

Nationalist Repression in China and Japan

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1 Introduction

Nationalist sentiment is hypothesized to constrain both authoritarian and democratic regimes. Democracies are unable to repress nationalist actions as the ruling party will be punished at the polls. In autocracies, repressed actors or repressive agents can morph into political rivals.

We investigate whether two governments – one authoritarian (China) and one democratic (Japan) – can effectively repress popular nationalism, and attempt to isolate the regime-related constraints they face. We use a survey experiment deployed in both countries to examine differences in levels of public support for government repression in both nationalist and non-nationalist, neutral contexts. By leveraging a politically sensitive territorial dispute common to both countries – the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute – we also examine whether public support for government repression of actions by citizens differs between China and Japan.

In each country, respondents are presented with one of two hypothetical scenarios and in each scenario are placed into either a control or treatment condition. In the nationalist scenario (i.e., C1 and T1), nationalists from the respondent’s own country protest in support of their county’s sovereignty claims over the Islands. In the control group, the government

takes a “non-response” to the protests (C1). Respondents in the treatment group are presented with the same protest scenario, but their government does not allow the protests to continue, citing a lack of requisite permits (T1).

In the neutral (economic) scenario (i.e., C2 and T2), citizens from the respondent’s own country protest in response to domestic economic grievances – deteriorating labor conditions. In the control group, the government takes a “non-response” to the protests (C2). Once again, respondents in the treatment group are presented with the same protest scenario, but their government does not allow the protests to continue, citing a lack of requisite permits (T2).

One may expect nationalist issues such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute to face particularly high costs of repression due the visible and nationally charged nature of the dispute. This suggests that we may find larger treatment effect estimates for our repression treatment in the charged Diaoyu/Senkaku scenario, but smaller effects for our non-nationalist, labor dispute scenario. Treatment effects may also be larger in Japan due to the country’s democratic political system, which should be less receptive to the use of repression.

But it is also possible that the government increases its support due to the repression under some conditions (see [Heterogenous Treatment Effects](#) section), and larger treatment effects can be observed in China than in Japan. Therefore, depending on the direction of differential treatment effects (if they exist), our experiment may reveal: (1) costless repression for both a democracy and an autocracy (or even “popular” repression), (2) repression that is costly only in a democracy, (3) costly repression only in an autocracy, or (4) costly repression in both an autocracy and democracy.¹ If repression of protests in China increases support for the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or has a null effect, this would run against the predominant theoretical arguments that repression is costly in authoritarian regimes. In Japan, if even some subgroups support repression (e.g. supporters of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party), this would add nuance to current theories of the high costs of repression

¹Note that the control groups provide baseline estimates for repression costs.

in democracies.²

Our experiment is also unique in the sense that we consider both nationalist and non-nationalist scenarios. For both scenarios, we consider all the possible outcomes described above: (1) costless repression for both a democracy and an autocracy (or even “popular” repression), (2) repression that is costly only in a democracy, (3) costly repression only in an autocracy, or (4) costly repression in both an autocracy and democracy. Although we may observe similar repression costs for both scenarios, it is possible that some citizens in both or either countries may find it *easier* to support or oppose the government’s repression in either scenario. This leads to twelve possible combinations in terms of treatment effects, summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: All the possible expected outcomes

| | Autocracy | | Democracy | |
|----------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|-----------------|
| | Nationalist | Non-nationalist | Nationalist | Non-nationalist |
| Combination 1 | Costless | Costless | Costless | Costless |
| Combination 2 | Costless | Costless | Costly | Costless |
| Combination 3 | Costly | Costless | Costless | Costless |
| Combination 4 | Costly | Costless | Costly | Costless |
| Combination 5 | Costless | Costly | Costless | Costly |
| Combination 6 | Costless | Costly | Costly | Costly |
| Combination 7 | Costly | Costly | Costless | Costly |
| Combination 8 | Costly | Costly | Costly | Costly |
| Combination 9 | Costless | Costless | Costless | Costly |
| Combination 10 | Costless | Costly | Costless | Costless |
| Combination 11 | Costly | Costless | Costly | Costly |
| Combination 12 | Costly | Costly | Costly | Costless |

²This finding would necessitate the discovery of heterogenous treatment effects by respondent subgroup. This analysis is discussed later in the [Heterogenous Treatment Effects](#) section

2 Theory

Repression is traditionally thought to be a symptom of specific political-economic systems such as autocracy, developing economies, or states engaged in violent conflict (Davenport 2007). By contrast, democracies are theorized to exhibit low levels of political repression due to: (1) the ability of voters to vote oppressive politicians out of office, (2) a generally positive relationship between democratization and political tolerance, and (3) democratic institutions' ability to offer citizens additional channels to display their grievances outside of regime change (Davenport 2007). Empirically, democracies have been shown to be more accommodating of the opposition and less likely to engage in repression (Carey 2006).

However, while constraints on the use of repression tend to be higher in democracies than autocracies, the scope of repression in authoritarian regimes is also hypothesized to be limited. For example, Svoboda (2012) identifies a fundamental moral hazard of authoritarian repression, whereby use of repression can empower repressive agents and ultimately give them tools to overthrow the regime.

Nationalist sentiment is hypothesized to constrain both authoritarian and democratic regimes, but through different mechanisms. In democracies, public opinion ties the hands of leaders because if they eschew public opinion, they will be punished at the polls. Weiss (2013) suggests that autocrats leverage (non-antiregime) foreign protest as a signal in international bargaining, whereby the authoritarian regime uses the protests to signal domestic public opinion and constraints to foreign actors. These signals are hypothesized to increase the credibility of adopting a hard line against concessions in international negotiations. Chen, Pan, and Xu (2016) leverage an audit experiment to show that threats of collective action increase rates of response to citizen requests in China, suggesting that authoritarian regimes are responsive to issues with high degrees of public salience and visibility.

In addition to facing electoral penalties for failing to adopt policies in line with popular opinion, democracies are hypothesized to face "audience costs" where backing down after

escalating a crisis is costly to elected officials (Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001). Audience costs have also been theorized to exist in autocracies by Weeks (2008) in the event that (1) elites have the ability and will to overthrow the autocrat, (2) backing down from threats is perceived as costly for the leader, and (3) that other states perceive that the leader could feasibly receive domestic sanctioning. Blocking a nationalist action may be seen as akin to “backing down” in a politically sensitive international dispute, and thus higher costs may be associated with backing down in nationalist scenarios.

To our knowledge, however, no literature has yet directly looked at the relationship between nationalism and the costs of repression. We therefore aim to examine this relationship using an experimental design that ensures that factors other than nationalism that may interact with the costs of repression are held constant by random assignment.

3 Methods

Our research design takes the form of a survey experiment administered in the form of a vignette to 3000 respondents in both China and Japan (6,000 respondents total). The experiment considers whether there are indeed costs to each type of repression, whether the costs of repression differ by type (nationalist and economic), whether the costs of repression differ by regime of interest (China and Japan), and whether the costs of repression differ amongst different groups of respondents.

We test for costs of repression by calculating difference-in-means in our treatment group minus our control group. Differential costs of repression by type are estimated by comparing the magnitude of our treatment effect estimates in each of our treatment arms – nationalist and economic. Differential costs of repression by regime are estimated by comparing the magnitude of our treatment effects estimates in each of our surveys – China and Japan. Finally, we look for the existence of heterogeneous treatment effects across a battery of pre-treatment covariates by regressing our outcome variable on treatments conditional upon the data representing the covariate of interest, as well as using Bayesian Additive Regression

Trees (BART).

3.1 Context

We leverage the existence of a politically sensitive territorial dispute common to both countries – the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute – to examine whether public support for government repression of nationalistic actions by citizens differs between China and Japan.

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are located in the East China sea, north of the Japanese Ryukyu Islands chain, northeast of Taiwan, and east of the Chinese coast. The Islands are currently claimed by China, Japan, and Taiwan.

Japan claims that the islands were uninhabited when they first surveyed the Islands in the 1800s, and the Islands became part of Japanese territory after Japan’s victory in the first Sino-Japanese war. Following the American occupation of Japan after WWII, the Islands were returned to Japanese control in 1972. Beginning in the 1970s, however, China began to claim that the islands have been part of Chinese territory since the 15th century. The Islands are particularly valuable due to both economic and strategic advantages. The Islands contain important fishing reserves, and may contain oil and natural gas deposits. In addition, they are situated in the middle of vibrant international shipping lanes.

In recent years a number of domestic protests and attempted landings have taken place in support of each country’s claim over the islands. Chinese and Taiwanese activists attempted to land on the Islands in 2006, 2011, and 2013, and were stopped by the Japanese coast guard. Japanese activists attempted to land on the Islands in 2012 but were blocked from landing by the Japanese coast guard, prompting a number of activists to swim to shore and plant a Japanese flag.

Domestic protests in support of sovereignty claims have also occurred in all three countries. Major protests were held in all three countries after a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard patrol ships in 2010. Protests also occurred in China in 2012 after reports emerged that the Japanese government was planning to purchase the Islands.

Some of these protests escalated to violence and vandalism.

3.2 *Subjects*

Our survey will be administered to 3000 respondents each in Japan and China by *SSI* (China) and *Nikkei Research* (Japan). Subjects will be taken from across all provinces of China and prefectures of Japan, and will consist of a variety of backgrounds. The validity of this claim will be confirmed by a balance test of [pre-treatment covariates](#) in each country.

Subjects who see the vignette and respond to the experiment will be limited to those who pass an initial “attention check.” The “attention check” takes the form of a pre-treatment question in which we ask subjects to “please ignore the question below about which school subject you prefer and instead check the ‘Other’ option as your answer and click ‘Continue’.”

Note that this is a pre-treatment attention check that screens subjects from analysis. It does not represent a post-treatment manipulation check, which has been likened to introducing differential attrition among treatment groups, which risks “inducing bias of unknown sign” [Aronow, Baron, and Pinson \(2015\)](#).³ By contrast [Aronow, Baron, and Pinson \(2015\)](#) show that pre-treatment attention checks in which screening is conditioned exclusively on checks administered prior to the experimental treatment stand to improve estimates by focusing solely on those subjects who pass.

3.3 *Pre-Treatment Covariates*

Prior to the administration of the survey experiment, subjects will be asked to answer a series of questions in order to determine their background characteristics. We collect information on both the subjects’ demographic and background characteristics, as well as about their general political attitudes. Demographic covariates will be used independently for analysis, while political attitudes covariates will be combined into a single “nationalism scale” metric using principle components analysis.

³For information on the danger of inducing post-treatment bias in general see [Gerber and Green \(2012\)](#) Chapter 4.

These covariates will be collected for three primary purposes: (1) to ensure that our subjects within Japan and China are balanced across backgrounds within the control groups and each of the treatment conditions, (2) to increase the precision of our estimates of average treatment effects, and (3) to test for the existence of heterogeneous treatment effects by background characteristics. A list of all pre-treatment covariates and a balance test can be found in [Table 2](#) and [Table 3](#) below. The balance test includes the mean value of each pre-treatment covariate in each country, as well as within both control groups and each treatment group. We also report p-values corresponding to F tests of all treatment indicators to ensure that pre-treatment covariates are not correlated with random assignment.⁴

Table 2: Demographic Pre-Treatment Covariates

| | Covariate | Obs. | Control 1 | Treat 1 | Control 2 | Treat 2 | P Value |
|----|-----------------------|------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|---------|
| 1 | Age | | | | | | |
| 2 | Gender | | | | | | |
| 3 | Province/Prefecture | | | | | | |
| 4 | Urban | | | | | | |
| 5 | Education | | | | | | |
| 6 | Employment Type | | | | | | |
| 7 | Political Affiliation | | | | | | |
| 8 | Income | | | | | | |
| 9 | Employment Industry | | | | | | |
| 10 | Trade Relationship | | | | | | |

3.4 Treatment Effects

As noted above, the primary outcome measure of interest will be approval of the government’s response to the protest described in the survey. This outcome is measured on a five point disagreement scale where 1 indicates strong agreement with the government’s response, 2 represents agreement, 3 represents neutrality, 4 represents disagreement, and 5 represents strong disagreement. These treatment effect estimates will be calculated as the difference-in-

⁴We utilize randomization inference in order to calculate these p-values.

Table 3: Political Attitudes Pre-Treatment Covariates

| | Covariate | Obs. | Control 1 | Treat 1 | Control 2 | Treat 2 | P Value |
|---|-----------------------|------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|---------|
| 1 | Dispute Opinion | | | | | | |
| 2 | US Opinion | | | | | | |
| 3 | Territory | | | | | | |
| 4 | Citizenship Pride | | | | | | |
| 5 | Government Acceptance | | | | | | |
| 6 | Trade Relationship | | | | | | |
| 7 | Trade Benefits | | | | | | |
| 8 | Fight for Country | | | | | | |
| 9 | Nationalism Scale | | | | | | |

means of support for the government response in the treatment group minus the difference-in-means of support for government response in the control group.⁵

Differential costs of repression by type are estimated by comparing the magnitude and precision of our treatment effects estimates in each of our treatment arms – nationalist and economic. We will test if the treatment effect estimates from our nationalistic repression scenario and economic repression scenario are significantly different from one another in order to establish whether or not there are differential costs of repression by type.

Differential costs of repression by regime are estimated by comparing the magnitude of our treatment effects estimates in each of our surveys – China and Japan. We will test if the treatment effect estimates of each type (nationalistic and economic) are significantly different from one another in China and Japan in order to establish whether or not there are differential costs of repression by regime.

3.5 Heterogenous Treatment Effects

It is hypothesized that levels of support for government repression will be positively correlated with levels of government or party support, level of education, and degree of dependence on trade. It is likewise hypothesized that levels of support for government repression

⁵In practice this will be performed using OLS regression, both including pre-treatment covariates as controls as well as without covariates.

of nationalist actions will be negatively correlated with pre-existing levels of nationalism (as measured by a selection of questions from the World Values Survey).

Our test will take the form of regressing our outcome variable on treatments conditional upon the data representing the covariate of interest. In other words, we will split our sample by subject attributes, then estimate conditional average treatment effects (CATEs) separately for each of these attributes. For example, to test for heterogenous effects on pre-existing government or party support, we will regress support for government response on each of the two treatments for all observations in which pre-existing government support is above 50%.

The search for heterogenous treatment effects often suffers from the multiple comparisons problem.⁶ In a dataset with a large number of covariates, if a large enough number of subgroups is examined, it is highly likely that statistically significant interaction effects will emerge merely by chance. In other words, the more significance tests are performed, the higher the likelihood of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis at least once. The hypothesis tests we will perform therefore utilize a Bonferroni correction in order to account for the multiple comparisons problem by lowering the target p-value of each hypothesis test in proportion to the number of total significance tests performed. In practice, this implies that because we have four pre-treatment covariates that we hypothesize will lead to heterogenous treatment effects, the target level of significance for each test will now be approximately 0.0125 rather than 0.05. We also reduce the possibility of our study suffering from the multiple comparisons problem by pre-registering our heterogenous treatment effects of interest, rather than simply testing across all of our covariates to see if any significant effects emerge.

In addition to the standard methods of searching for heterogenous treatment effects described above, we will also use Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART) to systematically test for heterogenous treatment effects across all 18 of our pre-treatment covariates.⁷ BART benefits from not requiring the same specification choices that are required when fitting

⁶Gerber and Green (2012)

⁷See Green and Kern (2012) for an in-depth discussion of this methodology

parametric models such as OLS regressions with covariate interactions, and instead requires only a vector of outcomes and a matrix of covariates for estimation.

3.6 Survey Questions

In each country, respondents are presented with one of two hypothetical scenarios – nationalist or economic – and in each scenario are placed into either a control or treatment condition.

In the nationalist scenario, nationalists from the respondent’s own country protest in support of their county’s sovereignty claims over the Islands. In the control group, the government takes a neutral “non-response” to the protests. Respondents in the treatment group are presented with the same protest scenario, but their government does not allow the protests to continue, citing a lack of requisite permits.

In the economic scenario, protestors from the respondent’s own country protest over deteriorating labor conditions. In the control group, the government takes a neutral “non-response” to the protests. Respondents in the treatment group are presented with the same protest scenario, but their government does not allow the protests to continue, citing a lack of requisite permits.

All possible survey questions are provided below. Chinese and Japanese translations are provided in [Appendix A](#) and [Appendix B](#), respectively, and the compatibility of the translations has been confirmed by a trilingual third party.

Nationalist Repression

Control: Japan and China both have both claimed sovereignty over the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands. Major Chinese [Japanese] media reported today that in response to the ongoing dispute, several thousand Chinese [Japanese] citizens planned to demonstrate to claim its sovereignty in several cities. The Chinese [Japanese] government did not interfere with the protests, while reiterating its stance that the Islands belong to China [Japan].

Treatment: Japan and China both have both claimed sovereignty over the Diaoyu [Senkaku] Islands. Major Chinese [Japanese] media reported today that in response to the ongoing dispute, several thousand Chinese [Japanese] citizens planned to demonstrate in support of China's [Japan's] sovereignty claim in several cities. The Chinese [Japanese] government did not allow the protests to continue, citing a lack of the requisite permits.

Economic Repression

Control: Major Chinese [Japanese] media reported today that several thousand Chinese [Japanese] citizens planned to demonstrate against deteriorating labor conditions at Chinese [Japanese] companies in China [Japan] in several cities. The Chinese [Japanese] government did not interfere with the protests.

Treatment: Major Chinese [Japanese] media reported today that several thousand Chinese [Japanese] citizens planned to demonstrate against deteriorating labor conditions at Chinese [Japanese] companies in China [Japan] in several cities. The Chinese [Japanese] government did not allow the protests to continue, citing a lack of the requisite permits.

4 Pre-Analysis

Prior to the administration of the experiment, pre-analyses were performed using the aforementioned sample sizes of 3000 subjects in Japan and 3000 subjects in China. The pre-analyses include a power test and average treatment effect estimates calculating using differences-in-means and p-values from randomization inference. The power analysis assumes that repression of the nationalist scenario will have a larger impact on disagreement with government action than repression of the economic scenario, and that repression will increase disagreement more in Japan than in China.

4.1 Power Analysis

The power analysis assumes that in the nationalist scenario in China, receiving treatment increases the probability of disagreeing with the government's response by 0.03 percentage points, increases the probability of strongly disagreeing with the government's response by 0.02 percentage points, decreases the probability of agreeing with the government's response by 0.03 percentage points, and decreases the probability of strongly agreeing with the government's response by 0.02 percentage points.⁸ In Japan, the analysis assumes that receiving treatment increases the probability of disagreeing with the government's response by 0.04 percentage points, increases the probability of strongly disagreeing with the government's response by 0.03 percentage points, decreases the probability of agreeing with the government's response by 0.04 percentage points, and decreases the probability of strongly agreeing with the government's response by 0.03 percentage points.

In the economic scenario in China, the analysis assumes that receiving treatment increases the probability of disagreeing with the government's response by 0.02 percentage points, increases the probability of strongly disagreeing with the government's response by 0.01 percentage points, decreases the probability of agreeing with the government's response

⁸Sample datasets are created by randomly sampling from integers 1 through 5 with replacement 3000 times while assigning different probabilities to the likelihood of each number being drawn.

by 0.02 percentage points, and decreases the probability of strongly agreeing with the government's response by 0.01 percentage points. In Japan, the analysis assumes that receiving treatment increases the probability of disagreeing with the government's response by 0.03 percentage points, increases the probability of strongly disagreeing with the government's response by 0.02 percentage points, decreases the probability of agreeing with the government's response by 0.03 percentage points, and decreases the probability of strongly agreeing with the government's response by 0.02 percentage points.

These assumptions reflect that fact that we hypothesize that we will find larger treatment effect estimates for nationalist repression than economic repression, as well as larger treatment effects estimates in Japan than China. We believe that these assumptions are conservative due to the minimal increases in probabilities of disagreeing with government response after repression described above. Previous work theorizes high costs of repression in both authoritarian and democratic regimes, suggesting that these probabilities may be higher than those described above.

The assumptions described above result in a statistical power of 0.73 in the nationalist scenario and 0.29 in the economic scenario in China, and 0.95 and 0.72, respectively, in Japan. Both power analyses were performed using 1000 simulations. The histograms below show graphical depictions of the study's predicted statistical power.

Figure 1: China: Nationalist scenario distribution of p-values




Figure 2: China: Economic scenario distribution of p-values




Figure 3: Japan: Nationalist scenario distribution of p-values





Figure 4: Japan: Economic scenario distribution of p-values



4.2 Hypothetical Treatment Effect Estimates

Using the same assumptions supplied in the power analysis described above, we find an estimated average treatment effect of 0.169 for the nationalist scenario and 0.073 for the economic scenario in China. This implies that the repression treatment increases disagreement with the government’s response to the protests by approximately 0.17 points on our disagreement scale in the nationalist scenario and 0.07 points in the economic scenario. In Japan, the estimates are 0.241 for the nationalist scenario and 0.132 for the economic scenario.

In China, the nationalist repression treatment effect estimate is significant at the 1% level, while the economic treatment does not reach statistical significance. The associated two-tailed p-values calculated using randomization inference are 0.002 and 0.21 respectively. This suggests that even when the economic repression treatment only increases disagreement with government actions by 0.02 percentage points and strong disagreement by 0.01 percentage points on average, complete randomization of treatment assignment only results in treatment effect estimates as large or larger than actual treatment assignment effects 21% of the time.

In Japan, the nationalist estimate is significant at the 1% level while the economic treatment effect estimate is significant at the 5% level. The higher levels of significance arise due to assuming higher probabilities of disagreement in Japan. The associated two-tailed p-values calculated using randomization inference are approximately 0 for the nationalist scenario, and 0.015 for the economic scenario.⁹

The estimated treatment effects were calculated using both regression and traditional difference-in-means. See [Table 4](#) and [Table 5](#) for a tabular depiction of the estimated treatments effects by treatment scenario and country, and [Figure 5](#) and [Figure 6](#) for graphical depictions.

⁹Note that this p-value of 0 arises due to the one random generation of treatment effects used in this scenario that occurs under the chosen seed. Under different seeds the p-value is not necessarily zero, but it does not seem appropriate to “pick” a seed based on the resulting p-value.

Table 4: China: Disagreement with Government Response by Scenario

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|--------------------------------|---|---------------------|
| | Disagreement with Government Response (1 - 5) | |
| | Nationalist Scenario | Economic Scenario |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Repression Treatment | 0.169*** (0.054) | 0.073 (0.053) |
| Constant: Control Disagreement | 2.975*** (0.038) | 2.997*** (0.037) |
| Observations | 1,500 | 1,500 |
| R ² | 0.007 | 0.001 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: Japan: Disagreement with Government Response by Scenario

| | <i>Dependent variable:</i> | |
|--------------------------------|---|---------------------|
| | Disagreement with Government Response (1 - 5) | |
| | Nationalist Scenario | Economic Scenario |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Repression Treatment | 0.241*** (0.054) | 0.132** (0.053) |
| Constant: Control Disagreement | 2.975*** (0.038) | 2.997*** (0.037) |
| Observations | 1,500 | 1,500 |
| R ² | 0.013 | 0.004 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure 5: China: Group Means by Economic or Nationalist Treatment





Figure 6: Japan: Group Means by Economic or Nationalist Treatment



Differential costs of repression by type are estimated by comparing the magnitude and precision of our treatment effects estimates in each of our treatment arms – nationalist and economic. In the hypothetical scenario described above, the treatment effect estimates of nationalist and economic repression are not significantly different from one another in either China or Japan.

Differential costs of repression by regime are estimated by comparing the magnitude of our treatment effects estimates in each of our surveys – China and Japan. In the hypothetical scenarios described above, the treatment effect estimates in each regime are not significantly different from one another for the nationalist treatment or the economic treatment.

5 Conjoint Experiment

We also conduct conjoint experiments related to the research question. We also provide the questionnaire in [Appendix C](#) in English.

The conjoint experiment examines popular preferences for a potential bargain between China and Japan on trade, territorial, and symbolic issues. We ask respondents to choose between two potential hypothetical deals with which the Chinese and Japanese government agree. The attributes include a historical grievance (visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Japanese politicians); security (a potential amendment to the Japanese Constitution on the Japan Self-Defense Force); territorial disputes (the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands); and economic cooperation and tariffs.

The main results will be calculated using existing tools for calculating average component marginal effects. We will also examine heterogenous effects. It is hypothesized that different subgroups will place different weights on different issues. We expect that those with high levels of nationalism, low levels of education, and high dependence on trade with Japan will prioritize a deal that includes concessions on historical grievances, security, and territorial disputes and place less emphasis on trade and economic cooperation. Conversely, we expect that those with a high dependence on trade with Japan, high levels of education, and low

levels of nationalism will prioritize deals that include concessions on trade and economic cooperation issues.

6 Conclusion

We seek to investigate whether two governments – one authoritarian (China) and one democratic (Japan) – can effectively repress popular nationalism. We use a survey experiment deployed in both countries to examine differences in levels of public support for government repression in both a nationalist and neutral (economic) context. Our nationalist scenario leverages the existence of a politically sensitive territorial dispute common to both countries – the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute – to examine whether public support for government repression of nationalistic actions by citizens differs between China and Japan. We therefore look for differences in the magnitude of treatment effects in terms of type of repression (nationalist or economic), as well as by country. Finally, in each country we will examine heterogeneous treatment effects for government or party support, level of education, degree of connectedness with the global economy, and pre-existing nationalism.

Preliminary power tests imply that our sample sizes of 3000 subjects in each country are sufficient to detect even extremely minor shifts in the proportion of respondents who view their government’s response to the repression treatments negatively. The pre-analysis presented here does not find significant differences in treatment effect size across nationalist or economic repression, or across countries, but this is a product of the conservative treatment effect estimates and differences that underlie the sample data generation process.

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7 Appendix A: Chinese Survey Translation

控制组 1(Nationalist Protest): 中国和日本都对钓鱼岛提出领土主张。根据主流中国媒体今天的报道, 对于钓鱼岛争端, 多个城市的数千名中国民众计划通过游行示威的方式, 宣誓中国对钓鱼岛的主权。中国政府没有压制这一民众的自发行为, 但是重申中国对于钓鱼岛的主权。

实验组 1(Repression):

中国和日本都对钓鱼岛提出领土主张。根据主流中国媒体今天的报道, 对于钓鱼岛争端, 多个城市的数千名中国民众计划通过游行示威的方式, 宣誓中国对钓鱼岛的主权。中国政府压制了这一民众的自发行为, 宣称民众自发的游行示威没有受到官方批准。

控制组 2 (Economic Protest):

根据主流中国媒体今天的报道, 多个城市的数千名中国民众计划通过游行示威的方式抗议一些中国企业恶化的工作环境。中国政府没有压制这一民众的自发行为。

实验组 2 (Repression):

根据主流中国媒体今天的报道, 多个城市的数千名中国民众计划通过游行示威的方式抗议一些中国企业恶化的工作环境。中国政府压制了这一民众的自发行为, 宣称民众自发的游行示威没有受到官方批准。

8 Appendix B: Japanese Survey Translation

C1 (Nationalist Protest): 日本と中国両国は、尖閣諸島の領有権を主張しています。こうした中、日本の主要メディアによると、いくつかの日本の都市で日本の主権を主張するための数千人規模のデモが企画されていたとのことです。これに対し、日本政府はデモを阻止しなかったようです。

T1 (Repression):

日本と中国両国は、尖閣諸島の領有権を主張しています。こうした中、日本の主要メディアによると、いくつかの日本の都市で日本の主権を主張するための数千人規模のデモが企画されていたとのことです。これに対し、日本政府は、事前の許可申請がなかったことを理由にデモを阻止したようです。

C2 (Economic Protest):

日本の主要メディアによると、いくつかの日本の都市で日本企業における労働環境の悪化に対する数千人規模のデモが企画されていたとのことです。これに対し、日本政府はデモを阻止しなかったようです。

T2 (Repression):

日本の主要メディアによると、いくつかの日本の都市で日本企業における労働環境の悪化に対する数千人規模のデモが企画されていたとのことです。これに対し、日本政府は、事前の許可申請がなかったことを理由にデモを阻止したようです。

9 Appendix C: Conjoint Experiment

| Attributes | Values |
|---|--|
| Yasukuni shrine | Japanese Prime Ministers will resume visits to Yasukuni |
| | Japanese Prime Ministers will suspend all further visits to Yasukuni, but give no formal commitment |
| | Japanese Prime Ministers will make formal commitment not to visit Yasukuni again |
| Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Sovereignty | Status quo is maintained and neither party claims sovereignty |
| | Both parties declare that Japan has sovereignty |
| | Both parties declare that China has sovereignty |
| | Both parties share sovereignty |
| Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Resource Development | Status quo is maintained and moratorium on resource development |
| | Resource development by Japan only [attribute not available if China has sovereignty] |
| | Resource development by China only [attribute not available if Japan has sovereignty] |
| | Resource development by Japan and China with the equal distribution of resources |
| Japanese Constitution | Japan will not to amend its constitution to validate the Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF) |
| | Japan amends its Constitution to validate the Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF) |
| Economic Cooperation | Japan maintains its current policy of achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific and competes with Chinese policy |
| | Japan revises its current policy of achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific and coordinates with Chinese policy |
| Japanese Tariffs | Japan increases tariffs on Chinese goods by 20 percent |
| | Japan increases tariffs on Chinese goods by 10 percent |
| | Japan makes no change to existing tariffs |
| | Japan decreases tariffs on Chinese goods by 10 percent |
| | Japan decreases tariffs on Chinese goods by 20 percent |
| | Japan decreases tariffs on Chinese goods by 20 percent |
| Chinese Tariffs | China increases tariffs on Japanese goods by 20 percent |
| | China increases tariffs on Japanese goods by 10 percent |
| | China makes no change to existing tariffs |
| | China decreases tariffs on Japanese goods by 10 percent |
| | China decreases tariffs on Japanese goods by 20 percent |
| | China decreases tariffs on Japanese goods by 20 percent |