Brief 45: The Effect of Informing Voters About Incumbent Malfeasance in Brazil

The authors conducted a field experiment in Pernambuco, Brazil, to test whether voters punish politicians that are accused of malfeasance. The authors randomly sampled 3,200 voters two weeks prior to the 2016 municipal elections. A segment of respondents were randomly assigned to receive fliers with information about whether the incumbent mayor was in compliance with government laws and regulations. Other respondents received no information at all.

English
Eric Arias
Email: eric.arias@princeton.edu  Institution / Affiliation : Princeton University  EGAP member: Yes 
Edgar Franco Vivanco
Email: edgarf1@stanford.edu  Institution / Affiliation : Stanford University  EGAP member: No 
Pablo Querubin
Email: pablo.querubin@nyu.edu  Institution / Affiliation : New York University  EGAP member: Yes 
Umberto Mignozzetti
Email: umberto.mignozzetti@fgv.br  Institution / Affiliation : Fundação Getulio Vargas  EGAP member: Yes 
Omar García-Ponce
Email: omar.garciaponce@gmail.com  Institution / Affiliation : UC Davis  EGAP member: Yes 
Jorge Gallego
Email: jagallegod@gmail.com  Institution / Affiliation : Universidad del Rosario  EGAP member: Yes 
Pablo Egaña del Sol
Email: pegana@mit.edu  Institution / Affiliation : MIT  EGAP member: Yes 
Darin Christensen
Email: darinc@luskin.ucla.edu  Institution / Affiliation : UCLA  EGAP member: Yes 

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