and instability has become a fact of life, at least in some sub-national regions. In these contexts, insecurity may affect political attitudes and behavior in profound ways, and may even trump other motivations in driving support for politicians.

Insecurity may compel people to support candidates who position themselves as defenders of the community. A large body of research in social psychology and related disciplines posits that people close ranks when they experience a threat to themselves as members of a group (Huddy, 2013; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005). Perceived threats to the in-group can also mobilize support during elections, compelling citizens to support politicians who explicitly highlight these threats and pledge to offer protection (Cho, Gimpel, & Wu, 2006). Under these circumstances, voters are more apt to vote for in-group politicians, especially when campaign rhetoric emphasizes these threats and underscores the imperative to protect the in-group.

Field research in Lebanon indicates that threat perceptions are a key driver of political

support, including voting behavior, among Lebanese citizens. In a focus group conducted in 2012 by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), voters expressed support for political parties that were considered to be protectors of the community, even when they disagreed with their policies. For their part, Lebanese political leaders liberally employ sectarian discourse to mobilize their constituencies. This approach positions candidates as indispensable to at least a segment of the electorate by offering a sense of security to their respective communities. Political parties therefore promote themselves as in-group guardians in order to maintain or whip up support or as an alternative to delivering social services or issuing programmatic appeals. For example, in a speech during the 2009 national elections, a Kataeb candidate, Jean Ogasapian, proclaimed: “They are preparing for a coup to abolish the national charter, and to changing the entire system as they are declaring in their speeches...Lebanon is in danger, and the republic is in danger, and our historical Christian political line is in danger.” Such blatant references to threats may have the added benefit of mobilizing broader support among in-group members - in this case, Christians - than reliance on the distribution of material benefits, which target more limited components of the community.

These findings generate several hypotheses related to the effects of promises of in-group protection on political attitudes and behavior:

H3a: Respondents favor candidates promising in-group protection over clientelist distribution, especially of low value goods and services.

H3b: Respondents favor candidates promising in-group protection over programmatic issues.

H3c: Respondents who express less tolerance for out-group members favor candidates promising in-group protection over programmatic and clientelist distribution, especially of low value goods and services.

2.2 The political utility of fear

Increased experiences and perceptions of threats are likely to shape political attitudes and behavior at the individual level. A growing literature in political science and psychology examines how insecurity affects individual preferences, showing that threat perceptions tend to increase support for authoritarian rulers or “strongmen” who promise protection, reduce support for civil liberties, and raise intolerance towards minorities and out-group members and towards those who hold distinct political ideologies (Burke, Kosloff, &

Landau, 2013; Davis & Silver, 2004; Foa & Mounk, 2016; Inglehart, 1997; Motyl, Hart, & Pyszczynski, 2010; Nacos, Bloch-Elkon, & Shapiro, 2011).

Evidence also suggests that threat perceptions have different effects on different people. For example, some studies show that individuals who are more sensitive to security concerns than others or people with different levels of education or socioeconomic status may favor distinct responses to threats such as terrorism (Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009; Huddy & Feldman, 2011). In addition, as noted above, the perception of being targeted as a member of a group heightens feelings of belonging in that group, thus potentially compelling citizens to support politicians who pledge to protect in-group members. In an essay on political identity and group cohesion, Huddy (2013, 17) notes, “An external threat enhances in-group solidarity and tightens in-group boundaries in direct proportion to the degree of threat.” Other research in political psychology indicates that in-group solidarity only generates negative attitudes towards an out-group in situations of perceived threat (Brewer, 1999, 435-436), increasing support for retaliation (Huddy et al., 2005, 593).

Emotions evoked in conflict, notably anger and fear, have been recognized as important in shaping political attitudes (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & De Rivera, 2007) but they are argued to have opposite effects on behavior. Anger prompts individuals to action and makes them more likely to make risk-seeking choices, whereas fear increases risk perception and risk aversion (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Young, 2016). For this reason, we focus on fear, which should increase the perception of threat and encourage citizens to favor candidates promising protection, particularly to in-group members.

Following gender role congruity theory (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Karau, 2002),² fear of political violence may also induce citizens to feel less confidence in female candidates, whom they view as less capable of offering protection against threats.

H4a: Treated respondents, or those who have been primed to feel fear, express lower support for candidates who promise clientelist distribution, especially of low value goods and services.

H4b: Treated respondents express more support for candidates who pledge to protect co-religionists.

² We are grateful to Lindsay Benstead and Kristen Kao for introducing us to research on gender role congruity theory (Benstead and Kao 2017).

H4c: Treated respondents express no or less support for candidates who pledge protection for out-group members, especially when the out-group has antagonistic relations with the in-group.

H4d: Treated respondents are more likely to vote for and take part in demonstrations for co-religionist candidates.

H4e: Treated respondents are less likely to support female candidates.

2.3 Additional attributes

2.3.1. Religion and co-religionism

Some voters may be swayed by the religious identities of politicians. Research on voting behavior in other contexts, including advanced, industrialized countries, suggests that religion can mobilize certain constituencies (Dalton & Welzel, 2014; De La O & Rodden, 2008; Margolis, 2014; Norris & Inglehart, 2011). In the Middle East and other Muslim-majority regions, it is often presumed that religion sways voters, although evidence from specialists strongly suggests that other considerations are more important, particularly with regard to political and economic concerns rather than social issues (Blaydes, 2010; Corstange, 2013; Lust-Okar, 2006; Masoud, 2014; Pepinsky, Liddle, & Mujani, 2012).

Still, citizens may support politicians who share the same religion out of a sense of linked fate (Dawson, 1994), or the notion that what is good for the group is a proxy for individual utility, particularly when official religious identity is a key building block of the political system as in Lebanon. Indeed, Lebanese politicians do sometimes explicitly emphasize their religious identities. For example, in a speech during the 2009 Lebanese national elections, Nayla Toueni, a Christian politician with the March 14th bloc, emphasized her Christian credentials and highlighted her personal connections to a respected religious authority figure after she faced accusations of conversion to Islam: “I am proud of my Christianity, of being an Orthodox, of belonging to the Church and of being the goddaughter of Bishop Audi.”

An additional or alternative reason why citizens support co-religionist politicians is the expectation of increased benefits. In this case, shared identity with party elites is a cue that the party will deliver more psychic or material goods (Chandra, 2004), although the extent to which voters actually support co-religionist politicians may be contingent on a demonstrated ability to deliver better access to education, health care or physical

infrastructure (Carlson, 2015).

H5a: Respondents are more likely to vote for and take part in demonstrations for co-religionist candidates.

H5b: People who identify more with their religious community are more likely to vote for and take part in demonstrations for co-religionist candidates.

2.3.2. Piety

The perceived religiosity of candidates may compel at least some voters to support particular candidates, whether because especially pious or observant voters reward such qualities in politicians, religious leaders encourage voters to support candidates on the basis of their alleged religious credentials, or outward piety signals a reputation for probity (Cammett & Jones Luong, 2014; Pepinsky et al., 2012). Piety can be signaled by public pronouncements about religious commitment or references to regular prayer outside of major holidays and religious events.

H6a: Respondents who report higher levels of piety and religious observance are more likely to support pious candidates.

2.3.3. Partisanship

Attachment to parties, or partisan identification, can be an important predictor of voting behavior in its own right. As Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2004) argue in the American context, partisanship may have little to do with the actual policies or platforms promoted by political parties or their record in office (Fiorina, 1981). Rather, their conceptualization of party identification is more akin to notions of religious identification that emphasize membership in a group rather than an ideological or principled commitment to set of ideas or policy positions. Often forged during early adulthood, such attachments emerge from socialization and insertion in social networks and tend to persist over time, acquiring a life of their own. To be sure, both political and religious affiliations may be shaped in part by the actual content of messages but causality can run in the other direction as well (Green et al., 2004, 2).

In Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East where political parties and movements contest elections, this conceptualization of partisanship may be appropriate, particularly when contrasted to a notion of partisanship grounded in performance evaluations vis-à-vis policy goals. Few specialists on the region would contend that a commitment to or an

assessment of party programs and performance affects partisan identification. Indeed, as noted above, the receipt of clientelist benefits from parties and politicians is widely seen to be a powerful motivation for electoral behavior in the Middle East, which can manifest in voting patterns arrayed along partisan lines. Furthermore, even in Lebanon where parties are structured by sectarian affiliation, partisanship is distinct from religious identification: A national survey in Lebanon demonstrated that while most support for parties comes from co-religionists, most members of religious groups do not support co-religionist parties (Cammett, 2014, ch. 5). Thus, partisan and religious identities should be analyzed separately.

While clientelism certainly drives partisan identification for some voters in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region, the influence of clientelism on electoral support may be exaggerated. This leaves open the possibility that partisan attachments, understood as attachment to a group, may drive patterns of political support above and beyond the receipt of benefits from parties and politicians. Once people consider themselves to be members of a collective, they tend to adopt the positions of the group (Green et al., 2004, 2). The heightened sense of membership that comes from a sense of vulnerability from conflict along communal lines may result in even greater attachment to partisanship. These points yield hypotheses related to the effects of partisanship on political behavior:

H7a: Co-partisanship has a bigger effect on political support than co-religionism.

H7b: Co-partisanship has a higher effect among core co-partisans than more marginal supporters or non-supporters on political support.

2.3.4. Qualifications

All things being equal, respondents are more likely to prefer competent candidates over those deemed to have fewer qualifications for holding public office. Existing research shows that campaign messages about competence of candidates yield greater electoral support (Kendall, Nannicini, & Trebbi, 2014) and that candidate occupations may signal qualifications for office (McDermott, 2005). Studies in the US, Italy, and Japan have shown that higher education makes candidates more likely to be elected (Franchino & Zucchini, 2015; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Horiuchi, Smith, & Yamamoto, 2016). Thus, factors that point to capabilities and expertise, such as higher levels of education, may garner more support among citizens.³

³ However, other research shows that voters in the US, UK, and Argentina perceive working class candidates as equally qualified and more relatable and are just as likely to vote for them (Carnes & Lupu, 2016).

We are agnostic about citizen preferences regarding candidates who have more experience holding public office. On the one hand, political experience is an asset because it enables politicians to acquire valuable knowledge about how governance works and therefore potentially boosts their efficacy, which should be appealing to voters. Furthermore, in some contexts, voters report more positive assessments of more politically experienced candidates (Horiuchi et al., 2016; Kirkland & Coppock, 2017). On the other hand, given high levels of dissatisfaction with the political system and near-universal perceptions of corruption in politics (Atallah, 2012), political experience may backfire, compelling citizens to look at longstanding politicians with distrust and cynicism.

H8a: Respondents will prefer candidates with higher education.

The next section elaborates on the data and methods to be used to test these hypotheses.

3. Study Design

This research employs a conjoint experimental design (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014), in which voters are asked to choose between two hypothetical candidates. Certain aspects of each candidate's background are randomized to identify the causal effect of each attribute on respondents' willingness to vote for the candidate and to attend a rally sponsored by the candidate. In addition, for those respondents who are assigned to a version of the survey which combines a priming experiment with the conjoint experiment, we will randomly prime half of the respondents in the sample to think about what makes them fearful about their current political situation in order to test how living in a volatile political environment shapes preferences for political candidates.

3.1 Case selection

Lebanon is an appropriate site for this research for a variety of reasons. First, since at least 2005, and particularly since the outbreak of the civil war in neighboring Syria in 2011, the country has witnessed increasing instability and acts of political violence, which have at times threatened to erupt into full-scale civil conflict. In 2013 and 2014, a renewed round of car bombings, suicide attacks and targeted assassinations threatened Lebanon's fragile peace and some analysts predict that intensifying regional and global efforts to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria will lead to renewed acts of violence on Lebanese soil.

Second, mounting regional tensions as well as deliberate efforts to whip up sectarian fears by politicians and other "cultural entrepreneurs" have contributed to sectarian tensions

within Lebanon and elsewhere in the region, particularly between the Sunni and Shi'a communities, and have heightened the political salience of religion. The presence of more than one million Syrian refugees in Lebanon as a result of the Syrian war has only increased these tensions.

Third, the Lebanese government is based on a power-sharing arrangement that enshrines religion in the political system and stipulates that government posts are allocated by sect according to a pre-established formula. Thus, even if Lebanese citizens do not primarily or exclusively view themselves in sectarian terms, religion is highly salient in politics and society.

Fourth, Lebanon formally boasts a democratic political system that holds relatively free elections, albeit characterized by rampant clientelism, which plays a key role in structuring economic, political and social life in the country both during elections and in between electoral cycles. At the same time, the *Beirut Madinati* campaign in the May 2016 municipal elections demonstrates that there is a demand for more programmatic politics. As a result, research in Lebanon affords the opportunity to test whether different types of citizens prefer different levels and types of clientelist exchange and which groups of citizens favor programmatic platforms.

Finally, although the Lebanese political context certainly has unique features, political dynamics are generalizable to other democracies and hybrid regimes with politicized ethnic and religious divisions and to other countries experiencing chronic political violence and instability.

3.2. Treatments

The research design for this study entails two distinct experimental components with two distinct versions of the survey. First, two-thirds of the sample will take a version of the survey that incorporates both experiments. Of these, half of the respondents will be randomly assigned to a fear priming exercise, in which they are asked to consider acts of political violence in Lebanese territory, while the other half will be assigned to the control condition and prompted to describe activities that they enjoy. The priming experiment is then followed by a conjoint experiment, in which respondents see a series of pairs of candidate profiles. After each round, they are prompted to choose a preferred political candidate and to indicate how likely they would be to attend a demonstration or rally organized by each candidate. Candidates' characteristics vary on a number of theoretically and empirically relevant dimensions. By randomly assigning some respondents to be primed with fear prior to making their candidate choices, we can investigate whether

preferences for distinct types of politicians vary depending on the political context. Second, the remaining third of the sample will take a survey that includes a conjoint experiment only.

3.2.1. Fear prime

The first component of the survey is an emotional memory task designed to induce emotions in participants by asking them to describe a situation, in which they felt the intended emotion. This method is commonly used in psychology and has been adopted in political science as an effective way to trigger a specific emotion (Banks & Valentino, 2012; Callen, Isaqzadeh, Long, & Sprenger, 2014; Myers & Tingley, 2016; Young, 2016). The method has been widely used across different contexts and no incidents have been reported in previous studies. Moreover, even though we ask participants to describe in detail an aspect of the political situation that makes them afraid, those topics are commonly discussed in Lebanon, in the public and media discourse as well as in private conversations. Since the manipulation does not differ from participants' experiences in daily life, it poses no more than minimal risk (Morton & Williams, 2010). Nevertheless, we deal with the risk that subjects will become distressed as a result of treatment in two ways. First, we are working with a local partner familiar with the context and a survey firm experienced with carrying out surveys in Lebanon. Second, enumerators will be trained to look out for signs of distress and, in the event that a participant appears to be adversely affected, they will stop the interview and refer the participant to a psychologist. We have secured support of a licensed psychologist in Lebanon who will be available on the phone for the duration of fielding.

In the task, enumerators will ask respondents to talk about one of their hobbies or everyday activities (control) or a situation that makes them afraid (treatment), in a way that would make the listener feel the emotion as well. In the treatment condition, participants will be asked to talk about fears specifically related to political violence that has affected Lebanon such as car bombs or fighting in Syria spilling over into Lebanon. The instructions we will give to the enumerators, tailored to the assigned treatment and including permitted probes to direct the participant, as well as the wording of the treatment are provided below.

Instructions for enumerators (following Young, 2016): Probe until you are confident that the respondent feels the desired emotion. Re-direct the respondent until s/he talks about [activities s/he enjoys / politics]. If s/he stops speaking or goes off-topic, use probes. Write down 1 key word from the

response.

PROBE for control: What activity do you enjoy? What do you like about it? What do you feel when you're doing it?

PROBE for treatment: What makes you feel most afraid? Why does it make you feel so afraid? What does it feel like to be afraid?

Assignment	
Control	Treatment
We would like you to describe in detail one hobby you're very interested in or activity that you enjoy doing. This could be something you do often or something you have enjoyed in the past or would like to do in the future. You might enjoy playing sports or spending time with family and friends. Try to think about this activity as vividly as possible. How does it make you feel? If this is something from the past or future, try to imagine what you are doing and who you are with, what you are wearing, what you see, hear and smell. Please describe this to me as accurately as possible.	We would like you to describe in detail one situation that makes you most afraid about the political situation in your country. This could be something you are presently experiencing or something from the past. You might be afraid of the fighting in nearby Syria spilling over into Lebanon, or car bombs, or suicide bombings. Please describe it as if you're trying to make someone else feel afraid as well. What is it like to be in this situation? Why is it so frightening?

3.2.2. Conjoint Experiment

After completing the emotional memory task, all respondents will go through four conjoint tasks. Respondents will be presented with short bios of two hypothetical candidates running for a political office. Within each candidate's biography, we will randomly vary the following characteristics: a clientelistic promise of low value or high value goods, a commitment to protect national security or to offer protection to a specific religious community, and the candidate's party affiliation, religious identity, piety, programmatic platform, educational level, political experience, and gender. (Table 2 provides a list of all attributes and their corresponding levels. Baseline levels are italicized.)

An important advantage of a conjoint experimental design is that it allows the researcher to

vary many candidate attributes simultaneously, instead of limiting the analysis to one or two factors. This makes it possible to evaluate which aspects of candidate's biography make them more likely to be elected and by extension, to compare the relative explanatory power of distinct hypotheses, from those highlighting importance of sect to those which focus on clientelistic relationships or promises of protection for the in-group. Randomizing numerous attributes in a single experiment will allow us to identify and compare the unique effects of each of candidate's characteristics or campaign promises - for example, piety relative to political experience or a well-developed plan to address a salient policy issue relative to providing goods to constituents. Moreover, such a set-up more accurately reflects the multidimensional choice faced by voters (Meyer & Rosenzweig, 2016).

All attributes of each candidate will be independently randomly assigned. Some combinations might be rare, but since they are all plausible, no restrictions will be placed on randomization. The order in which attributes will be presented will be randomly assigned to rule out attribute ordering effects. Each respondent will see four pairs of profiles, presented side-by-side, with each pair of profiles on a separate screen. On the same screen as each candidate pairing, respondents will be asked to choose between the two candidates, a question which resembles real-world voter decision making. They will also be asked to say how likely they would be to attend a rally or demonstration organized by each candidate. The order of the outcome questions will be randomized.

Table 2: Conjoint study attributes and levels

Relationship with supporters	Security	Religion	Piety	Party	Platform	Education	Political experience	Gender
<i>Promises to work hard for the people in the electoral district</i>	<i>In a campaign speech, the candidate says, "I will ensure that the national security of Lebanon is the highest priority."</i>	<i>Christian</i>	<i>Rarely attends religious services</i>	<i>Runs on the party list of a party that you neither support nor oppose</i>	<i>Discusses the problem of waste management and sanitation in the country</i>	<i>Has a high school degree</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>Male</i>
Distributes food baskets and cash during elections	In a campaign speech, the candidate says: "Wahhabi influences are threatening us. We must defend ourselves and our honor."	Shi'a	Frequently attends religious services	Runs on the party list that you prefer	Discusses the problem of unemployment in the country	Has a university degree	5 years	Female
Helps constituents to get parking tickets canceled	In a campaign speech, the candidate says: "Iranian influences are	Sunni		Runs on the party list of a party you oppose	Has a detailed plan to address waste management and sanitation	Has a post-graduate degree	15 years	

	threatening us. We must defend ourselves and our honor."					problems in the country			
Helps constituents get jobs for family members	In a campaign speech, the candidate says, "The extremists are anti-Christian. We will stand up to defend our values, liberty and justice."					Has a detailed plan to boost job creation in the country			
Arranges medical treatment for constituents									

3.3. Outcome Measures

After each candidate pair (task), we will ask the following questions, which will serve as dependent variables:

- a. If you had to make a choice without knowing more, which of the two would you vote for?
- b. How likely would you be to attend a rally or demonstration organized by each candidate? [1=not likely at all, 7=very likely]

Candidate A

Candidate B

3.4. Sample

We will work with Statistics Lebanon, one of the most respected survey companies in the country, to recruit a nationally representative sample of 2,400 voting age respondents in Lebanon. Interviews will be conducted face-to-face in respondents' households by trained enumerators using the CAPI method and tablets. The survey will last about 45 minutes.

Statistics Lebanon uses probability proportional to size sampling, done in four stages: 1) selecting 240 clusters, each of which contains about 100 to 150 households; 2) randomly selecting 10 households from each cluster; 3) listing all adults of voting age who are available at the time of the interview using a Kish table matrix; and 4) selecting an adult at random using the Kish table. Statistics Lebanon maintains a list of populated areas covering the Lebanese national territory as well as the estimated population size in each location. This includes records on about 800,000 households out of a total of about 877,000 households in the country. The sampling system is obtained from repeated door-to-door visits by the firm's data collection teams covering each household in Lebanon with detailed street maps. This listing of all dwellings, buildings, and apartments is used for selecting households at random.

About two thirds of respondents (approximately 1,600) will be randomly assigned to a combination of the priming experiment and the conjoint experiment. Of these, half will be randomly assigned to the political fear prime, while the other half will receive a control emotional memory task. All respondents will then proceed to the four rounds of the conjoint experiment. The unit of analysis is the rated candidate profile. Since each of 1,600 respondents will rate four pairings, with two candidate profiles per pairing, there will be up to 12,800 observations in some models and 6,400 in each of the emotional task conditions.

Additionally, about one third (approx. 800) respondents will be randomly assigned to see only the conjoint experiment, without any preceding emotional memory task. If the substantive results of the conjoint experiment in this group are the same as the results in the control group of the conjoint experiment combined with a prime (activity), these samples will be pooled and analyzed together.

4. Analysis

The quantity of interest is the Average Marginal Component-specific Effect (AMCE), or the treatment effect of any one of the profile characteristics. The AMCE represents the average difference in the probability of being the elected candidate when comparing two different attribute values - for example, a candidate who discusses the problem of unemployment in the country to a candidate who has a detailed plan for job creation - where the average is taken over all possible combinations of the other candidate attributes. Due to random assignment of attributes, on average, profiles with a candidate with a vague platform have the same distribution for all other attributes as profiles with a programmatic candidate, allowing for a straightforward comparison of means. The reference categories for each attribute are italicized in Table 2.

In two cases, we will analyze the levels both separately and aggregated up into categories. First, in the clientelism attribute, we will analyze the effect of each type of good promised but also compare the effect of low level clientelism (food and cash, parking tickets) and high level clientelism (jobs and medical expenses) relative to the baseline, a promise to work hard for the district. Second, in the case of programmatic policy, we will explore the effect of each type of platform but also compare the effect of moving from a vague program to a detailed plan by aggregating general statements about waste management and jobs and well-developed plans to address these issues. We included two types of salient issues in order to ensure we are analyzing a general claim about programmatic policy rather than measuring attitudes about a particular issue such as waste management.

Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2013) show that the AMCE is nonparametrically identified given the conditionally independent randomization of the attributes and can be estimated by regressing the binary outcome variable, Candidate Selected, on sets of indicator variables measuring the levels of each attribute. Moreover, it does not require functional form assumptions about the choice probabilities. Because observed choice outcomes are not independent across the profiles rated by a single respondent, standard errors will be clustered by respondent to obtain accurate variance estimates.

We will estimate the AMCEs by running a regression on the full sample of respondents. We

will also compare the effects of candidate attributes among individuals in the fear prime control and treatment groups to explore how the estimated AMCEs differ in distinct political contexts (i.e., safe versus volatile). Specifically, we will show the results of our tests when divided in separated groups by priming treatment, as well as the differences in AMCEs for each attribute level between the two experimental (activity control/fear prime) conditions. Finally, to test our hypotheses about in-group identities, we will also run analyses including a dummy coding whether the respondent belongs to the same religious sect as the candidate.

4.1. Heterogeneous treatment effects

We will also estimate the AMCEs by running a regression on the theoretically relevant subsets of respondents as suggested by our hypotheses. Specifically, we will estimate AMCEs for high SES and low SES individuals; religious and nonreligious respondents; respondents tolerant and intolerant of out-groups; and non-partisans, marginal activists, and core supporters.

5. Conclusion

Political violence and chronic instability have generated a heightened sense of insecurity among populations in the Middle East and other developing regions. Living under such precarious and uncertain conditions undoubtedly has political effects both at the micro- and macro-levels. In this research, we focus on the effects of a heightened sense of fear as a result of this state of affairs on political behavior. We then delve more deeply into a variety of factors that potentially shape distinct forms of political participation, including voting and participation in elections. In particular, we consider a variety of material and non-material factors that may shape support for candidates above and beyond short-term clientelist transactions, which dominate the current social science literature on voting and other forms of political engagement in developing countries. Focusing on the political salience of fear, we examine whether promises of protection against threats by violent extremists affect political behavior as well as a variety of other theoretically and empirically relevant motivations.

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