A. Information about the respondent

Thomas Zeitzoff
Assistant Professor, School of Public Affairs, American University
zeitzoff@american.edu

B. General information about the project

B1. Title of project
Fighting the Past: Perceptions of Control, Historical Misperceptions, and Corrective Information in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

B2. Author(s)

Brendan Nyhan
Assistant Professor
Department of Government
Dartmouth College
nyhan@dartmouth.edu

Thomas Zeitzoff
Assistant Professor
School of Public Affairs
American University
zeitzoff@american.edu

Is this registration prospective or retrospective?
Registration prior to researcher access to outcome data.

Is this an experimental study?
Yes.

Date of start of study
March 12, 2015 (approximate)

Should this study be gated (discouraged)?
Yes - until May 2016 or publication.

Was this design "cliniced" at an EGAP meeting?
No.

C. Registration data

C1. Background and explanation of rationale
Misperceptions are a recurring element of ongoing disputes between national, ethnic, or religious groups, which frequently feature widespread belief in narratives that emphasize the uniqueness of group members’ suffering and denigrate or ignore injustices suffered by the other group (Bar-Tal 2007; Noor et al. 2012). Along these lines, when conflicts between groups intensify, individuals are more likely to excuse or deny collective responsibility for their own group’s past misdeeds (Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan 2006; Wohl and Branscombe 2008).

These disputes over historical wrongdoing can contribute to the persistence of intergroup conflicts (Bar-Tal 2000) – a pattern that has frequently been observed in contexts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the former Yugoslavia, and Northern Ireland as well as relations between states such as Japan and South Korea. By contrast, acknowledging wrongdoing against the other side can contribute to reconciliation (e.g., Ginges et al. 2007; Vollhardt, Mazur, and Lemahieu 2014).

In many cases, denials of historical evidence in intergroup conflicts are paired with conspiracy theories attributing perceptions of an injustice to the power of the other group in the conflict. For instance, leaders in divided societies often promote conspiracy theories about the other side to try to achieve their own political goals (De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999). One reason these theories may resonate with ingroup members is the threat that conflict poses to people’s feelings of control due to the occurrence of random or chaotic violence, minority group status, or power imbalances such as occupation. Previous research has shown that reduced perceptions of control can make people more prone to conspiracy theory beliefs (Whitson and Galinsky 2008; Sullivan, Landau, and Rothschild 2010).

Specifically, we investigate the factors that contribute to historical (mis)perceptions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one of the most intractable ongoing conflicts in the world. Our study considers an especially divisive historical misperception—Jewish denial of the forced expulsion of Palestinians during the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. Palestinians refer to the expulsion as the “Nakba” (Arabic for catastrophe), and commemorate it with protest marches. Most historians agree that Israeli soldiers expelled large numbers of Palestinians from their homes during the 1948 war and banned their return after the war. However, misperceptions about the Nakba or even denial of its veracity appear to be common among Jewish Israelis. In the most extreme version of the myth, Jewish forces played no role in the process; Palestinians are thought to have instead left their homes and villages on their own or at the direction of their leaders. Along the lines of the theory described above, feelings of a lack of control induced by the terrorist threat in Israel may contribute to Nakba denial and resistance.

In addition, the effects of information exposure and feelings of control are likely to vary by ideology. Vulnerability to misperceptions – and resistance to corrective information – are likely to be highest among conservative Jewish Israelis. Previous research has found that misperceptions are typically higher and corrections are often ineffective or even increase misperceptions among the most vulnerable ideological groups (e.g., Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Nyhan, Reifler, and Ubel 2013).
By contrast, non-conservative Jewish Israelis may be more vulnerable to the effects of a lack of control. First, perceptions of system instability and fears of threat and loss (Jost et al. 2003) are associated with conservatism, which may explain why liberals in the U.S. (Nail and McGregor 2009) and people exposed to the terrorist attacks (Bonanno and Jost 2006, Hersh 2013) moved in a conservative direction after 9/11. Similar results have been found using experimentally stimulated threats (Landau et al. 2004, Nail et al. 2009, Thórisdóttir and Jost 2011; but see Greenberg et al. 1992, Kosloff et al. 2010). System justification theory explains this response as the result of a process of compensatory control – feelings of low control or uncertainty cause people to increase belief in the social and political status quo or reduce their support for change (Willer 2004, Kay et al. 2008, Banfield 2010, van der Toorn 20152, Whitson et al. 2015). These effects may be larger among ideologically moderate and left-leaning Israelis,¹ who are otherwise less likely to believe in nationalist myths about Israel’s history and past behavior.

To test how feelings of control influence the persistence of misperceptions about the Nakba and the effectiveness of corrective historical information, we conduct an online survey experiment on 2,000 Jewish Israelis using the Midgam Project survey panel. We will randomly assign subjects to one of five conditions – either a pure control group or to one of four experimental groups in a 2x2 between-subjects design in which we independently manipulate level of control (low vs. high) and exposure to corrective information (Nakba denial vs. denial plus corrective information):

1. Pure control (no information)
2. Nakba denial; low control
3. Nakba denial + correction; low control
4. Nakba denial; high control
5. Nakba denial + correction; high control

After the experimental manipulations, we will measure individual beliefs about the Nakba and Nakba denial (did the Nakba happen? what role did Jewish soldiers play in it? etc.) and also measure attitudes on other key issues related to the conflict (final status of settlements, Jerusalem, etc.) as well as more general views toward Israel and feelings toward Jewish Israelis, Arab Israelis, and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. To measure how manipulating control and corrective information about Nakba influence a separate misperception involving Israeli military actions, we will also ask people’s beliefs about the massacre of civilians at Sabra and Shatila. The massacre, which took place in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon during the 1982 war, was carried out by Lebanese Christian militias with the help of the Israeli Defense Forces. A common misperception is that the Palestinians that were killed were terrorists and not civilians. Our survey experiment will be able to provide policymakers and scholars a better understanding for why these historical misperceptions persist, how they can be corrected, and whether they influence key attitudes toward the conflict and the peace process.

¹ In Israel, the main axis of political competition is on security. Supporters of the right-wing parties take a harder line on security issues and are less supportive of peace overtures to Palestinians. Left-wing and moderate Israelis are more likely to support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
What are the hypotheses to be tested?

We plan to test the following four experimental hypotheses.

Hypotheses:

H1: Individuals in the correction conditions will report lower misperceptions than those who receive only misleading information about the Nakba.

H2: Respondents in the low control condition will report greater misperceptions about the Nakba and less critical views of Israel’s behavior than those in the high control condition.

H3: The effect of misinformation on misperceptions will be moderated by level of control. Specifically, misperceptions will increase more in response to exposure to Nakba denial among respondents in the low control condition than among those in the high control condition (relative to pure controls).

H4: Right-wing respondents will be more resistant to the effects of corrective information than non-conservatives. Specifically, the misperception-reducing effect of the correction will be greater among right-wing respondents than among other participants (relative to respondents in each group who are only exposed to Nakba denial).

We will plan to explore the following research questions, which raise important issues for which we do not have strong theoretical expectations:

RQ1: Will the relationship between the effect of corrective information and ideology on misperceptions be moderated by level of control? It is possible, as we found in pilot data, that the difference in the effect of the correction between right-wing respondents and other respondents will vary by level of control. In particular, if other respondents’ misperceptions increase more in response to Nakba denial when control is low, then the scope for negative correction effects is correspondingly larger.

RQ2: Will exposure to corrective information change respondents’ overall view of the extent to which Israel was founded in an ethical manner and acts in a manner consistent with its ideals? Respondents may, for instance, accept corrective information about the Nakba but interpret its implications in different ways (Gaines et al. 2007), causing their beliefs about Israel more generally not to change.

RQ3: Do feelings of a lack of control or corrective information affect respondent beliefs about other misperceptions? A secondary outcome measure asks respondents whether Palestinian civilians (truth) or terrorists (misperception) were killed in the Sabra and Shatila massacre. Responses to this question will help us to disentangle the mechanism behind any level of control effect we find on our primary outcome measure. If Sabra/Shatila misperceptions increase in the low control conditions relative to high control conditions, then it would suggest that the control effect on misperceptions is not domain-specific. Alternatively, if Sabra/Shatila misperceptions do not change
significantly, we would conclude that the level of control effect we observe relative to the control condition is conditional on the presence of information about Nakba denial.

RQ4: An additional research question is whether corrective information about the Nakba influence attitudes towards Palestinians and Arab Israelis (Palestinian Citizens of Israel) as well as attitudes towards final status issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Scholars of intractable conflict would suggest that humanizing the outgroup by acknowledging their past victimization might make ingroup member view them more favorably and be more supportive of the peace process.

RQ5: Past research suggests that those exposed to intergroup violence become more proingroup, but little research considers whether this process extends to misperceptions about the outgroup. We will examine whether violence exposure moderates the effect of Nakba denial and corrective information on misperceptions.

**How will these hypotheses be tested?**

[All of the survey items and the experimental protocol are attached below.]

*Eligibility and exclusion criteria for participants*

Subjects are Jewish Israelis over the age of 18 that are members of the Midgam online panel.

*Randomization approach*

We will randomly assign subjects to one of five treatment conditions:

1. Pure control (no information whatsoever)
2. Nakba denial; low control
3. Nakba denial + correction; low control
4. Nakba denial; high control
5. Nakba denial + correction; high control

*Data collection and blinding*

The Midgam Project will conduct the survey and data collection.

*Interventions and dates of administration*

Surveys will be made available on or around March 9, 2015 and will remain open until data collection is complete.

*Primary and secondary outcome measures*

Primary measures:
Our principal outcome measure is average misperceptions and perceptions about Jewish military behavior during the Nakba in 1948. We will take the mean of the four questions about it in our survey where 5=the highest level of misperception and 1=the lowest level (reverse-coded as appropriate).

Secondary measures include:
- Misperceptions about the Sabra and Shatila massacre (mean after questions are reverse-coded as appropriate)
- General beliefs about Israeli history and values (mean after questions are reverse-coded as appropriate)
- Attitudes about acceptability of protests related to Nakba day (mean after questions are reverse-coded as appropriate)
- Attitudes on final status agreement between Jews and Palestinians (mean after questions are reverse-coded as appropriate)
- Feeling thermometer scores for Jewish Israelis, Arab Israelis, and Palestinians (difference between thermometer score for Jewish Israelis and mean score for Arab Israelis and Palestinians)

If the questions used for our measures do not scale together, we may analyze responses to each question separately.

**Statistical analyses**

For H1-H3, we will use OLS with robust standard errors to estimate average treatment effects for our four experimental conditions relative to the control condition for our primary outcome measure (misperceptions about the Nakba) and the secondary dependent variables listed above. We will compute the appropriate differences in means between conditions to test the hypotheses above if the relevant test is not relative to the control group.

For H4, we will interact the four experimental conditions with an indicator for right-wing self-identification (selecting the two most right-wing options on a seven-point scale: right or extreme right) and calculate the difference in correction effects between right-wing respondents and other participants in both the low and high control conditions.

For RQ1, we will interact the experimental indicators with an indicator for right-wing self-identification and use a F-test to compare this model with a nested model that includes a conservative indicator. If it is, we will compute the relevant estimated marginal effects by comparing experimental means by cell. For RQ5, we will do the same with both an indicator for direct exposure to violence and (if possible) an indicator for recent violence in the area in which the respondent lives.

For RQ2-RQ4, we will repeat the analysis approach from H1-H3 using appropriate secondary outcome measures (RQ2 corresponds to H1, RQ3 to H1-H3, and RQ4 to H1).
(Note: If Midgam provides survey weights, we will use those in our primary analysis. Otherwise, our results will be unweighted. All regression results for single ordered dependent variables will be verified for robustness using ordered probit.)

**Has this research received Institutional Review Board (IRB) or ethics committee approval?** *

- American University IRB Exemption - Protocol #14224 (1/5/15)
- Dartmouth University CPHS Exemption - STUDY #00028488 (12/12/14)

**Was a power analysis conducted prior to data collection?** *

No

**Will the intervention be implemented by the researcher or a third party? If a third party, please provide the name.**

It will be implemented by the Midgam Project.

**Did any of the research team receive remuneration from the implementing agency for taking part in this research?**

No.

**If relevant, is there an advance agreement with the implementation group that all results can be published?**

No.
SURVEY PROTOCOL

[Sample: Pre-screen for Jewish respondents who live in Israel.]

Consent form

Research Study

Principal Investigators
Two professors in the United States are conducting this study: Brendan Nyhan, a professor at Dartmouth College, and Thomas Zeitzoff, a professor at American University.

Purpose
You are invited to participate in a research study. By taking this survey, you can help researchers understand how people process information about politics. Approximately 1500-2000 participants will be recruited for this study.

Procedures
This survey takes an average of 10-15 minutes. If you choose to take the survey, you can stop at any time. You may skip any questions you don't want to answer.

Risks
In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life.

Benefits
Participation in this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we hope to learn about how people make sense of the information they receive about politics.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal
Participation in research is voluntary. You do not have to be in this study. If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any time. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time.

Confidentiality
Your name will not be recorded anywhere in this survey. All of your answers will be completely confidential. The survey will not ask you for any identifying information. We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. The data will be stored on password- and firewall-protected computers. Information may also be shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly (Dartmouth Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects and the American University Institutional Review Board). The findings will be summarized and reported in group form. You will not be identified personally.

Contact
The Dartmouth Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects (CPHS) and the American University Institutional Review Board (IRB) have determined that this study is
exempt from CPHS and IRB oversight. If you have any questions about the study, please contact Brendan Nyhan (nyhan@dartmouth.edu).

Your help means a lot to us. We thank you again for taking the time to complete this survey.

Clicking "Yes" below indicates that you agree to participate in the study.

-Yes, I agree to participate in this study

Warm up Questions

1. In general, how are you feeling?
   a. Very good
   b. Fairly good
   c. Neither good nor bad
   d. Fairly bad
   e. Very bad

2. In general, how is your family doing?
   a. Very good
   b. Fairly good
   c. Neither good nor bad
   d. Fairly bad
   e. Very bad

3. In general, how do you feel about the future personally?
   a. Very positive
   b. Fairly positive
   c. Neither positive nor negative
   d. Fairly negative
   e. Very negative

4. In general, how do you feel about Israel’s future?
   a. Very positive
   b. Fairly positive
   c. Neither positive nor negative
   d. Fairly negative
   e. Very negative

5. Do you approve or disapprove of how the current government is handling the problems that exist in Israel today?
   a. Strongly approve
   b. Somewhat approve
   c. Somewhat disapprove
d. Strongly disapprove

[new page]

Religious/political questions

1. There is a lot of talk about left and right in the security policy realm. How would you rate yourself on a scale of 1-7, where 1 is leftwing-dovish, 7 is right wing-hawkish, and 4 is in the middle?
   1. Leftwing-dovish
   2.
   3.
   4.
   5.
   6.
   7. Right wing-hawkish

2. How would you describe yourself politically?
   a. Extreme left
   b. Left
   c. Moderate left
   d. Center
   e. Moderate right
   f. Right
   g. Extreme right

3. If an election were held today, which list would you vote for?
   a. Likud
   b. Jewish Home
   c. Yisrael Beitanu
   d. Hatnuah
   e. Labor
   f. Shas
   g. Kadima
   h. United Torah Judaism
   i. Meretz
   j. Hadash
   k. A different party
   l. Don’t know

4. Which of the following would you define yourself as?
   a. Secular
   b. Traditional
   c. Religious
   d. Ultra Orthodox/Haredi
Demographic questions

1. Age

How old are you? ___________ [exclude if under 18]

2. Sex

What gender are you?
-Male
-Female

3. How many people live in your household? (including soldiers) ___________

4. Which sub-district do you live in?
   a. Jerusalem
   b. Safed
   c. Kinneret
   d. Yizre’el
   e. Akko
   f. Haifa
   g. Hadera
   h. Sharon
   i. Petah Tikvah
   j. Ramla
   k. Rehovot
   l. Tel Aviv
   m. Ashkelon
   n. Beersheba

5. How long have you lived in that sub-district?
   a. Since before 2000 (more than 14 years)
   b. Since 2000 (14 years)
   c. Since 2001 (13 years)
   d. Since 2002 (12 years)
   e. Since 2003 (11 years)
   f. Since 2004 (10 years)
   g. Since 2005 (9 years)
   h. Since 2006 (8 years)
   i. Since 2007 (7 years)
   j. Since 2008 (6 years)
   k. Since 2009 (5 years)
   l. Since 2010 (4 years)
   m. Since 2011 (3 years)
   n. Since 2012 (2 years)
6. What is your family status?
   a. Married
   b. Living permanently with partner
   c. Divorced
   d. Separated (living separately)
   e. Widowed
   f. Single, never married

7. What is your country of origin?
   a. Asia/Africa
   b. Europe/America
   c. Soviet Union/Former Soviet Union
   d. Native born Israeli, father – native-born Israeli
   e. Native born Israeli, father - Asia/Africa
   f. Native born Israeli, father - Europe/America
   g. Native born Israeli, father - Soviet Union/Former Soviet Union
   h. Other __________

8. If you were not born in Israel, when did you immigrate? [display if native born Israeli not selected]
   a. Year of immigration ________
   b. I was born in Israel

9. Highest level of education:
   a. Elementary school or less
   b. Partial high school
   c. Full high school without matriculation exams
   d. Full high school with matriculation exams
   e. Post-high school, non-academic (teachers seminar, nursing school, engineering school, yeshiva)
   f. Partial academic degree
   g. Full academic degree - BA
   h. Full academic degree - MA or higher

[page break]

[Randomly assign respondents with equal probability to one of five groups: a pure control group (no control content, no correction content); low control, no correction; low control, correction; high control, no correction; high control, correction]

High/low control manipulation

[High control]
Please recall a particular incident in which something significant happened to you and you had complete control over the situation. Please describe the incident in which you felt complete control over the situation in as much detail as possible – what happened, how you felt, etc.

[large text box]

[Low control]

Please recall a particular incident in which something significant happened to you and you did not have any control over the situation. Please describe the incident in which you felt a complete lack of control over the situation in as much detail as possible – what happened, how you felt, etc.

[large text box]

[page break]

Correction manipulation

[Misperception]

Please read the following text, which is based on a statement made by a prominent Israeli political organization about the events surrounding the founding of Israel:

The claim that “Zionist forces expelled Palestinian Arabs to ensure a decisive Jewish majority in the future state of Israel” is the culmination of a huge campaign of lies that seeks to rewrite, distort, and falsify history. Nobody claims that the Arabs of the Land of Israel did not experience a catastrophe at the end of the 1940s. Yes, they did experience a catastrophe, a Nakba, as they call it. So why do we dare to call the Nakba a lie? Because the discourse has become so false and distorted that there is no other way to describe it.

Specifically, it is a lie to claim that Jewish fighting forces perpetrated a series of brutal massacres of Palestinian Arabs that served the deliberate policy of expulsion and ethnic cleansing. This claim is false. The results of the war were terrible. There certainly were refugees. But the Nakba was not what they want us to believe it was. It is an unprecedented and unabashed misrepresentation that aims at rewriting history.

[page break]

Correction
Now please read the following text, which is based on an account by a well-respected Israeli historian about the events surrounding the founding of Israel:

However, most historians who have researched the subject – Zionists, post-Zionists and non-Zionists – paint a radically different picture.

Most historians in Israel and abroad no longer dispute the fact that IDF soldiers expelled large numbers of Palestinians from their homes during the 1948 war, and banned their return after the war.

They present evidence that Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion knew in real time about the expulsion of Palestinians and authorized expulsions in a number of cases. Most agree that Jewish military forces expelled the Palestinian inhabitants in at least 120 of 530 villages. In half the villages, the inhabitants fled because of the battles and were not allowed to return. Only in a handful of cases did villagers leave at the instructions of their leaders or mukhtars’ (headmen).

In many cases, senior commanders of the Israel Defense Forces ordered Palestinians to be expelled and their homes blown up. The Israeli military not only updated Ben-Gurion about these events but also apparently received his prior authorization in several cases.

[page break]

Dependent variables

Please indicate whether you believe the following claims are accurate or not accurate.

1. Jewish soldiers forcibly expelled Palestinian Arabs from many villages in 1948.
   a. Extremely accurate
   b. Very accurate
   c. Somewhat accurate
   d. Not very accurate
   e. Not at all accurate

2. Palestinian Arabs in Israel abandoned their villages on their own in 1948; they did not leave because of Jewish actions.
   a. Extremely accurate
   b. Very accurate
   c. Somewhat accurate
   d. Not very accurate
   e. Not at all accurate

3. Jewish civilian and military leaders knew about and in some cases authorized the expulsions of numerous Palestinian Arabs in 1948.
4. The claim that Jewish soldiers forcibly expelled Palestinian Arabs from many villages in 1948 is a lie that is spread by Israel’s enemies.
   a. Extremely accurate
   b. Very accurate
   c. Somewhat accurate
   d. Not very accurate
   e. Not at all accurate

5. Israeli leaders were responsible for allowing the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians by Christian militiamen at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps during the First Lebanon War.
   a. Extremely accurate
   b. Very accurate
   c. Somewhat accurate
   d. Not very accurate
   e. Not at all accurate

6. Hundreds of Palestinian terrorists, not civilians, were killed by Christian militiamen whom Israeli leaders allowed to enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps during the First Lebanon War.
   a. Extremely accurate
   b. Very accurate
   c. Somewhat accurate
   d. Not very accurate
   e. Not at all accurate

7. Israel was founded in an ethical manner.
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Somewhat agree
   c. Slightly agree
   d. Slightly disagree
   e. Somewhat disagree
   f. Strongly disagree
8. Arab Israelis who participate in Nakba Day protests should be stripped of their citizenship.
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Somewhat agree
   c. Slightly agree
   d. Slightly disagree
   e. Somewhat disagree
   f. Strongly disagree

9. The actions taken by Jewish soldiers against Palestinian Arabs during the founding of Israel violates the ideals of our country.
   a. Strongly agree
   b. Somewhat agree
   c. Slightly agree
   d. Slightly disagree
   e. Somewhat disagree
   f. Strongly disagree

10. Every Israeli citizen has a right to protest - even in support of Nakba Day.
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Somewhat agree
    c. Slightly agree
    d. Slightly disagree
    e. Somewhat disagree
    f. Strongly disagree

11. Israel has always done its best to uphold its founding principle of “purity of arms”—that its soldiers use the minimum amount of force and avoid harming civilians whenever possible.
    a. Strongly agree
    b. Somewhat agree
    c. Slightly agree
    d. Slightly disagree
    e. Somewhat disagree
    f. Strongly disagree
12. I’d like you to rate the groups below using something called the “feeling thermometer.” You can choose any number between 0 and 100. The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable you feel toward that group, the lower the number, the colder or less favorable. You would rate a group at the 50-degree mark if you feel neither warm nor cold toward them.
   a. Filipinos (0 to 100)
   b. Arab Israelis (0 to 100)
   c. Australians (0 to 100)
   d. Jewish Israelis (0 to 100)
   e. Canadians (0 to 100)
   f. Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza (0 to 100)

[instructions to Midgam – randomize order]

Please answer the following questions.

13. In your opinion, should Israel consent or not consent to the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip under the framework of a permanent agreement?
   a. Definitely should consent
   b. Probably should consent
   c. Probably should NOT consent
   d. Definitely should NOT consent

14. Some people think Israel should be prepared to return the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem to the Palestinians under the terms of a permanent agreement. Other people think Israel should continue to occupy the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem even if the price of doing so is the prevention of a permanent agreement. What is your view?
   a. Definitely should return Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem
   b. Probably should return Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem
   c. Probably should NOT return Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem
   d. Definitely should NOT return Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem

15. What is your view on the evacuation of Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria in a final status agreement with the Palestinians?
   a. There should be no evacuation under any circumstances
   b. Israel should evacuate all the small and isolated settlements
   c. Israel should evacuate all settlements, including the large settlement blocs

[page break]

Additional demographics
1. What is your employment situation?
   a. Employed
      i. Salaried
      ii. Independent
   b. Not employed
      i. Retired
      ii. Homemaker
      iii. Soldier
      iv. Yeshiva student
      v. Student
      vi. Looking for work

[Display if selected employed]

2. If employed, do you work in a
   a. Full-time position
   b. Part-time position

3. What is your status with the IDF?
   a. I currently serve in a combat unit (regular service)
   b. I served in the past in a combat unit
   c. I currently serve in a non-combat unit (regular service)
   d. I served in the past in a non-combat unit
   e. Have not ever served in the IDF

4. What is your household income from all sources (after taxes and other obligatory deductions)?
   i. Up to 3,000 NIS
   ii. 3,001-6,000 NIS
   iii. 6,001-10,000 NIS
   iv. 10,001-14,000 NIS
   v. 14,001-20,000 NIS
   vi. More than 20,000 NIS

5. a. Have any of your friends or family suffered adverse mental health effects (such as post-traumatic stress disorder) from Arab or Palestinian terrorist attacks?
   i. No
   ii. Yes, one friend or family member
   iii. Yes, two friends and/or family members
   iv. Yes, three friends and/or family members
   v. Yes, four or more friends and/or family members
b. Have any of your friends or family been physically injured or wounded from Arab or Palestinian terrorist attacks?
   i. No
   ii. Yes, one friend or family member
   iii. Yes, two friends and/or family members
   iv. Yes, three friends and/or family members
   v. Yes, four or more friends and/or family members

c. Have any of your friends or family been killed by Arab or Palestinian terrorist attacks?
   i. No
   ii. Yes, one friend or family member
   iii. Yes, two friends and/or family members
   iv. Yes, three friends and/or family members
   v. Yes, four or more friends and/or family members

[page break]

Debriefing

Please note that the historical record contradicts the information provided above about the Nakba. The information below is adapted from an account by an Israeli historian. Please read it carefully before proceeding.

Most historians in Israel and abroad no longer dispute the fact that IDF soldiers expelled large numbers of Palestinians from their homes during the 1948 war, and banned their return after the war.

They present evidence that Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion knew in real time about the expulsion of Palestinians and apparently authorized expulsions in a number of cases. Most agree that Jewish military forces expelled the Palestinian inhabitants in at least 120 of 530 villages. In half the villages, the inhabitants fled because of the battles and were not allowed to return. Only in a handful of cases did villagers leave at the instructions of their leaders or mukhtars’ (headmen).

In many cases, senior commanders of the Israel Defense Forces ordered Palestinians to be expelled and their homes blown up. The Israeli military not only updated Ben-Gurion about these events but also apparently received his prior authorization in several cases.

[page break]

Comments
Do you have any comments on the survey? Please let us know about any problems you had or aspects of the survey that were confusing.
Thank you for taking part in our survey!