Metaketas are integrated research programs where teams of researchers work on parallel projects around the world to generate generalizable answers to major questions of scholarly and policy importance. Metaketa means integrated research for knowledge accumulation. The main objectives of this Metaketa is to fund experimental research projects that attempt to assess the role of information in promoting political accountability in developing countries. In addition, this Metaketa Initiative aims to maximize comparability and accumulated knowledge across different studies. See the initial RFP for more information.

 

Randomized Controlled Trials:

Meet the Candidates: Information and Accountability in Primary and General Elections



Other Principal Investigators: Melina Platas Izama, Pia Raffler
Research Design:

The common treatment arm makes use of scorecards: local government and service delivery audit information will be hand delivered to individuals during surveys. The alternate treatment arm consists of public and private screenings of “Meet the Candidate” sessions and surveys in primary and general elections, and assesses the role of public information in affecting voter attitudes and behavior. Conducting two types of screenings – public and private – will illuminate the role of public information in affecting voter attitudes and behavior.


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Can Common Knowledge Improve Common Goods?


EGAP Principal Investigators: Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon, Gwyneth McClendon
Other Principal Investigators: Claire Adida
Research Design:

A random sample of citizens will receive legislator performance information as part of a private screening, and another random sample will receive it as part of a public screening. Additionally, a random sample of citizens will receive a “civics message” in which arguments and examples are provided about the important implications of national legislation and oversight for citizens’ wellbeing in addition to legislator performance information; the rest will receive only the legislator performance information.


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Repairing Information Underload


EGAP Principal Investigators: Daniel Nielson
Other Principal Investigators: Paula Pickering, Mark Buntaine, Sarah Bush, Ryan Jablonski
Research Design:

The common treatment arm evaluates the effect of local budget management on voter attitudes and behavior. Voters at polling stations that are assigned to the common treatment arm will receive official information produced by the Auditor General about the percentage of local council budgets that are not accounted for.


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Common Knowledge, Relative Performance, and Political Accountability



Other Principal Investigators: Eric Arias, Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall, Pablo Querubin
Research Design:

Our research design is factorial and varies along two main dimensions: the method of delivery (private vs. social), and the type of provided information (local vs. relative). In the private treatment, voters will receive information privately through leaflets distributed door-to-door by enumerators. In the social treatment, we will couple the leaflet delivery with cars with loudspeakers attracting attention to the leaflet delivery.


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Using Local Networks to Increase Accountability



Other Principal Investigators: Simon Chauchard, Neelanjan Sircar
Research Design:

Information will be disseminated to a varying percentage of voters in the polling booth area (0%, 25% or 75%), in the context of a door-to-door campaign performed by enumerators from our implementing partner. The information provided to voters is about all candidates in the constituency and focuses on ongoing charges for financial crimes faced by candidates in the constituency (we focus on criminal charges that may have led to a net loss to the exchequer).


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Citizens at the Council: Comparing the Impact of Mediated Information and First-Hand Experience on Voter Turnout in Municipal Elections



Other Principal Investigators: Malte Lierl, Marcus Holmund
Research Design:

The researchers carry out a survey experiment with voting-age citizens in 118 rural municipalities. Respondents are asked about their preference between two imaginary mayoral candidates, who are characterized by eight randomly varied attributes, along which the two candidates may or may not differ. Furthermore, respondents are asked about the extent to which their preference might be altered by additional information about the candidates, and about the types of information that would have the greatest influence over their preference.


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Accountability and Incumbent Performance in the Brazilian Northeast



Other Principal Investigators: Daniel Hidalgo, Taylor Boas, Marcus Melo
Research Design:

The experiment will be a multi-arm study. In the common arm, respondents in the treatment condition will be informed as to whether the TCE-PE’s audit found evidence of mayoral corruption during an earlier year in his/her term. We plan to sample an equal number of “corrupt” and “non-corrupt” municipalities in which incumbents are running for reelection. Alternative arms will convey information about other municipal performance indicators that ought to be more salient, particular for certain categories of voters who receive benefits.


English