Abstract

Does lack of information undermine political accountability? This is important because political accountability is one of the pillars of good governance. Recent research has evaluated the effectiveness of interventions aimed at providing information to voters but the evidence is mixed. Some studies have found that it influences vote choices, while others have found no effect. Moreover, while some work has found positive effects on turnout, indicating more engaged voters, other studies have found negative effects, hinting at a disenchanted electorate. Thus, it is important to disentangle the different channels and conditions under which information influences voting behavior. We argue that individuals should react to information about politicians’ performance whenever it differs from their prior expectations and believe a better option is feasible. Furthermore, we argue that the effects are greatest when information is communicated publicly because there is increased deliberation and internalization of the information contained in the leaflets, and coordinated voter action may be facilitated. We plan to test these hypotheses using a field experiment in the context of Mexico’s 2015 municipal elections by randomizing (1) the provision of information about the incumbent party only or alongside with other parties, and (2) whether the information is publicly or privately provided.
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1 Outline

Across the world, economic policies to alleviate poverty are put in place by democratically elected politicians. While international organizations and academics have played an increasing role in designing such policies, citizens must ultimately rely on politicians to implement those policies. Thus, the election of competent leaders, and the capacity of voters to keep elected leaders accountable once in office, is a crucial challenge in many developing countries.

Existing theoretical models focus on the importance of information about incumbent performance for political accountability. They argue that information is essential to prevent voters from electing incompetent candidates and candidates that engage in malfeasance. Such models, which typically fix the perceived competence of alternative candidates, assume that simply receiving information about their incumbent’s performance will induce voters to elect high-quality politicians. However, as indicated by the mixed empirical support for workhorse models of political accountability (see below), there are good reasons to doubt that this is sufficient. First, it is hard to evaluate incumbent performance, or the likelihood that a challenger will perform better, without benchmarking such performance against other politicians in similar contexts. Second, coordinated electoral behavior by voters may require that voters believe that others also received the same information and expect them to act upon it.

To understand when elections effectively select politicians that will implement policies benefiting the poor, we our randomized field experiment will provide voters with information about the past performance of incumbent and opposition parties prior to the 2015 Mexican municipal elections. We will provide voters with information from independent federal audits documenting the proportion of funds—which are solely intended for social infrastructure projects benefiting voters in extreme poverty—that are instead spent in a corrupt manner or spent on projects that do not benefit the poor. Given that corrupt and diversionary spending account for 14% of such funds, our project has important implications for both effective policy implementation and understanding how political can be held to account. Since Mexican mayors cannot seek re-election, we ask when is information effective at holding political parties to account?

We propose two interventions to identify the importance of the content and mode of in-
formation provided for the incumbent party’s re-election prospects: (1) providing information about the performance of the incumbent party in only a voter’s own municipality, relative to pairing it with information about the worse/better performance of other incumbent mayors from other parties in their state; and (2) providing information through private or social modes of transmission. The first intervention studies the role of relative performance information for voter beliefs about the quality of candidates from incumbent and challenger parties. The second intervention identifies the role of social transmission for deliberation and internalization of information, and potentially for coordinated voter behavior. Given the replicability and scalability of our treatments, our findings may have the potential to inform the design of accountability campaigns in many countries.

2 Theory

Standard agency models of political choice focus on incumbent performance in office, arguing that voters should replace their incumbent if a certain level of performance is not realized (see Fearon, 1999), but also by forward-looking voters that learn about incumbent types from observing performance in office (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990). However, empirical studies analyzing the effect of providing voters with information about incumbent performance find mixed evidence. Ferraz and Finan (2008) and Larreguy, Marshall, and Snyder Jr. (2015) find that local media revealing mayors to be malfeasant reduce their likelihood of reelection in Brazil and Mexico respectively. Conversely, Banerjee et al. (2011), Chong et al. (2015), and (de Figueiredo, Hidalgo, and Kasahara, 2013) find that providing negative information about the performance of incumbents via flyers or report cards has no effect on their votes shares. Some studies suggest that negative information may cause disenchanted voters to abstain (Chong et al., 2015).

We explore two theoretical mechanisms that might explain when information provision supports electoral accountability. First, we use a simple learning model to understand how the type of performance information provided—whether simply about a given incumbent party, or in comparison to incumbents in other similar contexts—impact voter behavior. Second, we

\[\text{Such predictions can be generated by both purely backward-looking models (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986)}\]
explore how the mode of transmitting such information affect the relative impact of providing a given piece of information.

2.1 Information content and voter learning

We first explore how the provision of information affects electoral accountability. A key insight is that negative information about the incumbent (without reference to other politicians) might influence beliefs about candidates from both the incumbent’s party and opposition parties. For example, if voters believe that politicians from all parties are similar, corruption revelations could cause voters to believe all politicians are corrupt. However, when information is provided relative to other incumbents or challengers, voters may differentially update about incumbents and challengers.

To motivate our empirical analysis, we propose a simple voter learning model to develop specific empirical predictions pertaining to the provision of information about the local incumbent, and an incumbent from a different party in a similar municipality. Our theoretical model is based on several key features: voters receive expressive utility from supporting their favored party; voters are uncertain about the “quality” of each party; and voters face a cost to voting that may cause them not to turn out when they are relatively indifferent between political parties. Our analysis focuses on the effects of altering the information environment facing voters, and thus generating predictions regarding the effect of information on voting behavior. We focus on a simple political environment where there exist two parties, the incumbent $I$ and challenger $C$, and for simplicity we assume that candidates within parties are perfectly correlated (although we examine this empirically). Parties do not take actions, and thus voting behavior is a simple decision-theoretic problem.

We denote the expected utility from voting for party $j \in \{I, C\}$ by:

$$U_j(\mu_j, \tau_j^2, s_j, s_{-j}, \sigma_j^2, \sigma_{-j}^2, \rho; \theta)$$

The theory can be easily adjusted to allow for imperfect within-party correlations.

While in our most basic model we do not consider the possibilities that parties might react to the information we provide, in order to counteract its effect possibly through strategies such as vote buying, we later implicitly extend the model to account for the possibility of such strategies, and hypothesize the effect of our treatments on vote-buying practices (H33 and H34) and strategic campaign efforts to accentuate or attenuate the effects of information (H41 and H42).
for a voter of type $\theta$. We assume that this expressive expected utility function \textit{additively} captures two components. First, voters form beliefs about party $j$'s quality. In terms of prior beliefs, $\mu_j$ denotes $\theta$'s prior belief regarding the mean utility associated with voting for party $j$, and $\tau^2_j$ denotes the variance of the distribution associated with this prior. Voters may receive a signal about the quality of party $j$ before the election; in particular, $s_j$ is the value of the signal that $\theta$ receives before the election. This signal is drawn from a distribution with a known variance, $\sigma^2_j$, while $\rho$ denotes $\theta$'s belief about the correlation between the quality of parties $I$ and $C$. Similarly, voters may also receive a similarly distributed signal $s_{-j}$ with variance $\sigma^2_{-j}$ about party $-j$.

For simplicity, we assume that voters are risk-neutral, and thus care about the expected quality associated with voting for a given party $j$, and disregard the variance of their posterior beliefs.\footnote{At the cost of greater analytical complexity, we could include risk-aversion in $U_j$. Since we believe that this is likely to be a second-order effect, we assume that voters are risk-neutral.} Specifically, we assume that $U_j$ is increasing in $\mu_j$ and $s_j$, and thus good (bad) news, $s_j > (<) \mu_j$, will induce voters to positively (negatively) update about the quality of party $j$ (H19, H20 and H21). The variance parameters provide relative weights to the prior and signal; accordingly, the weight attached to the signal is increasing in $\tau^2_j/\sigma^2_j$.

If $\rho \neq 0$, then information about other parties $-j$ may also be informative about the utility associated with party $j$, and thus $s_{-j}$ and $\sigma^2_{-j}$ may also affect voter beliefs. In particular, if $\rho > 0$, which is most empirically plausible, then $U_j$ is increasing in $s_{-j}$; conversely, if $\rho < 0$, then $U_j$ is decreasing in $s_{-j}$. The strength of the correlation and the variance of this signal, $\sigma^2_{-j}$, determine the relative weight attached to signals about party $-j$ when learning about party $j$.

Second, $\theta$ captures voter-specific information that could include a bias toward a particular party. Given that the incumbent was elected at the previous election, most likely there is, on average, a bias toward the incumbent party across voters. Biases are continuously distributed across voter types according to a cumulative distribution function $F(\theta)$. As discussed below, the shape of this function is important in understanding the implications for electoral turnout.

The key feature of the model is voter updating about parties, and its implications for vote choice. Upon updating their beliefs about the expressive benefits of voting for each party, vote
choice reflects the following simple rule:

\[
v^*(\mu_j, \tau_j^2, s_j, s_{-j}, \sigma_j^2, \sigma_{-j}^2, \rho; \theta) = \begin{cases} 
I & \text{if } \Delta \geq c \\
C & \text{if } -\Delta \geq c \\
\emptyset & \text{if } |\Delta| < c
\end{cases}
\]

where \( c \) denotes a constant cost to voters of turning out. The vote shares of the respective parties can simply be calculated by integrating over \( F \). The key insight from this model is the importance of the relative expressive utilities associated with voting for the respective parties: \( \Delta \equiv U_I(\mu_j, \tau_j^2, s_j, s_{-j}, \sigma_j^2, \sigma_{-j}^2, \rho; \theta) - U_C(\mu_j, \tau_j^2, s_j, s_{-j}, \sigma_j^2, \sigma_{-j}^2, \rho; \theta) \). \( \Delta \) summarizes this information, determining how new information affects incentives to support different parties or to not turn out at all.

Information about the incumbent, \( s_j \), plays several roles. Least surprisingly, positive (negative) information about the incumbent party causes voters to positively (negatively) update about the quality of the incumbent. However, a signal about \( I \) also causes voters to update about the challenger. Provided that \( \rho > 0 \), a positive (negative) signal about \( I \) also induces voters to positively (negatively) update about \( C \), provided that \( s_I - \mu_C > 0 \). Whether the impact on expected quality is greater for \( I \) or \( C \) depends upon the relative weights attached to the signal: the effect of \( s_I \) on \( U_C \) is increasing in \( \rho, 1/\sigma_j^2, \) and \( \tau_C^2 \). Although it is theoretically possible that \( s_I \) has a larger impact on \( C \) than \( I \), we expect the effect to be smaller (H25), and thus \( \partial \Delta/\partial s_j > 0 \). Moreover, this comparative static is declining in \( \rho, 1/\sigma_j^2, \) and \( \tau_C^2 \).

Assuming that \( \partial \Delta/\partial s_j > 0 \), a positive (negative) signal, such that \( s_I - \mu_I > 0 \), will—on average—increase the vote share of \( I \) (H1, H5 and H6). When \( s_I = \mu_I \), voters do not adjust their expectations (H4). The effect of this signal is greatest when the voter has a weak prior about \( I \) (i.e. high \( \tau_I^2 \)) (H8, H36, H37 and H40), the signal is believed to be relatively precise (i.e. low \( \sigma_I^2 \)) (H2 and H14), and the partisan bias is small (i.e. the relative weight attached to quality is high) (H35 and H39). Of course, the impact is also increasing in the positivity of the signal (i.e. high \( s_j \)) (H3) and its difference relative to the prior (H7). While the information shock may be sufficient to convince some voters to change their vote choice, for others a positive (negative) information shock increases (decreases) the difference between the
parties (\(\Delta\)) without affecting vote choice. Nevertheless, we expect that a positive (negative) shock will reduce (increase) indifference between the parties, and thus increase (decrease) a voter’s confidence in their vote choice (H15). These changes are also increasing in the extent of positive (negative) news relative to an individual’s prior (H16).

A similar logic applies to receiving a signal about the challenger. Since our experiment will only provide information about the challenger in conjunction with information about the incumbent, we focus on the case where voters receive both \(s_I\) and \(s_C\). Furthermore, in our experimental conditions there is a strong negative correlation between \(s_I\) and \(s_C\). In other words, when voters receive good news about the challenger, they generally receive bad news about the incumbent, and vice versa; we thus expect voters to downwardly update their belief about the cross-party correlation \(\rho\) (H28). In this case, our predictions are unambiguous: since \(\partial U_j / \partial s_j > 0\), and assuming that \(\partial U_j / \partial s_I + \partial U_j / \partial s_C > 0\) (i.e. a signal about the other party is less informative than a signal about a given party), receiving a good (bad) signal about the incumbent \(and\) a bad (good) signal about the challenger will increase (decrease) \(\Delta\), and thus the vote share of \(I\). Furthermore, because the signals are generally negatively correlated in our particular application, receiving information about both \(I\) and \(C\) will magnify the effects of simply receiving information about \(I\) (H9-H13).

Our results also have implications for electoral turnout. Where \(|\Delta| < c\), the expressive benefits of voting for a voter’s favored party are not sufficient to justify turning out. Information again plays an important role. In the case of simply receiving \(s_I\), a positive signal about the incumbent induces some voters that would not have otherwise voted to vote for \(I\) (as well as some \(C\) voters if the signal is sufficiently powerful), and also induces some voters not to turn out that would not have otherwise voted for \(C\). Similarly, a negative signal about the incumbent induces some voters not to turn out and others to support the challenger.

The exact implications for turnout depend upon the shape of \(F\). For example, the effect on turnout depends on the relative density of voters who did not turn out to that of the voters that weakly preferred the incumbent in the past election. We consider the particular case of a bimodal distribution of partisan allegiances, where there is considerable bunching of voters around a given level of moderate favorability toward both \(I\) and \(C\) that is sufficient to ensure that such voters turn out to support their favored party. Under such a distribution, we
expect to find a non-linear relationship with turnout: while a relatively small shock reduces turnout, a relatively large shock may increase turnout (H17 and H18). Both cases follow a similar logic where, by virtue of the bimodal distribution, a small shock negative (positive) to the incumbent induces a relatively large drop in incumbent (challenging) turnout, but only induces a small number of voters that would not previously have voted to shift toward the challenger (incumbent).

2.2 Social transmission mechanisms

A second potential key factor in explaining when information supports political accountability, implied by the large effects of local media (Larreguy, Marshall, and Snyder Jr., 2015), is the method of information transmission. The role of information transmission mechanisms has been ignored in the literature, but it is possible that social modes of transmission—whereby, unlike private transmission, voters are aware that other voters have also received a given piece of information—can produce more powerful effects by facilitating coordination.

Coordination could be induced both by explicit interaction or through correlated beliefs. In the case of explicit voter coordination, upon realizing that others also received information, voters coordinate on their responses to such information through interpersonal discussion of meetings (H43). However, coordination could also occur without explicit social interaction. In particular, if a social transmission mechanism increases the probability that voters believe that others also received a given piece of information, and are willing to act upon it (because their beliefs about the relative merits of different politicians change or the issue becomes relatively more salient), social transmission can create a focal point as well as being informative (H44). This may induce a shift in a correlated equilibrium when voters believe that the behavior of others is similarly affected. Both such cases of coordinated behavior induce shifts that could not be achieved by providing the same information using private modes of information transmission.

Alternatively, social transmission may affect the behavior of parties rather than voters. Even if voters do not change their beliefs about others or discuss their political actions, political parties may differentially fear or seek to exploit the information provided by a social infor-
formation transmission mechanism. This could be because parties are more likely to be aware of social modes of transmission, or because they believe that such mechanisms are more likely to alter voter behavior. For example, we may thus expect that incumbent parties may seek to counteract negative information by discrediting, justifying or contextualizing such information (H41). Conversely, opposition parties may seek to exploit negative information about an incumbent party by increasing the salience of the information provided (H42).

However, social modes of transmission may simply be more effective signals. Independent of the behavior of other actors (or beliefs over such behavior), social mechanisms like local media may be particularly powerful just because they are more effective at reaching voters. In the context of the model above, social transmission mechanisms may reduce the variance of the signal ($\sigma_j^2$).

3 Research Design

To test these mechanisms, we propose a randomized field experiment in the context of Mexico’s municipal elections in June 7, 2015. Municipalities are governed by elected mayors, who are responsible for delivering basic public services and managing local infrastructure. Before the elections, we will provide voters with leaflets that contain information about either (a) corruption (percentage of funds spent on unauthorized expenses) or (b) the diversion of funds intended for the poor (percentage of funds spent on projects not benefiting the poor). These figures come from audit reports conducted by the Federal Auditor’s Office. The reports focus on mayoral use of the Fondo de Infraestructura Social Municipal (FISM) that consists of federal transfers legally earmarked for social infrastructure spending benefiting the poor. Such funds represent 24% of the average municipal budget. Between 2007 and 2014, 8% of funds were spent on projects not benefiting the poor, while a further 6% were spent in a corrupt manner.

The leaflets report the total amount allocated to the municipality (in $MXN) as part of the FISM as well as the percentage of funds on either unauthorized expenses (i.e. fraction not spent on social infrastructure projects such as drinking water, sewage, roads, electrification, schools, clinics and housing) or the percentage amount of funds spent on projects that
did not benefit the poor (e.g. the pavement of a road in a wealthy community). The type of information reported varies by municipality, and depends on the dimension on which the municipality exhibits the largest contrast relative to other municipalities in the state governed by a different party (this will be clarified below). Based on the findings of (Larreguy, Marshall, and Snyder Jr., 2015), throughout our analysis we pool municipalities with information on unauthorized expenses (corruption) or diversion of funds intended for the poor. The leaflets describe in a succinct and simplified way the type of projects in which FISM funds are meant to be spent in by law, and also make it explicit that 0% of these funds should go to projects that are not authorized or do not benefit the poor. In addition to reporting percentage figures, we also use graphical aids (stacks of coins) to facilitate the comprehension of the information.

Specifically, we propose a 2x2 factorial design with a pure control, where 4 different treatments are implemented prior to the election (within 2 weeks). As shown in Table 1, we intend to vary whether the leaflet reports only local information (on the municipality) or relative performance information (comparing own municipality with other municipalities governed by a different party in the state), as well as whether such information is provided privately or socially.

[Table 1 about here.]

**Type of Information (Local vs. Benchmark)** We have two different treatments regarding the informational content of the leaflets. In the *local* information treatment, voters receive a leaflet that reports information only about the performance of the municipal incumbent. In the *benchmark* information treatment the leaflet reports information on the performance of the municipal incumbent and on the average performance of audited municipal incumbents from all other political parties in the state. Sample leaflets associated with each treatment and type of information, as well as the cover common to all leaflets, are shown in Figures 1-5.

[Figure 1 about here.]

[Figure 2 about here.]

[Figure 3 about here.]
Method of Delivery (Private vs. Public)  We have two different treatments regarding the method of delivery of the leaflets. In the private treatment, the staff of a marketing firm will distribute leaflets door-to-door on behalf of the NGO we partnered with. In every case, enumerators will attempt to deliver the leaflet in person unless a household member is not present in which case the leaflet is left outside the door. In the social treatment door-to-door delivery of leaflets is accompanied by cars with loudspeakers attracting attention to the leaflets and the information contained in them. Such audio-vehicles are common in Mexico during political campaigns.

Mexico is divided into 32 states (including the Federal District), divided into approximately 2,500 municipalities, divided into around 67,000 electoral precincts. Electoral precincts contain around 1,600 citizens (1,200 registered voters) from around 420 households (based on the 2010 Census). Electoral precincts are contained within municipalities. Voters within a precinct are assigned alphabetically by surname between polling stations, which cannot contain more than 750 registered voters each. Thus, due to the allocation rule of voters into precincts, the precinct is the smallest level we can randomize at (we cannot assign a given household to a specific polling station but we can assign each household to an electoral precinct). Treatments will be randomly assigned at the electoral precinct level (a level at which official turnout and vote share statistics are reported) within municipalities.

Based on our power calculations, we will randomly assign 100 precincts to each of our four treatment conditions in Table 1, producing a total of 400 treated precincts and 100 control precincts where post-election surveys will be conducted and up to 178 additional control precincts where we will solely examine election outcomes. Our study will focus on 26 municipalities in the states of Guanajuato (7 municipalities), Mexico (13 municipalities), San Luis Potosi (5 municipalities) and Queretaro (1 municipality). Beyond logistical reasons, these states were selected because they contain internal variation in the municipal incumbent party, which is also broadly representative of Mexico as a whole. The total number of precincts in these municipalities is 4,082, and thus treated precincts account for 9.8% of.
Within these states, our municipalities were chosen according to three main criteria. First, to ensure that no participants or enumerators could be endangered in any way, we eliminated all municipalities regarded as dangerous in any respect. Second, in order to best understand how the relative performance treatment affects voting behavior, we initially focused on municipalities that under-performed relative to the state opposition averages. Specifically, we focus on municipalities where unauthorized spending or spending not on the poor exceeded the state opposition averages by at least 2 percentage points. Among these municipalities we picked all possible rural precincts subject to the constraint that no more than a third of the municipal precincts receive an informational treatment. Moreover, when considering urban precincts—where the third-of-the-precincts constraint never binds—we focused on the urban precincts with the smallest possible number of registered voters (see below). In order to maintain the non-partisan nature of the intervention, we ensured that the proposed municipalities were well balanced across political parties in the sense that party incumbency and malfeasance accurately reflected the broader distribution of the municipalities audited by the Federal Auditor’s Office in these states. Third, although our main focus is on under-performing incumbents so to better understand voter behavior, we also include municipalities with no or little malfeasance, as well as municipalities that over-performed relative to the state opposition averages, in order to examine the full range of municipal contexts.

Our dependent variables come from official electoral statistics and a post-treatment survey of 5,000 voters (evenly split amongst the control group and 4 treatment conditions). While electoral returns measure vote shares and turnout, our survey is designed to test the theoretical channels postulated above. For example, we will ask voters about their priors regarding how different parties compare regarding corruption and implementing policies required to benefit the poor, the correlation between candidates (henceforth referred to as “correlation of candidate types”) both within and across parties, and whether they believe other voters received information and acted upon it.
3.1 Sampling Strategy

The total number of precincts in our 26 municipalities is 4,082. Given the sample of feasible electoral precincts, we further restricted this set before obtaining our final sample (with some slack) that we use for randomization. First, to save leaflet distribution costs we removed the most difficult to reach electoral precincts from rural areas. Second, in urban areas, we sought to minimize both electorate size (to save costs) and precinct adjacency (to minimize potential spillovers). Specifically, this entailed first eliminating precincts with more than 1,750 registered voters, and then we devised an algorithm to minimize treatment spillovers across neighboring urban precincts. For the algorithm, we started from the set of neighboring precincts surrounding each precinct and identified all neighboring precincts that were eligible for our sample; we then iteratively removed the precinct with most “in-sample” neighbors until we had the specified number of precincts for a given municipality. In the vast majority of cases we were able to ensure that there exist no neighboring precincts. In municipalities where many (urban and rural) precincts survived, we allowed the matching algorithm used for the block randomization to determine which precincts would be included on the basis of precinct similarity. We thus discard the most anomalous precincts.

3.2 Block Randomization

Within each municipality, we stratified precincts into blocks. Similarly to Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov (2013), we created bins of precincts based on baseline characteristics and randomly assign treatment within those bins. Block randomization ensures that different municipalities do not receive different treatment dosages, since each municipality receives exactly the same distribution of treatments, and also maximizes the power of the experiment by minimizing differences between treated and control precincts (including controlling for all municipal level characteristics).

All blocks will contain 6 or 7 precincts. Specifically, each block contains 4 treated precincts, 1 control precinct where a post-election survey will be conducted, and 1 or 2 additional control precincts where only electoral outcomes will be examined. Whether 1 or 2 additional controls are used depends upon the number of feasible precincts available. These additional precincts
may also be used as replacements for treated units in the event that leaflet distribution is not possible.

The composition of our blocks is determined on the basis of 23 social, economic, demographic and political variables provided by Mexico’s National Statistical Agency (INEGI) and INE. We computed the Mahalanobis distance between all available precincts in a given municipality and then constructed blocks of most similar precincts on the basis of this distance. The assignment of precincts to blocks is greedy in the sense that it creates the most similar group first.\textsuperscript{5} Where there are more potential precincts available to choose from than we wish to include in the study, we select the most similar blocks to maximize statistical efficiency.

3.3 Leaflet distribution

The starting point for the leaflet distribution will be determined randomly within a given electoral precinct, and distributors will then precede to distribute leaflets to all available households until all of the 200 available leaflets are distributed. Leaflets will be given to the person that answers the door. If the individual that opens the door is a child, our distribution team will request that they call the head of the household or another adult in case they are absent. In case nobody answers the door, the leaflet will be taped to the door. We thus expect that the households receiving leaflets will reflect the average characteristics of the sample.

The leaflets will be distributed by Data OPM (http://www.dataopm.net/) on behalf of Borde Político. The Data OPM employees will use t-shirts with the logo of Borde Político and tell voters that they come on its behalf. The survey will also be conducted by Data OPM, but in the name of Harvard and NYU. Data OPM have significant experience, including implementing the annual Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in Mexico, and the Mexico Panel Surveys. Moreover, Que Funciona Para el Desarrollo (QFD) (http://qfd.org.mx/?lang=en), the firm we hired to deal with administrative, financial and logistical issues in Mexico, will oversee the distribution of the leaflets and conducting of post-election surveys. They have significant experience and have been involved in projects with the USAID and the World Bank, among other international institutions.

\textsuperscript{5}In particular, we used the R allocation algorithm “blockTools”.

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4 Survey Instrument

We administer a post-election survey to a sample of 5,000 individuals (1,000 surveys allocated to each treatment arm and 1,000 surveys in control precincts). We will survey 10 households per precinct, randomly sampled through a pre-specified random walk method. Specifically, our survey team—which will approach voters at home and conduct interviews in their homes—will first ask potential participants if they are registered voters, and only proceed with the survey if the participant is a registered voter (and thus of voting age, i.e. 18 or older). The starting point will be randomly determined, which should ensure that the surveys are broadly representative and give all voters an equal chance of being selected. We intend to stratify on age and gender, which are the only observable individual characteristics for the enumerators. All potential survey participants will be provided with basic information about the study as part of our informed consent protocol.

The survey instrument, which can be found in Appendix A, covers questions on a broad set of topics:

1. Voting Decisions
2. Ideology
3. Correlation of Candidate Types
4. Policy Preferences
5. Reality Check
6. Party Responses
7. Social Transmission Mechanisms
8. Vote Buying
9. Political Knowledge
10. Trust in Institutions
11. Assessment and Priors for Incumbent Party Based on Leaflet Information.
5 Dependent and Independent Variables

We will collect two types of outcomes: precinct-level voting records from official electoral data and individual-level outcomes retrieved from the post-treatment survey.

5.1 Precinct-Level Electoral Outcomes

To evaluate the effect of the treatments at the unit of randomization, we will collect data on turnout and party vote shares at the precinct-level:

1. *Incumbent Share*: Incumbent’s party vote share constructed using precinct-level outcomes reported by state electoral commissions (as a proportion of both the total number of voters that turnout and the number of registered voters).

2. *Challenger Share*: Vote share of the different challenging parties constructed using precinct-level outcomes reported by state electoral commissions.

3. *Turnout*: Turnout (number of those who effectively voted over number of registered voters) constructed using precinct-level outcomes and registered voters reported by state electoral commissions.

5.2 Individual-Level Electoral Outcomes

1. *Incumbent Vote*: The measure takes a value of 1 if the respondent voted for the incumbent’s party and 0 if she did not (whether or not she actually voted). Respondents will report their vote choice confidentially by marking a sample ballot and placing it in an envelope.

2. *Challenger Vote*: The measure takes a value of 1 if the respondent voted for a challenger party and 0 if she did not (whether or not she actually voted). Respondents will report their vote choice confidentially by marking a sample ballot and placing it in an envelope.
3. *Individual Turnout*: The measure takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports to have voted in the June 2015 election (we will request proof of turnout such as ink in the finger or official electoral credential) and zero otherwise.

### 5.3 Other Individual-Level Outcomes

Beyond the precinct-level and individual-level electoral outcomes, which constitute the core of our analysis, we will also use other outcome variables collected from our post-electoral survey in order to test our proposed theoretical model and substantiate the mechanisms through which our treatments affect voter’s behavior. Below we describe the additional outcome variables we will use in our analysis:

1. *Vote Confidence*: This measure codes on a 4-point scale how confident was the respondent on her choice of party. The goal here is to test the extent to which our treatment may have not only affected vote choice but also the confidence with which voters make their decisions. In some cases the informational treatment may not be strong enough to change a voter’s party choice, but may make voters less confident about their decision.

2. *Party Perceptions*: Respondents are asked to rate all parties on corruption and lack of interest in marginalized population using a 5-point scale. We use these ex-post assessments on these issues to test whether observed change in voting behavior is driven by changing voter perceptions on the issues on which information was provided and test whether voters are updating as our theoretical model would predict.

3. *Correlation Types Same*: Voters are asked to report on a 5-point scale the extent to which information on their own incumbent leads them to update their perceptions on other candidates from the same party.

4. *Correlation Types Others*: Voters are asked to report on a 5-point scale the extent to which information on their own incumbent leads them to update their perceptions on other candidates from different (challenging) parties.

5. *Information Consumption*: We have a wide range of measures on whether respondents (i) recall receiving information on municipal expenses; (ii) whether they did so via leaflets;
(iii) whether the leaflet contained information only on their own municipality or on other municipalities in their state and (iv) whether voters recall a loudspeaker inviting households to read the leaflet. These measures will be mostly used as validity checks for whether the treatments were successful in transmitting information to the voters, and the extent to which different treatments were more successful than others in generating interest in and comprehension of the information provided.

6. **Vote Buying:** We will use a list experiment to estimate the fraction of voters in different treatments that were offered money or gifts in exchange for their vote. We will also ask about this issue directly (and not only via the list experiment) by asking how common it is for residents of their locality to receive money in exchange for their vote. The objective of this outcome variable is to measure the extent to which candidates respond to informational interventions by making more intense use of vote-buying transactions in order to counteract the effect of the informational campaign.

7. **Politician Reactions:** We will also ask voters to report on how candidates from different parties mentioned or addressed during their campaign the information reported in the leaflets (discrediting the information, justifying their behavior, contextualizing their behavior, or accentuating the saliency of the information), as well as the ways in which such responses were communicated (in person, via the media, through campaign events, via posters, or via leaflets).

8. **Social Transmission:** As discussed above, our social transmission treatment could increase the effectiveness of information provision via various mechanisms. To differentiate such mechanisms, we will ask voters about the extent to which they (i) explicitly coordinated their vote choice with others in the community, tried to convince other voters to vote for a specific party, and others in the community tried to convince them to vote for a specific party; (ii) altered their beliefs about the how other voters view incumbent and challenger parties, and whether they believe voters will vote on the basis of such information; and (iii) whether politicians responded (see above). In addition, we will also ask survey respondents about their guess/perceptions on how many other members in their community received the information in the leaflets to test whether the social
transmission does indeed increase the likelihood that voters believe others received the information and may have acted upon it.

5.4 Basic Treatment/Independent Variables

Next, we define different treatment variables based on alternative groupings or interactions of our basic experimental treatments.

1. Information: This variable equals one for respondents in precincts that received any of the informational treatments (i.e. received a leaflet) and zero for households in control precincts.

2. Private: This variable equals one for respondents that received a leaflet privately (i.e. without an accompanying loudspeaker) and zero otherwise.

3. Social: This variable equals one for respondents that received a leaflet socially (i.e. accompanied by a loudspeaker) and zero otherwise.

4. Local: This variable equals one for respondents that received only a local-information leaflet (that is, a leaflet with information only on the municipal incumbent) and zero otherwise.

5. Benchmark: This variable equals one for respondents that received a benchmark-information leaflet (that is, a leaflet with information on both the municipal incumbent and challenging parties in other municipalities) and zero otherwise.

At this point it is important to define the way in which we will measure individual respondent priors regarding the extent of corruption or lack of interest in the poor for incumbent and challenging parties. Without a baseline survey, measuring priors is more challenging, especially since we cannot simply use post-treatment perceptions as these will partly reflect the effect of our intervention. We will employ different approaches for measuring priors. We can use perceptions by individuals in control precincts (and thus not subject to any effects of the treatment) within the same municipality and assume that all voters in the municipality shared the same prior. Alternatively, based on responses by individuals in control precincts, we can regress reported perceptions (priors)
on a wide range of individual demographic characteristics and then impute predicted priors for each household in treated precincts based on the estimated parameters for individuals in control precincts. This procedure can be used to elicit priors on both the incumbent party and other parties.

Also, at the end of the survey we will show to all respondents the information in our leaflet pertaining to the performance of the incumbent and opposition parties (for respondents in treatment precincts this will be information that had already been distributed prior to the elections). Then, we will ask respondents to rate the incumbent and opposition parties (based on the information in the leaflet) on a 5-point scale. We will also ask respondents whether the information reported in the leaflet is much better, better, the same, worse or much worse than they expected at the beginning of the campaign season. We can then use this reported change in perceptions and the reported post-treatment perceptions in order to infer individual-level priors at the beginning of the campaign. This approach has the advantage of not relying on imputations from voters in control precincts. On the other hand however, it may be that voters in treated precincts have a bias in reporting priors consistent with post-treatment perceptions. Similarly, it may that voters report being more surprised than they really were.

To address these concerns we will report our results using these alternative measures of priors. The goal of estimating voter priors is to generate different measures of voter’s assessment of the informational reported in the leaflets relative to their priors and interact them with the different indicator treatment variables described above:

6. **Change**: This variable simply measures on a 5 point scale the difference between the voters’ assessment of their own incumbent (based on the leaflet) and their priors. For example, if the voters’ assessment of the incumbent is much worse than priors, Change takes a value of 2, if it is simply worse it takes a value of 1, if the prior and post-treatment assessment are similar the measure takes a value of 0, if assessment is better than prior it equals -1 and if much better than prior it equals -2.

7. **Good**: This variable equals one for respondents for whom the information reported in the leaflets represented good news relative to their priors; i.e. individuals for whom the
ex-post perceptions are better than their priors ($Change < 0$).

8. **Bad**: This variable equals one for respondents for whom the information reported in the leaflets represented *bad news* relative to their priors; i.e. individuals for whom the ex-post perceptions are worse than their priors ($Change > 0$).

9. **Strength**: This variable measures the strength of the priors (how confident was the respondent about her assessment of the different parties on corruption and interest on marginalized population).

On average we expect the information reported in the leaflets to be worse than what voters expected ($Change < 0$), and we thus believe that our basic treatments will have a negative effect on vote for the incumbent on average (more on this below). However, the effect of the treatment may depend nonetheless on the magnitude (percentage mis-spent) of the information reported in the leaflet ($Own\_Report$) for the incumbent or on the gap between the information reported for the municipal incumbent and the average for incumbents from other parties in the state ($Dif\_Report$). Thus, we will also interact our basic treatment dummies with the absolute or relative information reported in the leaflets.

10. **$Own\_Report$**: Percentage amount of funds spent on unauthorized funds/on projects that did not benefit the poor for the municipal incumbent.

11. **$Dif\_Report$**: Difference between percentage amount of funds spent on unauthorized funds/on projects that did not benefit the poor for the municipal incumbent and incumbents form other parties (average) in the same state.

### 5.5 Individual Characteristics/Moderators

In our survey we will also collect information on a wide range of individual characteristics that can plausibly intermediate the effect of information on voting behavior. We will test the effect of these key mediators through interactions with our main treatment variables described above.
1. Attribute Preferences: We collect measures on the importance that respondents attach to the main candidate attributes associated with our informational treatments: honesty and interest in the poor.

2. Political Knowledge: We also collect objective measures of how knowledgeable the respondent is on basic political issues (names and parties of local and state officials, number of chambers in the federal legislature and term length).

3. Access Information: We code respondents’ self-reported interest in consuming political information as well as more objective measures of media consumption for different outlets (TV, radio, newspapers, internet, and social media).

4. Trust Institutions: We ask respondents to rate the extent to which they believe: (i) elections are helpful in electing honest and competent politicians; (ii) the ballot is secret in Mexico and (iii) June elections were free and fair.

5. Partisan Attach: We ask respondents to not only report the party to which they express greater affinity but also rate the intensity of their partisan attachment. Since partisan attachment is very likely affected by the treatment, absent a baseline survey we cannot use post-treatment self-reported partisan attachments as moderators. We can follow however, several strategies: (i) Use interaction of party choice and certainty of voting decision in the previous election (2012) as a measure of individual partisan attachment; (ii) Use precinct-level vote share in the previous election as a measure of intensity of voter’s preferences or (iii) Use partisan attachments in electoral precincts in the control group within the same municipality in order to generate a municipality-level measure of partisan attachments.

6. Demographics: We also collect several demographic characteristics of respondents that may mediate the effect of information and/or affect vote choice directly. We collect information on respondent’s gender, age, educational attainment, occupation, income and household composition.
6 Analysis and Main Hypotheses

Next we present the main specifications for our analysis associated to the different treatment/independent variables described in section 5.4. We present our main hypotheses regarding the effect of the different treatments on the vote share of the candidate from the incumbent party. We also present other hypotheses on the effects on other outcomes and key mediators.

In general terms, our empirical analysis is based on estimating regressions of the form:

\[ Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Treatment}_{pbm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm}, \]

where \( Y_{ipbm} \) corresponds to the outcome variable for individual \( i \), in electoral precinct \( p \), in randomization block \( b \), in municipality \( m \). For electoral outcomes at the precinct and not the individual level we simply drop the \( i \) subscript. Treatment\(_{pbm}\) corresponds to different combinations of the treatment variables described in section 5.4. \( \rho_{bm} \) corresponds to randomization block fixed effects and finally \( \epsilon_{ipbm} \) is the error term. Throughout our analysis, standard errors are clustered at the municipality-treatment level (unit of analysis at which the treatment varies).

6.1 Vote for the Incumbent Party

We begin with estimates for the average effect of distributing leaflets. In order to make sense of our hypothesized average effects, it is important to note that the municipalities sampled for our study are worse (in terms of the percentage of funds spent on unauthorized expenses or that do not benefit the poor) than the average municipality in the same state but governed by a different party. Thus, on average we expect Change \( > 0 \) and Diff_Report \( > 0 \). We also assume that voters perceive a higher correlation of types across candidates from the same party than across candidates of different parties. These assumptions are embedded in our hypothesized average effects. However, some hypotheses will be conditional on voters priors.

\[ Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 Information_{pbm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm}, \]  

(2)
[H1] Our informational treatment will decrease (on average) support for the candidate from the incumbent party ($\beta_1 < 0$). As stated above, this hypothesis is motivated by the fact that the percentage of funds on unauthorized expenses or that did not benefit the poor is relatively high (above average) for incumbents in our sample of municipalities. Thus, we expect that on average the information reported in the leaflets will exceed voters’ priors (though this is something that we will be able to test).

Next, we explore the average effect of our intervention, differentiating by the role of the method of delivery, by estimating a regression of the form:

$$Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 Private_{pbm} + \beta_2 Social_{pbm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm}$$ (3)

[H2] The Social method of delivery has on average a stronger effect than Private delivery ($\beta_2 < \beta_1 < 0$) since under the social treatment voters are more likely to learn about the treatment and potentially coordinate a change in their voting decision.

We also test how the effect of our leaflets varies with the severity of the audit information reported in the leaflet for the municipal incumbent:

$$Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 Information_{pbm} + \beta_2 Own\_Report_{pbm} + \beta_3 Information \times Own\_Report_{pbm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm}$$ (4)

[H3] The average effect of our informational treatment is increasing in the severity of the information reported for the incumbent in the leaflet ($\beta_3 < 0$). Similarly we hypothesize that in municipalities with no unauthorized expenses or spending that does not benefit the poor incumbent parties will be rewarded, $\beta_1 > 0$, given that voter prior beliefs are unlikely to be zero.

Next, we explore the average effect of our intervention according to how voters assessed the information in the leaflets relative to their priors:

$$Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 Information_{pbm} + \beta_2 Good_{ipbm} + \beta_3 Bad_{ipbm} + \beta_4 Information \times Good_{ipbm} + \beta_5 Information \times Bad_{ipbm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm}$$ (5)
[H4] Neutral information (no news) about the incumbent party, which is the baseline category in this regression, has no effect on voter support for the candidate from that party ($\beta_1 = 0$).\(^6\)

[H5] Good news about the incumbent party increases voter support for the candidate from that party ($\beta_4 > 0$).

[H6] Bad news about the incumbent party decreases voter support for the candidate from that party ($\beta_5 < 0$).

$$
Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 Information_{pbm} + \beta_2 Change_{ipbm} \\
+ \beta_3 Information \ast Change_{ipbm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm}
$$

[H7] The average effect of the informational treatment is increasing in the difference between the respondent’s assessment of the information reported and the respondent’s priors ($\beta_3 < 0$).

$$
Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 Information_{pbm} + \beta_2 Strength_{ipbm} \\
+ \beta_3 Information \ast Strength_{ipbm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm}
$$

[H8] The average effect of our treatment is weaker the stronger the voters’ priors are ($\beta_3 > 0$). This is because with stronger priors, voters are less likely to update their posterior beliefs about candidates’ types based on the information received to the extent that they will decide to change their voting behavior.

Next we explore the differential effect of our Local and Benchmark treatments:

$$
Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 Local_{pbm} + \beta_2 Benchmark_{pbm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm}
$$

[H9] The benchmark treatment has, on average, a stronger effect than the local treatment ($\beta_2 < \beta_1 < 0$). This is because in most municipalities in our sample, the municipalities in the state governed by other parties are on average better (in terms of the percentage of funds on unauthorized expenses or that did not benefit the poor) than the own municipality.

---

\(^6\)It is important to note the caveat that this effect could be positive if we incorporate risk-aversion into our theory.
The benchmark treatment weakens the correlation of types across parties and increases the
electoral sanctioning to the incumbent party.

\[ Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 Local_{pbm} + \beta_2 Benchmark_{pbm} + \beta_3 Good_{ipbm} + \beta_4 Bad_{ipbm} + \beta_5 Local \times Good_{ipbm} + \beta_6 Local \times Bad_{ipbm} + \beta_7 Benchmark \times Good_{ipbm} + \beta_8 Benchmark \times Bad_{ipbm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm} \] (9)

[H10] The effect of Bad news about the incumbent is strongest in the Benchmark treatment \((\beta_8 < \beta_6 < 0)\).

[H11] The effect of Good news about the incumbent is strongest in the Benchmark treatment \((\beta_7 > \beta_5 > 0)\).

\[ Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 Local_{pbm} + \beta_2 Benchmark_{pbm} + \beta_3 Own\_Report_{pbm} + \beta_4 Local \times Own\_Report_{pbm} + \beta_5 Benchmark \times Own\_Report_{pbm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm} \] (10)

[H12] The severity of the information reported in the leaflets has a stronger effect in the
Benchmark than in the Local treatments \((\beta_5 < \beta_4)\).

\[ Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 Local_{pbm} + \beta_2 Benchmark_{pbm} + \beta_3 Own\_Report_{pbm} + \beta_4 Dif\_Report_{pbm} + \beta_5 Local \times Own\_Report_{pbm} + \beta_6 Benchmark \times Dif\_Report_{pbm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm} \] (11)

[H13] The effect of the Benchmark treatment is stronger the larger is the difference in
the percentage of malfeasance reported for the municipality and the corresponding average
reported for other municipalities in the state governed by other parties \((\beta_6 < 0)\).

Finally, we hypothesize that our social method of delivery enhances the effect of all of the
above treatments. Thus we can include interactions of the different treatment variables in
the specifications above with our Social indicator variable and expect stronger effects. As an
example:

\[ Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 Local_{pbm} + \beta_2 Benchmark_{pbm} + \beta_3 Social_{pbm} + \beta_4 Local \times Social_{pbm} + \beta_5 Benchmark \times Social_{pbm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm} \] (12)
[H14] The *Social* method of delivery enhances the effect of both the *Local* and *Benchmark* treatments ($\beta_1, \beta_5 < 0$).

Hypotheses [H1]-[H14] focus on the effects of the treatments on voting for the incumbent party. Below we present other hypotheses based on estimating the same specifications as in equations (2)-(12) for alternative outcome variables that are important in order to test the driving forces of our theory.

### 6.2 Vote Confidence

[H15]: In cases in which the treatments do not generate a change in vote choice (i.e. no difference between party choice in 2012 and 2015), they will decrease confidence in the vote decision (as measured by the change in confidence reported for 2012 relative to reported confidence in 2015). This is because some voters will now be closer to being indifferent between the incumbent party and not voting.

[H16]: In cases in which the treatments do generate a change in vote choice (i.e. difference between vote choice in 2012 and 2015), the effect on confidence will depend on the magnitude of the information reported in the leaflet. In particular we expect a non-linear effect of $Local \times Own\_Report_{plm}$ and $Benchmark \times Dif\_Report_{plm}$. Whenever $Own\_Report_{plm}$ and $Dif\_Report_{plm}$ are small, confidence in vote choice may be low in spite of change in voting decision (voters may now weakly prefer the challenging party). On the other hand, whenever $Own\_Report_{plm}$ and $Dif\_Report_{plm}$ are large confidence in vote choice may increase as voters now strongly prefer the challenging party.

### 6.3 Turnout

The unconditional effect of our informational treatment ($Information_{plms}$) on turnout is ambiguous and depends on how strongly partisan voters are in the precinct and on the magnitude of the information reported (i.e. extent to which information leads voters to update and change their partisan alignments).

[H17]: Given our working assumptions regarding the bimodality of the voter partisan bias distribution, the effect of our treatments on turnout depends upon the magnitude of the
information reported. As explained in the theoretical model, if the negative information (Bad) reported in the leaflet (Own_Report or Dif_Report) is relatively weak, voters become indifferent but do not switch their support to the opposing party, and thus do not turn out to vote. If the information reported in the leaflet is relatively strong, voters switch their support to the opposing party, and may even increase turn out. In other words, we expect a non-monotonic relationship with the strength of the treatment. Moreover the effect of good news on turnout is stronger in the benchmark than in the local treatment.

[H18]: If the distribution of voter partisan biases is relatively symmetric, then good news (Good) about the incumbent should have a similar effect to bad news (some voters indifferent or inclined not to vote turn out to vote for the incumbent party, while some opposition voters no longer turn out). Moreover the effect of good news on turnout is stronger in the benchmark than in the local treatment.

6.4 Hypotheses on Secondary Outcomes and Key Mediators

6.4.1 Updating

In this section we postulate some hypotheses regarding the way in which voters should update their perceptions on the corruption/interest in the poor of the incumbent party based on the different treatments. These hypotheses are based on the predictions of our theory. An essential assumption here is that voters assume a positive correlation in types between candidates from the incumbent and challenging parties (even if such correlation is not perfect). The sign of some hypotheses will switch if it turns out that there is a negative correlation in types across parties (something that we will be able to test with our survey data).

[H19]: The Information treatment should, on average, increase the perception of corruption (lack of interest on marginalized populations) of the incumbent party. Such effect will be stronger the larger the information (Own_Report) reported in the leaflet is.

[H20]: Bad news about the incumbent party increase perceptions of corruption (lack of interest on marginalized populations) of that party.

[H21]: Good news about the incumbent party decrease perceptions of corruption (lack of interest on marginalized populations) of that party.
[H22]: Our benchmark treatment will, on average, have a weaker effect on perceptions of corruption or lack of interest on marginalized populations of the incumbent than the local treatment. This is because, on average, other municipalities in the same states but governed by other parties perform better along those dimensions than the own municipal incumbent. Since we assume a positive correlation across types, voters may then believe that their bad politician was just a bad draw and improve their perceptions on the incumbent party relative to the local treatment.

[H23]: The effect of the benchmark treatment on perceptions of corruption or lack of interest on marginalized populations of the incumbent decreases with the gap between own municipality and the average of the other municipalities in the same state but governed by other parties. Additionally, the better the other municipalities look, the less voters update (negatively) on candidates from the incumbent party.

[H24]: The effect of the local and benchmark treatments on perceptions of corruption or lack of interest on marginalized populations of the incumbent is stronger in the social than in the private treatment.

[H25]: The local treatment has a weaker effect (but with the same sign, provided that beliefs about candidates across parties are positively correlated) on perceptions of corruption or lack of interest on marginalized populations on other parties than on the municipality’s incumbent party since we assume a stronger correlation across candidates of the same party than across candidates of different parties.

[H26]: In the benchmark treatment, perceptions of corruption or lack of interest on marginalized populations of other parties depend negatively on the information reported for other municipalities.

6.4.2 Correlation of Candidate Types (Pool of candidates)

Essential for the predictions of our model are the effects of the treatments on the extent to which voters believe that attributes of candidates are correlated within and across parties. We postulate some hypotheses regarding the predictions of our model in this respect:

[H27]: The local treatments should have no effect on the extent to which voters believe candidates of the same party are strongly correlated.
Relative to the control and the local treatment, the benchmark treatment should decrease the extent to which voters believe that candidates from the incumbent party and candidates from other parties have correlated types. This effect should be increasing in the gap between own and other parties in the benchmark treatment.

**6.4.3 Information Consumption**

In principle, our treatments should increase the likelihood that voters report being more informed about their incumbent party and other parties in the state.

[H29]: Our treatments should increase the probability that voters report receiving information on municipal budgets in general, and via leaflets in particular.

[H30]: The benchmark treatment should increase the probability that people report that the leaflet contained information on other parties in the state.

The effects in [H29]-[H30] should be stronger when we interact the Local or Benchmark dummies with the Social delivery treatment dummy.

[H31]: The social treatment should increase the probability that people report hearing the loudspeaker.

[H32]: The social treatment should increases an individual’s estimate (guess) of how many people received the leaflet.

Note that we do not hypothesize that, even if we observe the hypothesized treatment effects on voting behavior, our treatments will have a certain effect on the extent that voters report that they received information related to our treatments. The reason is that, as it has been well documented in the literature, it can be that information affects voters posterior beliefs despite the fact that voters have a very short recall bias.

**6.4.4 Vote Buying**

There is recent evidence in the clientelism literature (see Cruz, Keefer, and Labonne (2015) for an example on the Philippines) that pre-electoral interventions that affect the re-election prospects of incumbents (for example by reporting on spending patterns) may lead these to try to counteract such interventions by engaging in vote-buying strategies. We believe these
insights are plausible in the Mexican context.

[H33]: The informational treatments increase the probability that voters report vote-buying and the effect is increasing in how negative the information reported about the incumbent \((Own\_Report_{pbm})\) is. The higher \(Own\_Report_{pbm}\) is, the higher the incentives of the incumbent party to engage in vote buying in order to counteract the increased potential effects of the information on its electoral prospects.

[H34]: The reported increase in vote buying should be higher in the benchmark than in the local treatment and the effect should be increasing in the gap between the negative information about the own municipality and the other parties. Again, this is because, on average, the benchmark treatment should have a stronger negative effect on the vote share of the incumbent party (see H9) and thus the candidate from the incumbent party needs to engage in more vote buying to counteract.

6.5 Conditional Hypotheses: Individual Level Moderators

Below we provide some hypotheses on the extent to which individual level characteristics can intermediate the effect of the treatments on electoral outcomes. These individual level moderators are analyzed by running regressions of the form:

\[
Y_{ipbm} = \alpha + \beta_1 Treatment_{pbm} + \beta_2 Treatment_{pbm} \times X_{ibpm} + \beta_3 X_{ibpm} + \rho_{bm} + \epsilon_{ipbm}
\]

where \(X_{ibpm}\) corresponds to different individual characteristics of interest and we are interested in estimating \(\beta_2\) (i.e. on how these individual characteristics influence the effect of the different treatments). Ideally, we would like all of these to be pre-treatment variables that reflect underlying characteristics of individuals. However, since we could not conduct a baseline survey, an important caveat is that some of these individual-level moderators may have been affected by the treatment and this makes their interpretation harder. We limit ourselves to variables that are unlikely to have been affected by the treatment. Moreover, we will always test if the individual level moderators were affected by the treatment and only consider specifications where such was not the case.

[H35]: The treatments should have a stronger effect for individuals who attach higher
importance to honesty or the fight against poverty. These individuals will care more about the type of information reported in the leaflets and thus may be more likely to respond to it.

[H36]: Treatment effects should be stronger for voters with weaker political knowledge. More knowledgeable individuals may be more aware about the attributes of candidates from different parties and about spending in the municipality, and thus the treatments will be less likely to provide new information.

[H37]: Treatment effects should be stronger for voters with lower access to information or media consumption. Again, more informed individuals (or those with higher access to media) may be more aware about partisan attributes or municipal affairs and thus less likely to respond to our leaflets.

An important concern regarding some individual mediators is that they may be strongly correlated with other individual characteristics such as education or income level. Thus, these hypotheses are more easily interpretable once we also control for the interaction with these other confounders.

[H38]: Treatment effects should be stronger for voters who believe that election outcomes reflect the preferences of the citizens. The reasons can be various. For example, those voters might believe that other voters will also act upon the received information.

6.6 Conditional Hypotheses: Contextual Moderators

Partisan attachment is potentially an important mediator of our treatments. Individuals with very strong partisan attachments to the incumbent party will likely not change their vote choice (though they may become less secure about their vote) while those with weak partisan attachments may be more likely to switch their votes (or stop turning out). The problem with using self-reported partisan attachment as an individual level moderator is that this specific variable is very likely affected by the treatment. Absent a baseline survey we need to think about alternatives to using post-treatment self-reported partisan attachments as moderators. We will follow several strategies: (i) Use interaction of party choice and certainty of voting decision in the previous election as a measure of individual partisan attachment; (ii) Use precinct-level vote share for the incumbent in the previous election as a measure of
intensity of voter’s preferences; (iii) Use partisan attachments in sections in the control group within the same municipality in order to generate a municipality-level measure of political attachments.

[H39]: Treatment effects should be stronger in places with weaker partisan attachments.

[H40]: The treatment may be stronger or weaker (ambiguous effect) in places where voters talk about politics more often. Since this is a potentially post-treatment outcome we will construct municipality-level measures based on respondents in control precincts. Effect is ambiguous because in places where voters talk about politics often they may be more informed to begin with but at the same time there is greater scope for the treatment to have bite and affect the behavior of other voters.

6.6.1 Politician Reactions

A natural possibility in our context is that candidates from incumbent and challenging parties will react to our intervention. We already anticipated this with our hypotheses regarding vote buying for instance. It is also possible that whenever the information in the report represents bad news for the incumbent party that the candidate from the incumbent party will try to minimize or dismiss the leaflets. Similarly, candidates from challenging parties may also have an interest in raising attention to the leaflets if they believe this could benefit them.

[H41]: Candidates from the incumbent party will react to the intervention by approaching voters (whether in person or through campaign and advertising strategies) and will try to dismiss the information in the leaflets (or offer justification or contextual explanations for the information reported in them). Reaction by candidates from the incumbent party will be stronger in the benchmark treatment, the higher is the percentage reported in the leaflet, or whenever the information represents bad news. If the social information transmission operates through politician responses, the social treatment will also increase such responses.

[H42]: Candidates from challenging parties will also react to the intervention by approaching voters (whether in person or through campaign and advertising strategies) and will bring attention to the leaflets and point to the relevance and veracity of the information reported in them. Reaction by candidates from challenging parties will be stronger in the
benchmark treatment, the higher is the percentage reported in the leaflet or whenever the information represents bad news. If the social information transmission operates through politician responses, the social treatment will also increase such responses.

### 6.6.2 Social Transmission

As argued above, the social transmission mechanism could induce explicit or tacit coordination among voters. The social treatment could also induce a coordinated political response from parties (see above). Alternatively, even if the social treatment does not generate explicit or tacit coordination, it may strengthen the treatments by bringing attention to the leaflets and leading people to read them more carefully and absorb the information contained in them, which is a hypothesis we already stated in section 6.4.3.

[H43]: If the social treatment operates though explicit coordination, we expect to observe an increase in the the probability that (i) voters coordinated amongst themselves on who to vote for (ii) voters tried to convince others about who to vote for and (iii) others attempted to convince the voter about who to vote for.

[H44]: If the social treatment operates though tacit coordination, we expect to observe an increase in the the probability that (i) voters believe that the beliefs of other voters about the incumbent and challenger parties are similarly affected by our treatments, (ii) voters believe that other voters are likely to vote on the basis of such beliefs.

### 7 Ethics

#### 7.1 Partners and permissions

Borde Político has a history of collaboration with other organizations in various transparency projects. Borde Político has developed the Open Budget platform,\(^7\) together with Visión Legislativa\(^8\) and Fundar A.C.,\(^9\) who helped in the design of the 2014 Federal Budget by providing analysis and evaluation of Federal Government programs. Moreover, Borde

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\(^7\)www.presupuestoabierto.mx
\(^8\)http://visionlegislativa.com/
\(^9\)http://fundar.org.mx/
Político has taken part in the design and implementation of the Public Designation platform, a website for citizens to monitor the selection process of various public officials. Lastly, Borde Político is part of the Alliance for an Open Parliament, which is a group of civil society organizations that are specialized in legislative and transparency issues. On August 25th, 2014, Borde Político won the Innovation in Transparency Prize, which was organized by the Federal Auditor’s Office (ASF), the World Bank, the Federal Institute for Access to Information (IFAI), the National Institute of Public Administration, and the Secretariat of Public Function.

This experiment has received approval from the Harvard and New York University Institutional Review Boards. In addition, we sought permission from the electoral authorities, as well as legal advice from experts in Mexican electoral law. In particular, a legal expert explicitly confirmed that our intervention does not in any way violate Mexican law, which was further confirmed by our conversations with INE.

### 7.2 De-briefing

We will debrief voters in treated precincts via several methods. First, all survey participants in the post-election survey will be informed (towards the end of the survey) that their precincts were involved in a study run by Borde Político in collaboration with researchers at Harvard and NYU universities. This information precedes our question asking participants to re-examine the leaflet that they received in order to check comprehension and assess its impact on their opinion about their mayor.

Second, to address the fact that we are not able to debrief all voters as part of our limited post-election survey, we also intend to debrief the entire precinct by publicly informing the population of our experiment upon completion. In particular, we intend to hold a press conference in conjunction with Borde Político. In addition, we also intend to inform local media radio stations, television stations, and newspapers of our intervention and request that they disseminate such information to voters. Furthermore, Borde Político will provide on their website—a link to which is provided in our leaflets—details explaining that the experiment took place with financial assistance and technical advice from researchers at Harvard and

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11. [http://premiotransparencia.org.mx/Lists/ResultadosPremio14/AllItems.aspx](http://premiotransparencia.org.mx/Lists/ResultadosPremio14/AllItems.aspx)
NYU universities.

7.3 Impact on election outcomes

A potential concern is the experiment will have a major impact upon electoral outcomes. To minimize our imprint, the sample selection procedure considered the share of treated registered voters within each municipality and the expected competitiveness of the race (based on the previous municipal election). First, never more than 30% of a municipality’s registered voters will be affected by the intervention. However, in most instances this proportion is far lower: the average share of a municipality’s registered voters affected by the intervention is less than 12.5%. Based on our power calculations, we do not anticipate that the experiment will induce more than a 2 percentage point swing in vote share toward or away from the municipal incumbent’s party. Second, the number of close races is small and the incumbent typically wins by a large margin: in the entire sample, the mean and median incumbent won by more than 10 percentage points. Thus, we do not anticipate that the experiment will affect municipal electoral outcomes.

Furthermore, it is important to reiterate that neither the researchers involved in this project nor Borde Político seek to influence election outcomes by providing partisan political information. The information that will be provided comes entirely from non-partisan reports of audits carried out by the government that are already publicly available. Our prior observational research indicates that such information is already widely publicized by broadcast media stations (Larreguy, Marshall, and Snyder Jr., 2015). At no point is any factual information presented that is not contained in the audit reports. The goal of the information provision is to understand how voters respond to various forms of provision of information about incumbent performance.

7.4 Potential risks to participants

We believe that the provision of such leaflets via public or private modes of transmission does not constitute more than minimal risk to recipients. First, it is important to emphasize that the leaflets do not encourage voters to support a particular political party - they
strictly provide factual information about the incumbent government and political parties in other municipalities within the state based on official and publicly-available audit reports. Although we expect that voters will update their perceptions about different political parties, which may in turn impact that vote choice, neither Borde Político nor ourselves are seeking to influence voting decisions beyond providing information that will help voters to make an informed choice between candidates from different parties. Moreover, as the attached letter from a lawyer attests, the leaflets do not constitute political propaganda, and do not attempt to unlawfully influence voting behavior. From the perspective of Mexican jurisprudence, the provision of information that the experiment entails constitutes a common practice of Mexican civil society organizations whose goal is to promote governmental transparency.

Second, we believe that such information has the potential to help voters to elect mayors that engage in lower levels of malfeasance. We anticipate that, by helping Borde Político to design its future informational campaigns, this should have important future benefits for voters in terms of mayors providing the services that they are legally obliged to provide. In the case of the social infrastructure program that we provide information about, this should entail greater provision of public services benefitting poor citizens. Furthermore, it is important to reiterate that the information that Borde Político intends to provide is publicly-available and is typically widely publicized in the local media.

Third, the costs associated with consuming such information are minimal. The leaflet itself is short and extensive piloting through focus groups suggests that it is easy to understand, and thus places little cognitive or time burden upon recipients. Moreover, voters are not being compelled to read the leaflet if they have no interest in doing so. Individuals that decline to receive the leaflet are thanked for opening the door to the Data OPM employees distributing the leaflets on behalf of Borde Político. Similarly, the car or individuals with megaphones publicizing the delivery of the leaflets in the social form of transmission should place minimal burden on citizens. The message should last no longer than 30 seconds and the car or individuals with megaphones will move on to other parts of the community relatively quickly. The practice of communicating information through megaphones is extremely common in Mexico.

Fourth, we do not believe that individuals in precincts that receive information will be harmed by any potential political response to the distribution of leaflets. We base this judg-
ment on two arguments. First, in a very similar experimental design by researchers from Princeton and Yale where the same type of information was provided in very similar areas in Mexico (Chong et al., 2015) did not experience any political response to the delivery of leaflets. Second, by selecting only the safest municipalities—on the basis of on-the-ground advice from Data OPM regarding levels of violence and political behavior—it is very unlikely that the distribution of leaflets could induce any type of response that endangers either individuals or members of our research team.

8 Timeline

1. Experimental design: Spring 2015.


3. Informational campaign: May 16th – June 3rd.

4. Election Day: June 7.


8. Write-up: August 15 – September 30.
References


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www.asf.gob.mx

Cualquier inquietud contáctanos al 52 08 01 88 o en informes@borde.mx

Visita www.borde.mx/2015 para ver más datos y los documentos originales.

52 08 01 88 0 en informes@borde.mx

Contacte Inquiries (Contacto):

www.borde.mx

Superior de la Federación que pueden encontrar en: 

La información de este volante está basada en los reportes oficiales de la Auditoría.
EL DINERO DEL **FISM**, FONDO DE INFRAESTRUCTURA SOCIAL MUNICIPAL, **DEBE GASTARSE EN OBRAS QUE BENEFICEN** A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN.

**¡LOS GASTOS EN OBRAS QUE NO BENEFICIAN A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN DEBEN SER 0%**

EN 2013, EL **PARTIDO QUE GOBIERNA GUANAJUATO** RECIBIÓ **29.2 MILLONES** DE PESOS DEL FISM Y GASTÓ **28%** EN OBRAS QUE **NO BENEFICIAN** A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN.

**GASTOS QUE NO BENEFICIAN A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN**

**28%**

**PARTIDO QUE GOBIERNA GUANAJUATO**

¡PIÉNSALO! EL 7 **DE JUNIO** EL VOTO DEPENDE DE TI ¡COMPÁRTELO!

42
Figure 3: Example of Benchmark Leaflet-Diversion of Funds Intended for the Poor

EL DINERO DEL FISM, FONDO DE INFRAESTRUCTURA SOCIAL MUNICIPAL, DEBE GASTARSE EN OBRAS QUE BENEFICIEN A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN.

¡LOS GASTOS EN OBRAS QUE NO BENEFICIAN A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN DEBEN SER 0%!

EN 2013, EL PARTIDO QUE GOBIERNA GUANAJUATO RECIBIÓ 29.2 MILLONES DE PESOS DEL FISM Y GASTÓ 28% EN OBRAS QUE NO BENEFICIAN A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN.

¡COMPAREREMOS CON LOS GASTOS DE OTROS PARTIDOS!

MUNICIPIOS DE TU ESTADO GOBERNADOS POR OTROS PARTIDOS GASTARON EN PROMEDIO 4% EN OBRAS QUE NO BENEFICIAN A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN.

GASTOS QUE NO BENEFICIAN A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN

28% PARTIDO QUE GOBIerna GUANAJUATO

4% OTROS PARTIDOS EN TU ESTADO

¡PIÉNSALO! EL 7 DE JUNIO EL VOTO DEPENDE DE TI ¡COMPÁRTELO!
Figure 4: Example of Local Leaflet-Unauthorized Expenses

El dinero del FISM, Fondo de Infraestructura Social Municipal, **DEBE** gastarse en obras de infraestructura.

Los gastos que no sean en obras de infraestructura **DEBEN SER 0%**

En 2013, el **PARTIDO QUE GOBIERNA LA PAZ** recibió **32.7 MILLONES** de pesos del FISM y gastó **0%** en cosas que **NO DEBE**

**GASTÓ COMO NO DEBE**

0 %

Partido que goberna la Paz

¡Piénsalo! El **7 DE JUNIO** el voto depende de ti. ¡Compártelo!
EL DINERO DEL FISM, FONDO DE INFRAESTRUCTURA SOCIAL MUNICIPAL, DEBE GASTARSE EN OBRAS DE INFRAESTRUCTURA.

LOS GASTOS QUE NO SEAN EN OBRAS DE INFRAESTRUCTURA DEBEN SER 0%.

EN 2013, EL PARTIDO QUE GOBIerna LA PAZ RECIBIÓ 32.7 MILLONES DE PESOS DEL FISM Y GASTÓ 0% EN COSAS QUE NO DEBEN.

¡COMPREDEMOS CON LOS GASTOS DE OTROS PARTIDOS!

MUNICIPIOS DE TU ESTADO GOBERNADOS POR OTROS PARTIDOS GASTARON EN PROMEDIO 9% EN COSAS QUE NO DEBEN.

GASTÓ COMO NO DEBE.

0 % PARTIDO QUE GOBIerna LA PAZ

9 % OTROS PARTIDOS EN TU ESTADO

¡PÍÉNSALO! EL 7 DE JUNIO EL VOTO DEPENDE DE TI

¡COMPÁRTEL0!
Table 1: **Treatments constructed by the Experimental Design**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Local information</th>
<th>Relative information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private</strong></td>
<td>I. Private/Local [100/1000]</td>
<td>II. Private/Benchmark [100/1000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Precincts/Surveys]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>III. Social/Local [100/1000]</td>
<td>IV. Social/Benchmark [100/1000]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Precincts/Surveys]</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>V. Control [278/1000]</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Appendix A: Survey Instrument

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Estado:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fecha (DD/MM/AAAA):</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipio:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sección:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nombre del encuestador:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID del encuestador:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inicio (HH:MM):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termino (HH:MM):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numero de folio : Letra |__| Entidad |__|__| Municipio |__|__|__| Localidad |__|__|__|__| Folio |__|__|__|__|

**Instrucciones generales para el encuestador:** Encuestador, seleccione al jefe de familia u otro responsable del hogar mayor de 18 años.

**COMENTARIOS DEL ENCUESTADOR:**

__________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________

**CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO**

Hola mi nombre es (...), estoy realizando una encuesta para **Qué Funciona para el Desarrollo**, en colaboración con varias universidades. Esta es mi identificación. No representamos al gobierno ni a ningún partido político. Estamos preguntando a más de mil personas en todo el país sus opiniones sobre política y elecciones. Esta encuesta es anónima, confidencial y para usos académicos, por lo que nadie va a saber lo que respondió usted en específico. Puede elegir no responder ciertas preguntas. En general, la encuesta permitirá que se conozca mucho mejor lo que opinan y desean los mexicanos. La entrevista dura de 20 a 25 minutos. También, si lo desea, le puedo dar un número de teléfono donde puede contactarnos si tiene alguna pregunta luego de la entrevista. ¿Me permite entrevistarlo?

¿Tiene credencial para votar vigente en el lugar donde vive?

1. SI → CONTINUAR ENTREVISTA
2. NO → SUSPENDER ENTREVISTA
1. **VOTACIÓN**

1. El pasado 7 de junio hubo elecciones para Presidente Municipal y, como en cualquier elección, siempre hay personas que no tienen tiempo de ir a votar y otras a las que no les interesa. ¿Usted votó en las elecciones del 7 de junio?

1a. ¿Tiene aún la tinta en el dedo como prueba de haber votado o me podría mostrar su credencial de elector con la marca de que votó? **Esta es sólo para un control de calidad de la información de la encuesta y es opcional para usted.**

2. **(ENCUESTADOR: ENTREGUE BOLETA A)** ¿Podría indicarme el partido por el cual votó para Presidente Municipal? Para su respuesta, use esta boleta de muestra y colóquela aquí en este sobre **(ENCUESTADOR: LEA OPCIONES DE 1 A 4)**

3. ¿Qué tan seguro estaba usted sobre su elección al momento de votar? **(ENCUESTADOR: NO LEA OPCIONES, REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA)**

4a. Si usted hubiera cambiado su voto por algún otro candidato, ¿por quién hubiera votado? **(ENCUESTADOR: NO LEA OPCIONES, REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA)**

4b. Si usted hubiera votado, ¿por qué partido lo habría hecho? **(ENCUESTADOR: NO LEA OPCIONES, REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pregunta</th>
<th>Opciones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Si</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Si</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Muy seguro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a</td>
<td>PAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a</td>
<td>Todas ir a preg 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. **(ENCUESTADOR: PREGUNTAR SOLO A QUIENES NO VOTARON)**
¿Cuáles fueron las razones por las que usted no votó en las elecciones del 7 de junio?
**(ENCUESTADOR: NO LEA LAS OPCIONES, CIRCULE TODAS LAS QUE INDIQUE EN LA PRIMERA COLUMNA Y EN LA SEGUNDA COLUMNA REGISTRE EL ORDEN EN EL QUE FUERON MENCIONADAS) ANOTE HASTA TRES MENCIONES**

ANOATE TEXTUAL Y CODIFIQUE EN LA TABLA:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Razón</th>
<th>Menciona</th>
<th>Orden mencionado</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. No renovó credencial de elector a tiempo</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Otros problemas con la credencial de elector</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tuvo que trabajar</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Tuvo otros compromisos o actividades</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. No le dio tiempo</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. No supo dónde votar</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. No le interesó votar</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. No le atrajo ningún candidato</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Todos los políticos son iguales</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Todos los políticos son corruptos</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Estaba de viaje</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Se gasta mucho dinero en las elecciones</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Otra razón (especificar)</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Yo nunca vote</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
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<tr>
<td>99. NS/NR</td>
<td>1 2</td>
<td>__________</td>
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6. Ahora le voy a preguntar acerca de la elección de Presidente Municipal que se celebró hace tres años en el 2012. ¿Usted votó en esas elecciones?

7. **(ENCUESTADOR: ENTREGUE BOLETA B)**
¿Podría indicarme el partido por el cual votó para Presidente Municipal? Para su respuesta, use esta boleta de muestra y colóquela aquí en este sobre

8. ¿Qué tan seguro estaba usted sobre su elección al momento de votar?
**(ENCUESTADOR: LEA OPCIONES DE 1 A 4)**

9. Si usted hubiera cambiado su voto por otro partido, ¿por qué partido hubiera votado?
**(ENCUESTADOR: NO LEA OPCIONES, REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opción</th>
<th>Menciona</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Si</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: No</td>
<td>ir a pregunta 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
<td>ir a pregunta 10</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opción</th>
<th>Menciona</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Muy seguro</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Seguro</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Inseguro</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Muy inseguro</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
<td>9</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opción</th>
<th>Menciona</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: PAN</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: PRI</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: PRD</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Partido Verde (PVEM)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Partido del Trabajo (PT)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: Movimiento Ciudadano</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: Otro: ______________________</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10: No hubiera cambiado</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99: NS/NR</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. IDEOLOGÍA

10. Generalmente, usted con qué partido político simpatiza?
   (ENCUESTADOR: NO LEA LAS OPCIONES.
   REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA.)

   [MK] 11a. MUESTRE TARJETA A AL
   ENCUESTADO (ENCUESTADOR: UTILICE LA
   RESPUESTA A LA PREGUNTA ANTERIOR
   COMO EL PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE EN
   LA SIGUIENTE PREGUNTA)
   En una escala de 1 a 7, donde 7 significa que se siente muy apegado al [PARTIDO
   CORRESPONDIENTE] y 1 significa que no se siente muy apegado al [PARTIDO
   CORRESPONDIENTE], ¿qué grado de apego
   siente por el [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE]?  

   1: No muy apegado  
   2: 
   3: 
   4: 
   5: 
   6: 
   7: Muy apegado 
   9: NS/NR

   11b. (ENCUESTADOR: PREGUNTAR SÓLO A LOS QUE
   CONTESTARON NINGUNO O
   NS/NR EN 10)
   Pero, ¿siente un poco más de simpatía por algún partido que por los otros?

   1: Si  
   2: No, por ninguno

   11c. (ENCUESTADOR: SI LA RESPUESTA ES
   “SI”, ENTonces PREGUNTAR:) ¿Por cuál
   partido?
   (ENCUESTADOR: NO LEA LAS OPCIONES.
   REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA.)

   1: PAN 
   2: PRI 
   3: PRD 
   4: Partido Verde (PVEM)
   5: Partido del Trabajo (PT)
   6: Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)
   7: Movimiento Ciudadano
   8: MORENA
   9: Otro (especificar): ________________
   99: NS/NR


   12.a (ENCUESTADOR: MOSTRAR TARJETA B) En una escala del 1 a 5, donde 1 es muy baja y 5 es muy alta, ¿cuál es su percepción del grado de corrupción de los políticos locales del [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE]?:

   [ENCUESTADOR: SOLO LEER SOLO EN CASO QUE LA PERSONA NO SEPA QUE ES

   PRI 
   PAN 
   PRD 

   PARTIDO DE
   PREGUNTA 10/11c SI
   ES DIFERENTE A
   PRI/PAN/PRD. ANOT
CORRUPCIÓN Ejemplos de corrupción incluyen el desvío de recursos públicos para usos indebidos como: usos personales o para fines electorales.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Código</th>
<th>Ejemplos de corrupción incluyen el desvío de recursos públicos para usos indebidos como: usos personales o para fines electorales.</th>
<th>Código</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:</td>
<td>Corrupción muy baja</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:</td>
<td>Corrupción baja</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>Corrupción regular/intermedia</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:</td>
<td>Corrupción alta</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:</td>
<td>Corrupción muy alta</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:</td>
<td>NS/NR</td>
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</table>

12.b ¿Qué tan seguro está de su respuesta? (ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS OPCIONES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Código</th>
<th>¿Qué tan seguro está de su respuesta? (ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS OPCIONES)</th>
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<td>Seguro</td>
<td>_____</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>Inseguro</td>
<td>_____</td>
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<tr>
<td>4:</td>
<td>Muy inseguro</td>
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<td>9:</td>
<td>NS/NR</td>
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12.c ¿Cómo cambió su percepción sobre el nivel de corrupción del [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE] en el último mes? (ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS OPCIONES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Código</th>
<th>¿Cómo cambió su percepción sobre el nivel de corrupción del [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE] en el último mes? (ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS OPCIONES)</th>
<th>Código</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:</td>
<td>Aumentó mucho</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:</td>
<td>Aumentó</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>Permaneció igual</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:</td>
<td>Disminuyó</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:</td>
<td>Disminuyó mucho</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:</td>
<td>NS/NR</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


13.a (ENCUESTADOR: MOSTRAR TARJETA C) En una escala del 1 a 5, donde 1 es muy bajo y 5 es muy alto, ¿cuál es su percepción del grado de interés para atender a los que menos tienen de los políticos locales del [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE]?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Código</th>
<th>INTERÉS PARA ATENDER A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN</th>
<th>Código</th>
<th>Código</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:</td>
<td>Interés muy bajo</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:</td>
<td>Interés bajo</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>Interés regular/intermedio</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:</td>
<td>Interés alto</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:</td>
<td>Interés muy alto</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:</td>
<td>NS/NR</td>
<td>_____</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13.b ¿Qué tan seguro está de su respuesta? (Encuestador: leer las opciones)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Código</th>
<th>¿Qué tan seguro está de su respuesta? (Encuestador: leer las opciones)</th>
<th>Código</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:</td>
<td>Muy seguro</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:</td>
<td>Seguro</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>Inseguro</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13.c ¿Cómo cambió su percepción sobre el interés que tiene el [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE] para atender a los que menos tienen en el último mes? (ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS OPCIONES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Código</th>
<th>¿Cómo cambió su percepción sobre el interés que tiene el [PARTIDO CORRESPONDIENTE] para atender a los que menos tienen en el último mes? (ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS OPCIONES)</th>
<th>Código</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:</td>
<td>Aumentó mucho</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:</td>
<td>Aumentó</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:</td>
<td>Permaneció igual</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:</td>
<td>Disminuyó</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:</td>
<td>Disminuyó mucho</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:</td>
<td>NS/NR</td>
<td>_____</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. CORRELATION OF TYPES NOTA: EL ORDEN DE LAS PREGUNTAS DE ESTA SECCIÓN DEPENDE DEL FOLIO DEL CUESTIONARIO.

SI EL FOLIO DEL CUESTIONARIO EMPIEZA EN LETRA “C” PREGUNTAR:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14a.c Si usted recibe información que el Presidente Municipal ha estado involucrado en actos de corrupción, ¿qué tan probable cree usted que el siguiente candidato a Presidente Municipal del partido que gobierna su municipio haga lo mismo? (ENCUESTADOR: LEAS LAS OPCIONES Y HACER ÉNFASIS EN QUE SE TRATA DEL PARTIDO QUE GOBIERNA AL MUNICIPIO)</th>
<th>14b.c Si usted recibe información que el Presidente Municipal ha estado involucrado en actos de corrupción, ¿qué tan probable cree usted que los siguientes candidatos a Presidente Municipal de los otros partidos hagan lo mismo? (ENCUESTADOR: LEAS LAS OPCIONES Y HACER ÉNFASIS EN QUE SE TRATA DE OTROS PARTIDOS)</th>
<th>15a.c Si usted recibe información que el Presidente Municipal ha usado fondos destinados para los que menos tienen para actividades que no los benefician, ¿qué tan probable cree que el siguiente candidato a Presidente Municipal del partido que gobierna su municipio haga lo mismo? (ENCUESTADOR: LEAS LAS OPCIONES Y HACER ÉNFASIS EN QUE SE TRATA DEL PARTIDO QUE GOBIERNA AL MUNICIPIO)</th>
<th>15b.c Si usted recibe información que el Presidente Municipal ha usado fondos destinados para los que menos tienen para actividades que no los benefician, ¿qué tan probable cree que los siguientes candidatos a Presidente Municipal de los otros partidos hagan lo mismo? (ENCUESTADOR: LEAS LAS OPCIONES Y HACER ÉNFASIS EN QUE SE TRATA DE OTROS PARTIDOS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Nada probable</td>
<td>1: Nada probable</td>
<td>1: Nada probable</td>
<td>1: Nada probable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Algo probable</td>
<td>2: Algo probable</td>
<td>2: Algo probable</td>
<td>2: Algo probable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Muy probable</td>
<td>4: Muy probable</td>
<td>4: Muy probable</td>
<td>4: Muy probable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Extremadamente probable</td>
<td>5: Extremadamente probable</td>
<td>5: Extremadamente probable</td>
<td>5: Extremadamente probable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SI EL FOLIO DEL CUESTIONARIO EMPIEZA EN LETRA “P” PREGUNTAR:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15a.p Si usted recibe información que el Presidente Municipal ha usado fondos destinados para los que menos tienen para actividades que no los benefician, ¿qué tan probable cree que el siguiente candidato a Presidente Municipal del partido que gobierna su municipio haga lo mismo? (ENCUESTADOR: LEAS LAS OPCIONES Y HACER ÉNFASIS EN QUE SE TRATA DEL PARTIDO QUE GOBIERNA AL MUNICIPIO)</th>
<th>15b.p Si usted recibe información que el Presidente Municipal ha usado fondos destinados para los que menos tienen para actividades que no los benefician, ¿qué tan probable cree usted que el siguiente candidato a Presidente Municipal del partido que gobierna su municipio haga lo mismo? (ENCUESTADOR: LEAS LAS OPCIONES Y HACER ÉNFASIS EN QUE SE TRATA DEL PARTIDO QUE GOBIERNA AL MUNICIPIO)</th>
<th>14a.p Si usted recibe información que el Presidente Municipal ha estado involucrado en actos de corrupción, ¿qué tan probable cree usted que el siguiente candidato a Presidente Municipal del partido que gobierna su municipio haga lo mismo? (ENCUESTADOR: LEAS LAS OPCIONES Y HACER ÉNFASIS EN QUE SE TRATA DEL PARTIDO QUE GOBIERNA AL MUNICIPIO)</th>
<th>14b.p Si usted recibe información que el Presidente Municipal ha estado involucrado en actos de corrupción, ¿qué tan probable cree que los siguientes candidatos a Presidente Municipal de los otros partidos hagan lo mismo? (ENCUESTADOR: LEAS LAS OPCIONES Y HACER ÉNFASIS EN QUE SE TRATA DE OTROS PARTIDOS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Nada probable</td>
<td>1: Nada probable</td>
<td>1: Nada probable</td>
<td>1: Nada probable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Algo probable</td>
<td>2: Algo probable</td>
<td>2: Algo probable</td>
<td>2: Algo probable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Muy probable</td>
<td>4: Muy probable</td>
<td>4: Muy probable</td>
<td>4: Muy probable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Extremadamente probable</td>
<td>5: Extremadamente probable</td>
<td>5: Extremadamente probable</td>
<td>5: Extremadamente probable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. TEMAS IMPORTANTES

[MK] 16. A continuación vamos a preguntarle sobre distintas características del candidato a Presidente Municipal. Vamos a mencionar varias características, por favor piense cuidadosamente sobre cómo evalúa cada categoría a la hora de decidir por quién votar. Siendo 1 nada importante y 5 muy importante, ¿qué nivel de importancia le asignaría a cada una de las siguientes características? (ENCUESTADOR: MUESTRE LA TARJETA D A LOS ENCUESTADOS. LEA TODAS LAS OPCIONES Y MARQUE EN EL RECUADRO EL NIVEL DE IMPORTANCIA QUE SEÑALÓ EL ENTREVISTADO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADQUISICION DE INFORMACION</th>
<th>17. En general, ¿tiene usted interés en adquirir información sobre política? (ENCUESTADOR: LEER TODAS LAS OPCIONES, Y CODIFICAR SÍ O NO SEGÚN LA RESPUESTA DEL ENTREVISTADO).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Sí</td>
<td>2: No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 9: NS/NR                  | 1: Para votar a los mejores candidatos 1 2  
|                           | 2: Para poder hablar sobre política con familiares y conocidos 1 2  
|                           | 3: Para involucrarse en el proceso democrático 1 2  
|                           | 4: Para demostrar que estoy informado en el trabajo 1 2  
|                           | 5: Para demostrar a familiares y conocidos que estoy informado 1 2  
|                           | 6: Por razones laborales 1 2  
|                           | 7: Porque es un deber cívico 1 2  
|                           | 8: No hace la diferencia 1 2  |
5. REALITY CHECK

19. En las últimas semanas, ¿usted recibió o escuchó alguna información sobre la manera en la cual se utilizó el presupuesto municipal?
20. Por favor, mencione a través de qué medios recibió esta información (ENCUESTADOR: LEER TODAS LAS OPCIONES, Y SELECCIONAR TODAS LAS QUE APLIQUEN.)
21. ¿Usted recuerda recibir esta información en un tríptico?
22. ¿Qué información contenía este tríptico? (ENCUESTADOR: LEER TODAS LAS OPCIONES, Y SELECCIONAR TODAS LAS QUE APLIQUEN.)
23. ¿Este tríptico contenía información solamente sobre el partido que gobierna su municipio o también sobre otros partidos en su estado?
24. ¿Cuántas personas de su comunidad cree usted que recibieron un tríptico con información sobre cómo se utilizó el presupuesto municipal? (ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS OPCIONES)
25. Usted escuchó a una grabación hablando sobre los trípticos que estaban siendo distribuidos?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>99</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Otros: ________________________________</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 9: No hay razón importante |
|---|---|
| 10: Otros: ________________________________ |
| 99: NS/NR |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1: Sí</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2: No → ir a pregunta 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: NS/NR → ir a pregunta 21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1: Sí</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2: No → ir a pregunta 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: NS/NR → ir a pregunta 26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>23. Sólo del partido que gobierna su municipio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2: También de otros partidos en su estado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24. Muy pocas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2: Menos de la mitad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Aproximadamente la mitad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Más de la mitad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Casi todos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>25. Sí</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6. RESPUESTAS DE LOS PARTIDOS

| [MK] 26a. Durante la pasada elección, ¿hizo referencia el [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] a la información presentada en los trípticos sobre gastos indebidos o gastos que no beneficiaron a los que menos tienen a través de los siguientes medios? (ENCUESTADOR: LEA LAS OPCIONES Y MARQUE TODAS LOS QUE APLIQUEN) | 1: Volantes  
2: Actos de campaña  
3: Visitas de miembros locales de partido  
4: Anuncios en espectaculares  
5: Medios de comunicación como radio, TV o prensa  
6: Ninguno de los anteriores → Pasar a 26c.  
9: NS/NR |
|---|---|
| 26b. ¿Qué tipo de información/mensaje divulgó el [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] sobre la información contenida en los trípticos? (ENCUESTADOR: LEA LAS OPCIONES Y MARQUE ÚNICAMENTE UNA) | 1: Minimizando o restando importancia a la Información en los trípticos  
2: Llamando la atención o destacando la información contenida en los trípticos  
3: Justificando o presentando excusas para las cifras dadas en los trípticos  
4: Argumentando que todos los partidos son iguales  
9: NS/NR |
| 26c. Durante la pasada elección, ¿hicieron referencia partidos opositores distintos al [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] a la información presentada en los trípticos sobre gastos indebidos o gastos que no beneficiaron a los que menos tienen a través de los siguientes medios? (ENCUESTADOR: LEA LAS OPCIONES Y MARQUE TODAS LOS QUE APLIQUEN) | 1: Volantes  
2: Actos de campaña  
3: Visitas de miembros locales de partido  
4: Anuncios en espectaculares  
5: Medios de comunicación como radio, TV o prensa  
6: Ninguno de los anteriores → Pasar a 27  
9: NS/NR |
| 26d. ¿Qué tipo de información/mensaje divulgaron dichos partidos opositores diferentes al [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] sobre la información contenida en los trípticos? (ENCUESTADOR: LEA LAS OPCIONES Y MARQUE ÚNICAMENTE UNA) | 1: Minimizando o restando importancia a la Información en los trípticos  
2: Llamando la atención o destacando la información contenida en los trípticos  
3: Justificando o presentando excusas para las cifras dadas en los trípticos  
4: Argumentando que todos los partidos son iguales  
9: NS/NR |

### 7. MECANISMOS DE TRANSMISIÓN SOCIAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>27. ¿Platicó con su familia, amigos o vecinos sobre los trípticos y la información contenida en ellos?</th>
<th>28. Con base en la información de los trípticos, ¿se puso usted de acuerdo con otras personas de su colonia/localidad para votar todos por el mismo partido?</th>
<th>29. Con base en la información de los trípticos, ¿trató usted de convencer a alguna persona de su colonia/localidad, como por ejemplo familiares, amigos o conocidos, para que voten por algún partido en particular?</th>
<th>30. Con base en la información de los trípticos, ¿alguna persona de su colonia/localidad, como por ejemplo familiares, amigos o conocidos, trató de convencerlo a usted de votar por algún partido en particular?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1: Sí  
2: No  
9: NS/NR | 1: Sí  
2: No  
9: NS/NR | 1: Sí  
2: No  
9: NS/NR | 1: Sí  
2: No  
9: NS/NR |
31. ¿Cuántas personas de su localidad/colonia cree que cambiaron sus percepción sobre el grado de corrupción del [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] o su interés en atender a la población más pobre debido a la información contenida en los trípticos?

| 1: Muy pocas  |
| 2: Menos de la mitad |
| 3: Aproximadamente la mitad |
| 4: Más de la mitad |
| 5: Casi todos |
| 9: NS/NR |

32. ¿Cuántas personas de su localidad/colonia cree que cambiaron sus percepción sobre el grado de corrupción de partidos opositores diferentes al [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] o su interés en atender a la población más pobre debido a la información contenida en los trípticos?

| 1: Muy pocas  |
| 2: Menos de la mitad |
| 3: Aproximadamente la mitad |
| 4: Más de la mitad |
| 5: Casi todos |
| 9: NS/NR |

33. ¿Cuántas personas de su localidad/colonia cree que cambiaron su decisión de voto debido a la información contenida en los trípticos?

| 1: Muy pocas  |
| 2: Menos de la mitad |
| 3: Aproximadamente la mitad |
| 4: Más de la mitad |
| 5: Casi todos |
| 9: NS/NR |

8. CLIENTILISMO – LIST EXPERIMENT

34a. (ENCUESTADOR: SI EL FOLIO DEL CUESTIONARIO TERMINA EN NÚMERO “PAR” PREGUNTAR:)
[MOSTRAR Y LEER TARJETA E.1] Le voy a leer una lista de tres actividades que aparecen en esta tarjeta y quisiera que me diga cuántas de estas actividades ha hecho usted en las últimas semanas. Por favor, no me diga CUÁLES sino CUÁNTAS. Las tres actividades son...

| 1: Ver noticias en la televisión que mencionan algún candidato |
| 2: Asistir a un acto de campaña |
| 3: Hablar de política con otras personas |

34b. (ENCUESTADOR: SI EL FOLIO DEL CUESTIONARIO TERMINA EN NÚMERO “IMPAR” PREGUNTAR:)
[MOSTRAR Y LEER TARJETA E.2] Le voy a leer una lista de cuatro actividades que aparecen en esta tarjeta y quisiera que me diga cuántas de estas actividades ha hecho usted en las últimas semanas. Por favor, no me diga CUÁLES sino CUÁNTAS. Las cuatro actividades son...

| 1: Ver noticias en la televisión que mencionan algún candidato |
| 2: Asistir a un acto de campaña |
| 3: Recibir un regalo, favor o acceso a un servicio a cambio de su voto |
| 4: Hablar de política con otras personas |

| _____ | actividades que ha hecho |
| _____ | actividades que ha hecho |

34c. En su comunidad, ¿qué tan frecuente es que representantes del partido del gobierno municipal ofrezcan regalos, favores o acceso a servicios a cambio de su voto? (ENCUESTADOR: LEER OPCIONES)

| 1: Nada frecuente  |
| 2: Poco frecuente |
| 3: Frecuente |
| 4: Muy frecuente |
| 9: NS/NR |
### 9. CONOCIMIENTO SOBRE POLÍTICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pregunta</th>
<th>Respuesta correcta:</th>
<th>Respuestas correctas:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35. Antes de la elección, ¿qué tan frecuentemente ha hablado usted sobre política, por ejemplo, con la familia, amigos o conocidos? (ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS OPCIONES)</td>
<td>1: No habló</td>
<td>1: Diputados y senadores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2: Habló alguna vez</td>
<td>2: Solo Diputados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3: Una vez por semana</td>
<td>3: Solo Senadores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4: Varias veces por semana</td>
<td>4: Otro (especificar):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5: Diario</td>
<td>______________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. ¿Podría decirme ¿cuáles son las cámaras que tiene el Congreso de México? (ENCUESTADOR: NO LEA OPCIONES, REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respuesta correcta:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diputados y senadores</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. En general, ¿cuántos años dura un diputado (federal) en su cargo?</td>
<td>1: 3 años</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2: Otro (especificar):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>______________________</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38a. ¿Por favor, me puede decir el partido del último Gobernador de su estado? Es decir, aquel que gobernó su estado en los últimos años antes de la elección (ENCUESTADOR: VERIFIQUE SI SON CORRECTOS O INCORRECTOS, Y MARQUE LA RESPUESTA CORRESPONDIENTE)</td>
<td>1: Respuesta correcta</td>
<td>1: Respuesta correcta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2: Respuesta incorrecta</td>
<td>2: Respuesta incorrecta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38b. ¿Por favor, me puede decir el nombre del último Gobernador de su estado? Es decir, aquel que gobernó su estado en los últimos años antes de la elección (ENCUESTADOR: VERIFIQUE SI SON CORRECTOS O INCORRECTOS, Y MARQUE LA RESPUESTA CORRESPONDIENTE)</td>
<td>1: Respuesta correcta</td>
<td>1: Respuesta correcta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2: Respuesta incorrecta</td>
<td>2: Respuesta incorrecta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38c. ¿Por favor, me puede decir el nombre del último Presidente Municipal de su municipio? Es decir, el que está terminando su periodo de gobierno (ENCUESTADOR: VERIFIQUE SI SON CORRECTOS O INCORRECTOS, Y MARQUE LA RESPUESTA CORRESPONDIENTE)</td>
<td>38d. ¿Por favor, me puede decir el nombre del último Presidente Municipal de su municipio? Es decir, el que está terminando su periodo de gobierno (ENCUESTADOR: VERIFIQUE SI SON CORRECTOS O INCORRECTOS, Y MARQUE LA RESPUESTA CORRESPONDIENTE)</td>
<td>39. Fuera del [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA], ¿cuál otro partido cree usted que gobierna en la mayoría de los municipios de su estado? (ENCUESTADOR: NO LEA LAS OPCIONES. REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA. LA RESPUESTA NO PUEDE SER IGUAL AL PARTIDO QUE GOBERNÓ EL MUNICIPIO DE 2012 A 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respuestas correctas</td>
<td>Respuestas correctas</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guanajuato: Miguel Márquez Márquez</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>México: Eruviel Ávila Villegas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Querétaro: José Calzada Rovirosa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>San Luis Potosí: Fernando Toranzo Fernández</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Respuestas correctas:**
- Guanajuato: PAN
- México: PRI
- Querétaro: PRI
- San Luis Potosí: PRI

**Respuestas correctas:**
- Guanajuato: Miguel Márquez Márquez
- México: Eruviel Ávila Villegas
- Querétaro: José Calzada Rovirosa
- San Luis Potosí: Fernando Toranzo Fernández
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opción</th>
<th>Información y noticias de las campañas electorales</th>
<th>Partidos Políticos</th>
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<td>1: Respuesta correcta</td>
<td>1: Respuesta correcta</td>
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<td>2: Respuesta incorrecta</td>
<td>2: Respuesta incorrecta</td>
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<td>9: NS/NR</td>
<td>9: NS/NR</td>
<td>3: PRD</td>
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<td>4: Partido Verde (PVE)</td>
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<td>5: Partido del Trabajo (PT)</td>
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<td>6: Partido Nueva Alianza (PANAL)</td>
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<td>7: Movimiento Ciudadano</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8: MORENA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9: Otro (especificar): ____________________</td>
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</table>

40. ¿Siguió usted información y noticias de las campañas electorales por... **MOSTRAR TARJETA F (ENCUESTADOR: LEER CADA MÉTODO, Y LEER LAS OPCIONES DE RESPUESTA. ANOTAR LA RESPUESTA QUE CORRESPONDA):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medios de Comunicación</th>
<th>Diario</th>
<th>Varias veces a la semana</th>
<th>Una vez a la semana</th>
<th>De vez en cuando</th>
<th>Nunca</th>
<th>NS/NR</th>
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<td>Televisión</td>
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<td>4:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
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<td>4:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Periódicos</td>
<td>1:</td>
<td>2:</td>
<td>3:</td>
<td>4:</td>
<td>5:</td>
<td>9:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>1:</td>
<td>2:</td>
<td>3:</td>
<td>4:</td>
<td>5:</td>
<td>9:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redes sociales (ej. Facebook y Twitter)</td>
<td>1:</td>
<td>2:</td>
<td>3:</td>
<td>4:</td>
<td>5:</td>
<td>9:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. CONFIANZA EN INSTITUCIONES

41. **(ENCUESTADOR: MOSTRAR TARJETA G A LOS ENCUESTADOS)** Hay quienes creen que los procesos electorales permiten poder elegir candidatos adecuados. Otros, creen lo contrario. Usando la siguiente escala, donde 1 significa que las elecciones **No ayudan nada** y 5 que las elecciones **Ayudan mucho** a elegir candidatos honestos y competentes, ¿dónde ubicaría usted a las pasadas elecciones del 7 de junio de 2015?

[MK] 42. En su opinión, ¿qué tan probable es que gente con poder pueda enterarse de su voto, a pesar de que se supone que el voto es secreto? **(ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS OPCIONES)**

[MK] 43. En su opinión, ¿qué tan probable es que el conteo de votos de la elección del 7 de junio haya sido justo? **(ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS OPCIONES)**
11. CALIFICACIÓN DEL GOBIERNO CON BASE EN LA INFOMACIÓN DE LOS TRÍPTICOS  

**NOTA: EL ORDEN DE LAS PREGUNTAS DE ESTA SECCIÓN DEPENDE DEL FOLIO DEL CUESTIONARIO.**

**SI EL FOLIO DEL CUESTIONARIO EMPIEZA EN LETRA “P”:**

(SI EL FOLIO DEL CUESTIONARIO EMPIEZA EN LETRA "P".MOstrar TRÍPTICO CON INFORMACIÓN SOBRE GASTOS EN OBRAS QUE NO BENEFICIAN A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN Y LEER):

Antes de las elecciones Borde Político estuvo distribuyendo un tríptico entre algunos votantes de su municipio. Esto es parte de un estudio conjunto entre Borde Político, la Universidad de Harvard y la Universidad de Nueva York para analizar el efecto de la información provista en los trípticos sobre el comportamiento de los votantes. En el tríptico se reportó información oficial de la Auditoría Superior de la Federación sobre la forma en la que el partido que gobierna su municipio gastó los recursos del Fondo de Infraestructura Social Municipal durante el año 2013. Estos recursos deben gastarse en obras que benefician a los que menos tienen. Los gastos en obras que no benefician a lo que menos tienen deben ser 0%.

44p. (ENCUESTADOR: MOSTRAR TARJETA H.P)  
El partido que gobierna su municipio gastó el (ENCUESTADOR: LEER NÚMERO DEL TRÍPTICO PARA EL PROPIO MUNICIPIO)% en obras que no benefician a los que menos tienen.  
Con base en esta información, ¿cómo evaluaría usted al partido que gobierna su municipio en cuanto al interés para atender a los que menos tienen?  
(ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS OPCIONES Y REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA)

45p. Este porcentaje de dinero gastado por el [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] en obras que no benefician a los que menos tienen ¿cómo fue en comparación con lo que usted esperaba antes de que comenzara la campaña electoral?  
(ENCUESTADOR: LEA LAS OPCIONES Y REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA)

46p. (ENCUESTADOR: MOSTRAR TARJETA H.P) En promedio, otros partidos diferentes al [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] que gobernaron en otros municipios en su estado gastaron [ENCUESTADOR: LEER NÚMERO DEL TRÍPTICO PARA OTROS MUNICIPIOS]% en obras que no benefician a los que menos tienen.  
Con base en esta información, ¿cómo evaluaría usted a los otros partidos diferentes al [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] en cuanto al interés para atender a los que menos tienen?  
(ENCUESTADOR: LEA LAS OPCIONES Y REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA)

47p. Este porcentaje de dinero gastado por otros partidos diferente: al [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] en obras que no benefician a los que menos tienen ¿cómo fue en comparación con lo que usted esperaba antes de que comenzara la campaña electoral?  
(ENCUESTADOR: LEA LAS OPCIONES Y REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA)
1: Ningún interés  
2: Poco  
3: Algo  
4: Alto  
5: Muy alto  
9: NS/NR

1: Mucho más alto  
2: Más alto  
3: Igual  
4: Más bajo  
5: Mucho más bajo  
9: NS/NR

1: Ningún interés  
2: Poco  
3: Algo  
4: Alto  
5: Muy alto  
9: NS/NR

1: Mucho más alto  
2: Más alto  
3: Igual  
4: Más bajo  
5: Mucho más bajo  
9: NS/NR

**SI EL FOLIO DEL CUESTIONARIO EMPIEZA EN LETRA “C”:**

(SI EL FOLIO DEL CUESTIONARIO EMPIEZA EN LETRA "C". MOSTRAR TRÍPTICO CON INFORMACIÓN SOBRE GASTOS EN COSAS QUE NO DEBE Y LEER):

Antes de las elecciones Borde Político estuvo distribuyendo un tríptico entre algunos votantes de su municipio. Esto es parte de un estudio conjunto entre Borde Político, la Universidad de Harvard y la Universidad de Nueva York para analizar el efecto de la información provista en los trípticos sobre el comportamiento de los votantes. En el tríptico se reportó información oficial de la Auditoría Superior de la Federación sobre la forma en que el partido que gobierna su municipio gastó los recursos del Fondo de Infraestructura Social Municipal durante el año 2013. Estos recursos deben gastarse en obras de infraestructura. Los gastos que no sean en obras de infraestructura deben ser 0%.

44c. (ENCUESTADOR: MOSTRAR TARJETA H.C) El partido que gobierna su municipio gastó el (ENCUESTADOR: LEER NÚMERO DEL TRÍPTICO PARA EL PROPIO MUNICIPIO)% en cosas que no debe.  
Con base en esta información, ¿cómo evaluaría usted al partido que gobierna su municipio en cuanto al grado de corrupción de sus políticos?  
(ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS Opciones y REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA)

45c. Este porcentaje de dinero gastado por el [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] en cosas que no debe ¿cómo fue en comparación con lo que usted esperaba antes de que comenzara la campaña electoral?  
(ENCUESTADOR: LEA LAS OPCIONES Y REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA)

46c. (ENCUESTADOR: MOSTRAR TARJETA H.C) En promedio, otros partidos diferentes al [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] que gobernaron en otros municipios en su estado gastaron (ENCUESTADOR: LEER NÚMERO DEL TRÍPTICO PARA OTROS MUNICIPIOS)% en cosas que no deben.  
Con base en esta información, ¿cómo evaluaría usted a los otros partidos diferentes al [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] en cuanto al grado de corrupción de sus políticos?  
(ENCUESTADOR: LEER LAS OPCIONES Y REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA)

47c. Este porcentaje de dinero gastado por otros partidos diferentes al [PARTIDO EN FICHA ADJUNTA] en cosas que no deben ¿cómo fue en comparación con lo que usted esperaba antes de que comenzara la campaña electoral?  
(ENCUESTADOR: LEA LAS OPCIONES Y REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA)
| 1: Corrupción nula o muy baja | 1: Mucho más alto | 1: Corrupción nula o muy baja |
| 2: Baja | 2: Más alto | 2: Más alto |
| 3: Regular/ intermedia | 3: Igual | 3: Igual |
| 4: Alta | 4: Más bajo | 4: Más alto |
| 5: Muy alta | 5: Mucho más bajo | 5: Mucho más bajo |
| 9: NS/NR | 9: NS/NR | 9: NS/NR |

**12. DEMOGRÁFICOS**

| 1: Masculino | 1: Ninguno | 1: Trabaja |
| 2: Femenino | 2: Primaria Incompleta | 2: Tiene trabajo, pero no trabajó (por vacaciones, incapacidad o enfermedad) |
| 9: NS/NR | 3: Primaria completa | 3: Hogar |
| | 4: Secundaria incompleta | 4: Estudiante |
| | 5: Secundaria completa | 5: Trabaja y estuda |
| | 6: Preparatoria o carrera técnica incompleta | 6: Jubilado o pensionado |
| | 7: Preparatoria o carrera técnica completa | 7: Desempleado (no trabajó, pero buscó trabajo) |
| | 8: Universidad incompleta | 8: Está incapacitado permanentemente |
| | 9: Universidad completa y más | 9: Otro: ________________ |
| | 99. NS/NR | 99: NS/NR |

<p>| 50. ¿Cuál fue su actividad principal la semana pasada? (ENCUESTADOR: NO LEA LAS OPCIONES. REGISTRE LA RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA.) |  |  |
| | 1: Trabaja | 1: Trabaja, pero no trabajó (por vacaciones, incapacidad o enfermedad) |
| | 2: Tiene trabajo, pero no trabajó (por vacaciones, incapacidad o enfermedad) | 2: Tiene trabajo, pero no trabajó (por vacaciones, incapacidad o enfermedad) |
| | 3: Hogar | 3: Hogar |
| | 4: Estudiante | 4: Estudiante |
| | 5: Trabaja y estuda | 5: Trabaja y estuda |
| | 6: Jubilado o pensionado | 6: Jubilado o pensionado |
| | 7: Desempleado (no trabajó, pero buscó trabajo) | 7: Desempleado (no trabajó, pero buscó trabajo) |
| | 8: Está incapacitado permanentemente | 8: Está incapacitado permanentemente |
| | 9: Otro: ________________ | 9: Otro: ________________ |
| | 99: NS/NR | 99: NS/NR |</p>
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<th>Pregunta</th>
<th>Opciones</th>
<th>Explicación</th>
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</table>
Tarjeta A

No muy apegado 1

Muy apegado 7
Tarjeta B

Muy alta corrupción

Muy baja corrupción

5

1 2 3 4

1 2 3 4 5
Tarjeta C

Muy bajo interés

Muy Alto interés

1 2 3 4 5
Tarjeta D

1. Nada importante
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. Muy importante
Tarjeta E.1

a. Ver noticias en la televisión que mencionan algún candidato

b. Asistir a un acto de campaña

c. Hablar de política con otras personas
a. Ver noticias en la televisión que mencionan algún candidato

b. Asistir a un acto de campaña

c. Recibir un regalo, favor o acceso a un servicio a cambio de su voto

d. Hablar de política con otras personas
Tarjeta F

(1) Diario
(2) Varias veces a la semana
(3) Una vez a la semana
(4) De vez en cuando
(5) Nunca
Tarjeta G

No ayudan nada

Ayudan mucho
Tarjeta H.P

1. Ningún interés
2. Poco interés
3. Algo de interés
4. Interés alto
5. Interés muy alto
Tarjeta H.C

1. Corrupción nula/muy baja
2. Corrupción baja
3. Corrupción regular/intermedia
4. Corrupción alta
5. Corrupción muy alta
44.b. ¿Cuántos años completos de educación tiene usted?
____ Año de __________________ (primaria, secundaria, bachillerato/profesional
técnico/media superior, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = ______ años total
[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]

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<td>15</td>
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<td>18+</td>
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(01) Menos de $2,100
(02) Entre $2,101 – $4,200
(03) Entre $4,201 – $6,300
(04) Entre $6,301 – $8,400
(05) Entre $8,401 – $10,500
(06) Entre $10,501 – $12,600
(07) Entre $12,601 – $14,700
(08) Entre $14,701 – $16,800
(09) Entre $16,801 – $21,000
(10) Entre $21,001 – $25,200
(11) Entre $25,201 – $29,400
(12) Entre $29,401 – $33,600
(13) Entre $33,601 – $37,800
(14) Entre $37,801 – $42,000
(15) Entre $42,001 – $46,200
(16) Entre $46,201 – $50,400
(17) Entre $50,401 – $54,600
(18) Entre $54,601 – $58,800
(19) Entre $58,801 – $63,000
(20) Más de $63,001