# RESEARCH DESIGN FORM

| **Section 1: Introduction** | |
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| **1. Researcher Name** | Your Name<br>Martín Opertti |
| **2. Research Project Title** | Short title<br>The political conditioning of economic perceptions in Uruguay |
| **3. One sentence summary of research question** | Jargon free<br>Do citizens, faced to new information, update their beliefs about sociotropic economic perceptions depending on their political partisanship? |
| **4. Substantive motivation** | Why should anyone care about the results of this research?<br>If the partisanship bias is confirmed, then it directly affects one of the main principles of democracy, the electoral accountability. The theory of economic voting posits that economic perceptions are a key factor to explain political behavior. So, if the causality is reversed and the vote (or political partisanship) influence the economic perception, this means individuals form their evaluations in dependence of their prior partisanships, then electoral accountability is at risk. |
| **5. Theoretical motivation** | What theoretical questions can this research shed light on?<br>It will provide evidence that may contribute to the understanding of how political biases work and how impactful they are. The importance lies in unveiling the endogeneity in the economic perceptions and partisanship equation in a context that has little empirical evidence (Latin America in general and Uruguay in particular). The main questions here are: Do Uruguayans update sociotropic economic information asymmetrically due to their prior political partisanship? Up to what extent does this happen? |
| **6. Key literatures** | List 3 or 4 readings that this work will speak to.<br>Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1980). *The american voter*. University of Chicago Press.<br>Evans, G., & Andersen, R. (2006). The political conditioning of economic perceptions. *Journal of Politics*, *68*(1), 194-207.<br>Tilley, J., & Hobolt, S. B. (2011). Is the government to blame? An experimental test of how partisanship shapes perceptions of performance and responsibility. *The Journal of Politics*, *73*(2), 316-330.<br>Anson |
| **7. Primary Hypothesis** | This is a more specific form of the research question; provide no more than three hypotheses.<br>H1: Individuals with a partisanship bond with the ruling party will reject negative information about the sociotropic economic performance, while they will be willing to update their beliefs to positive economic information.<br><br>H2: Individuals with a partisanship bond with an opposition party will reject positive information about the sociotropic economic performance, while they will be willing to update their beliefs to negative economic information. |

| Section 2: Treatment | |
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| **8. Treatment (X)** | What is your treatment(s)?<br>• Single or multiple treatment arms<br>• At what level do you randomize?<br>There are two treatments. One is giving positive information about the Uruguayan economy and the other one is giving negative information about the country´s economy. Treatments will be randomized at individual level.<br><br>Treatment 1: Montevideo, MVD - In recent days, the National Institute of Statistics (INE) presented data on the unemployment rate, which averaged 8% in 2018, maintaining the upward trend. That is to say, in Uruguay there are more and more people who cannot get employment. In turn, this figure is higher than that of some countries in the region such as Chile or Mexico<br><br>Treatment 2: Montevideo, MVD - In recent days, the National Institute of Statistics (INE) presented data on the unemployment rate, which averaged 8% in 2018, maintaining the downward trend. In other words, in Uruguay there are fewer and fewer people who cannot get employment. In turn, this figure is lower than that of some countries in the region such as Argentina or Brazil. |
| **9. Implementation** | How will you track compliance and implementation quality?<br>The following filter question will be asked:<br>Some people read newspapers or see news, others do not read newspapers or see news. We just want to check that you are reading these questions until the end. Please, ignore the question that follows, and select option "5".<br>How often do you read newspapers or do you see news?<br>A) Everyday<br>B) Usually<br>C) Rarely<br>D) Never<br>E) 5<br>Only respondents that chose the option 5 will be considered for the data analysis. |
| **Section 3: Outcome** | |
| **10. Outcomes (Y)** | What are your primary outputs and outcome of interest.<br>• Describe and define them<br>• What data is needed?<br>• What are the units at which you measure your outcomes (e.g. Individuals? Communities? Schools?).<br>• What data sources (admin data, surveys, games, other), and number of data collection rounds.<br>The expected outcome variable is the sociotropic evaluation of the economy. The units of measurement are individuals. There will be one data collection |

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| | round, which will be an online survey.<br>The primary outcome of this experiment will be the means differences of individuals identified with the ruling party and individuals identified with opposition parties in the evaluation of sociotropic economic performance after receiving positive/negative information about the country´s economy. |
| **11. Priors** | • hat is the mean and SD of your outcome before doing the study?<br>• This will require insights from other studies and or data<br>The mean of the sociotropic perception of the economy by a representative probabilistic sample of Uruguayans collected by Equipos Consultores in December 2017 is 3.52 with a SD of .909 (N=XX) |
| **Section 4: Identification Strategy** | |
| **12. Identification** | What type of identification strategy will you use?<br>• Random assignment simple; complete; blocked; cluster; factorial<br>• two level; phase in<br><br>Simple random assignment |
| **Section 3: Sample, Data, & Implementation Strategies** | |
| **13. Heterogeneity** | Do you expect the treatment to work differently for certain individuals / groups / communities?<br>• Describe which?<br>• Think about blocking on those variables.<br>Heterogenous treatment effects expected for party identification and political sophistication.<br>The party identification heterogeneous effects is key to this experiment. The asymmetric update of information by party identification is the prime hypothesis.<br>Also, political sophistication and education can have an impact on the way individuals incorporate new information. |
| **Section 4: Power** | |
| **14. Effect Size** | What is your expected effect size?<br>• what effect size do you want your experiment to show?<br>• what effect sizes have similar studies found?<br>An effect size of .25 is expected after the positive treatment in partisans of the party in office, while an effect of -.25 is expected after the negative treatment in partisans of opposition parties. No effect is expected in giving positive information to partisans of opposition parties as well as no effect is expected in giving negative information to partisans of government party |
| **15. Intra-Cluster Correlation (ICC)** | If you have clusters, what are they?<br>• What is the intra cluster correlation?<br>• This requires insights from previous studies or representative data<br>There are no clusters |

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| **16. Power Calculation** | What is your power?<br>• If you want to calculate your sample size, given expected effect: use egap.org/power or STATA/R.<br>• If you want to calculate effect size, given a maximum sample: use STATA/R.<br>• Take into account type outcome (binary, continuous) and clustering (icc) if needed.<br><br>In order to achieve 80% of power, 416 cases will be needed (calculations made in egap.org/power) |
| **Section 5: Analysis & Threats** | |
| **17. Analysis strategy** | How will you draw conclusions from your evidence?<br>• What is your estimand (e.g. the ATE)?<br>• What is your estimator? (e.g a difference in means, OLS regression with block dummies, any clustering?)<br>• Note, this is closely linked to your randomization design<br><br>The conclusions will be using a difference in means estimator of sociotropic economic evaluations |
| **18. Interpretation strategy** | Summarize the substantive conclusions you will draw from your analysis? Describe the conclusions both for the case where you do find and where you do not find what you expect to find.<br>If the evidence goes along with the hypothesis, then there will be evidence that Uruguayans update their beliefs about the economy asymmetrically due to their party identification. This generates a vicious circle where individuals don't generate opinions about crucial political topics independently from their party identifications. If not, then there will be evidence that despite Uruguay being a country with strong political party identifications, people still form their opinions and evaluations independently from their party identifications. |
| **19. Threats to internal validity** | Note especially any key assumptions in identification of measurement strategies<br>• Think about compliance, attrition and spillovers (and its channels)<br>Spillovers and attrition are not actual problems for this experiment. The main threat is the actual effect of the treatment, whether the given information is powerful or realistic enough to have an effect on individuals. In order to attenuate this, the treatment will be provided in semblance to a newspaper´s new, making the information more realistic. |
| **20. Threats to external validity** | Note especially any key scope conditions (think about representativeness of the sample)<br>It is an online survey for Uruguayan people who have a Facebook account, so the sample is non-probabilistic. People who don't have a Facebook account won't have access to the survey, and that is a bias. In order to control any possible bias, we will take into account population parameters as age, |

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| | gender and income. |