

Pre-Analysis Plan: Revealed Identity in Experimental Games

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15 May 2013

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1. Motivation

The objective of this study is to provide an empirical investigation of cleavage-based discrimination. We implement experimental games aimed at measuring pro-social behavior (specifically, we implement a series of attribute-based dictator games). We conduct our study in rural communities in Sierra Leone, characterized by strong status-based patron-client networks. Our cleavage of interest is social status. We conduct (i) a standard anonymous attribute-based dictator game (ADG) where we ask participants to share an endowment both within and across status groups, and (ii) a local round-robin dictator game where the identity of the dictator remains anonymous. The term “local” indicates that participants know the identity of the recipient when making their allocation decisions. A “round-robin” design is one where each participant is paired with each other participant and asked to make an allocation decision. By comparing the outcomes, we seek to provide and understand techniques to make meaningful claims about the real world from lab experimental data.

1.1. Measurement and Attribute-Based Dictator Games

Attribute-based dictator games (ADGs) have often been used to make claims about the role of a social cleavage on pro-social behavior between individuals. Our approach explicitly defines an estimand of interest (pro-social behavior) and uses the basic structure of the ADG to deduce a good estimate. The village is the focal point of our analysis. In much of the developing world, villages are governed by traditional or elected hierarchies and constitute the level at which citizens engage for access to public goods or services. Furthermore, the village of habitation provides a natural context for rural citizens, as it comprises the vast majority of their interpersonal relations.

Consequently, we define our estimand of interest as pro-social behavior at the village level, and we conduct dictator games with individuals from both sides of the cleavage. This strategy yields two benefits. First, it provides the participants in the study with a natural context (although not a natural behavior) within which to interact. Second, as we discuss in some detail below, playing dictator games between individuals from the same village, who can be expected to know each other, prevents the accidental manipulation of priors on attributes that are unknown to the researcher. Thus, this study defines a meaningful estimand related to cleavage-based discrimination and devises a lab-based strategy to isolate this estimand.

The classic ADG samples individuals from a large sampling frame to ensure that dictators and receivers do not know each other. Classic ADGs, where the dictator is given some experimenter-controlled ‘cue’ or attribute regarding the receiver and no other information, trace their roots to the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel 1982). The purpose of this technique was to demonstrate that even subtle cues – such as the color of one’s shirt – are sufficient to induce group biases in pro-social behaviors in an anonymous setting. A recent literature in political science and economics has sought to use similar techniques in experimental lab games, cuing gender (Holm 2000), ethnicity (Habyarimana et al. 2009, Whitt and Wilson 2007, Fershtman and Gneezy 2001) or partisanship (Fowler and Kam 2007) to show evidence of discrimination in pro-social behaviors. The result has been a literature that largely attempts to arrive at claims about identity-based statistical discrimination – differences in the incidence of a particular outcome (e.g. donation) as it varies by the attribute under examination.

Since the ADG is drawn from a large enough sampling frame to ensure anonymity between individuals, the participants often cannot conceive of a comprehensible context within which to locate the interaction of a dictator game. Furthermore, the classic ADG may lead to the accidental manipulation of unobserved attributes, a violation of the exclusion restriction. To demonstrate the problem, imagine a population that can be partitioned into the educated (E) and the uneducated (NE), where each of the groups display a significant amount of animosity towards each other. To be precise, given an allocation over 5 utils in a dictator game, the dictator prefers to keep all 5 utils when the receiver is from the other group in terms of educated/uneducated status and prefers to keep 3 utils when the receiver is from the same group. First, imagine a population that does not discriminate based on age. Second, imagine a setup where the experimenter has only told an uneducated, old dictator that the receiver is either old or young. Assume further that a dictator has the prior belief that a young person is equally likely to be from E or NE, whereas as an elderly person is certain to be uneducated. This results in a scenario where the dictator keeps, on average, 4 utils when the receiver is believed to be young and 3 utils when the receiver is believed to be old. However, it would be wrong to claim that the difference in generosity of 1 util is due to the age of the receiver; it is the belief about education status that drives this incorrect conclusion. In short, by cuing age,

the researcher has unwittingly manipulated beliefs about education status. This is particularly problematic if the estimand of interest involves individuals who should have sufficient interaction/information to determine the education status and age of each other.

1.2. Attribute of Interest: Youth vs Elderly

We implement our study in rural villages in Eastern Sierra Leone, one of the poorest regions in the world, torn by a recent civil war. Sierra Leone has been characterized as a ranked lineage society where local elites control access to land and marriage (Richards 2005). Local elites [called “Taa Gbakoi” in Mende] are typically chiefs, town speakers, village imam, women’s and youth leader, tribal authorities, etc. and control access to labor and reproductive opportunities of low status villagers [“Nu Gbamei” in Mende], which are typically the youth. Many elites are appointed for life and have great authority to organize economic and social activity: including settling disputes, organizing public goods, etc. There is substantial heterogeneity among villages with respect to the exploitative nature of local elites. In a recent study, Acemoglu et al (2013) show how power of elites is influenced by the number of potential opponent ruling families, where chieftaincy contestation is linked to public good provision.

There is evidence that the nature of the high status-low status relationship is often exploitative. It is thought that it served as an important factor contributing to the recent civil war in Sierra Leone through the recurrent marginalization and humiliation and agrarian grievances of rural youth (Richards 2005, Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). For example, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) show how the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) were mainly made up of students and farmers. We seek to understand, if these cleavages persist in the post-war period. We also seek to understand cooperation and competition within status groups. For example, there is some evidence of collusion between high status individuals within villages, for example in relation to the mobilization of youth labor (Mokuwa et al 2011). At the same time high status and often richer villages compete over access to resources and positions of power. Low status individuals often collaborate to form labour groups, but at the same time are seen to compete over access to resources.

2. Hypotheses

The aim of this study is to provide empirical evidence of cleavage-based discrimination. We argue that classic ADGs—because of their feature of anonymity between participants—abstract from significant determinants of pro-social behavior, such as previous interaction and the social network. The identification the receiver in a dictator game as being of another group may lead to differences in donation behavior, but should not represent discrimination as practiced in reality by the dictator when the dictator is interacting with people she knows from the other group. We expect a statistically significant difference in the level of pro-social behavior between the (naïve) anonymous ADG and the local round-robin DG. In particular, we expect strong differences in the result for the cleavage under study (high vs low status). We are agnostic about the sign of this difference. We posit that social connection may increase or decrease cleavage effects:

Positive Contact Hypothesis: Group differences are *less* salient in local games. Because the dictator knows the receiver out-group discrimination is mitigated by the dyad’s personal relationship. This hypothesis would be confirmed if out-group donations in the local condition were greater than out-group donation in an anonymous condition.

Negative Contact Hypothesis: Group differences are *more* salient in local games. Because the dictator knows the receiver out-group discrimination is exacerbated by the dyad’s personal relationship. This hypothesis would be confirmed if out-group donations in the local condition were less than out-group donation in an anonymous condition.

In addition to this more general methodological question clarifying the significance of anonymous ADGs, we also want to understand the more specific type of discrimination taking place in Sierra Leone between high status and low status co-villagers. We hypothesize several different dynamics that may determine how players treat opponents from the out-group as well as opponents from their in-group.

When high-status dictators make allocation choices for high-status receivers, we expect two possible driving motivations are possible:

High status Cooperation Hypothesis: High-status individuals in the village work together often, making decisions about collective action and public good provision. This has developed relationships where these individuals are more pro-social towards one another. This hypothesis would be confirmed if high-status dictators made higher than average contributions to other high status receivers.

High status Competition Hypothesis: The high-status individuals in the village are competing with other high-status individuals for scarce resources, including access to power, land, labor, and women. This has developed relationships where these individuals are less pro-social towards each other. This hypothesis would be confirmed if high-status dictators made lower than average contributions to other high status receivers.

There might be similar motivations for low status dictators:

Low-status Cooperation Hypothesis: Low-status individuals in the village are poorer and have less access to resources. This has created more dependency among them. They survive by helping each other. This hypothesis would be confirmed if low-status dictators made higher than average contributions to low-status receivers.

Low-status Competition Hypothesis: The low-status individuals in the village are poorer and have less access to resources inducing competition. The easiest way to get scarce resources is to take advantage of other low-status people because they are not dependent on other low-status individuals. This hypothesis would be confirmed if low-status dictators made lower than average contributions to low-status receivers.

We are interested in understanding not only within-group discrimination, but across-group discrimination as well. When low-status dictators make allocation choices for high-status receivers, several factors could drive their behavior:

Low-High Generosity Hypothesis: When low-status individuals in the village interact with high-status individuals, there could be several reasons for them to be generous. For example:

- Positive Reciprocation: the high-status individuals have in the past provided services such as conflict resolution, insurance, and resource allocations to the low-status. The low-status are indebted to the high-status for this help and want to pay them back.
- Fear: the high-status have power they could use to punish or make life difficult for the low-status. Low-status individuals know this and give resources to the high-status to avoid provoking their ire.
- Social norms: the high-status command respect in the village. It may be the case that low-status individuals show respect by sharing resources.

This hypothesis would be confirmed if low-status dictators made higher than average contributions to high-status receivers.

Low-High Selfishness Hypothesis: Conversely, we can think of several reasons why low-status individuals may contribute less towards high-status co-villagers:

- Negative Reciprocation: if the high-status have abused their power in the past to take advantage of the low-status, then the low-status can use this game to punish them by not sharing resources.
- Fairness Preference: the high-status need resources less than the low-status. The low-status use the game to make the distribution of resources in the villages (slightly) fairer.
- Social Norm: it may be the case that low-status individuals, because they are poorer in general or because they transfer resources to the high-status in other ways, usually are expected to keep any resources they can secure on their own.

This hypothesis would be confirmed if low-status dictators made lower than average contributions to high-status receivers.

When high-status dictators make choices affecting low-status receivers, we expect a similar set of possible motivations could be at play:

High-Low Generosity Hypothesis: When high-status individuals in the village interact with low-status individuals, there could be several reasons for them to be generous. For example:

- Positive Reciprocation: the low-status provide labor and other help on demand for the high-status. There may be a feeling that the high-status owe them something in return.
- Patronage: the high-status have power because the low-status have agreed to be ruled by them. This power exists because the high-status feed resources to the low-status. The high-status view the interaction in this game as a time when the patron transfers resources to the client to secure that power.
- Social norms: the high-status may feel a responsibility for helping the low-status when they can, and perhaps particularly in situations where the stakes are low.

This hypothesis would be confirmed if high-status dictators made higher than average contributions to low-status receivers.

High-Low Selfishness Hypothesis: Conversely, we can think of several reasons why low-status individuals may be resentful towards high-status co-villagers:

- Negative Reciprocation: the high-status may feel they are continuously forced to help the low-status. This would create a feeling of resentment that would justify giving little to the low-status here.
- Patronage (reversed): the high-status treat the low-status as clients in a patron-client relationship. They view the interaction in this game as a time when the client transfers resources to the patron.
- Social Norm: there may be a norm that the high-status deserve as many resources as they can secure for themselves because of all the services they provide.

This hypothesis would be confirmed if high-status dictators made lower than average contributions to low-status receivers.

2.1. Variation in Treatment Hypotheses

Dictators play six different versions of the classic (anonymous) attribute based game: one for each status type (high or low status) and three types of prime about the receiver: the receiver is 1) from a randomly chosen village in the dictator’s chiefdom, 2) from the dictator’s village, and 3) from the people from the dictator’s village that currently play the game. The six settings are listed below:

Treat.	Enumerator message to the dictator before allocation decision
A1	<i>“The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen <u>Taa Gbakoi</u> (e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town speaker, etc) <u>from a randomly chosen village in your chiefdom, not from your village.</u>”</i>
A2	<i>“The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen <u>Nu Gbamei</u> (e.g. farmer, youth, etc) <u>not a Taa Gbakoi from a randomly chosen village in your chiefdom, not from your village.</u>”</i>
A3	<i>“The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen <u>Taa Gbakoi</u> (T e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town speaker, etc) <u>from your village. He or she may or may not be have come with you today from your village.</u>”</i>
A4	<i>“The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen <u>Nu Gbamei</u> (e.g. farmer, youth, etc) <u>not a Taa Gbakoi from your village. He or she may or may not be have come with you today from your village.</u>”</i>
A5	<i>“The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen <u>Taa Gbakoi</u> (e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town speaker, etc) <u>from the people from your village that came with you today from your village.</u>”</i>
A6	<i>“The person receiving the money is a randomly <u>Nu Gbamei</u> (e.g. farmer, youth, etc) <u>not a Taa Gbakoi from the people from your village that came with you today from your village.</u>”</i>

The order of playing A1/2, A3/4 and A5/6 is randomly assigned to the players. There are multiple reasons for playing the anonymous dictator game with these multiple treatments.

First, there are two concerns when using the village prompts (A3/4). While the dictator does not know who exactly the receiver is, the allocation decision by the dictator will be based upon playing a representative villager. We thus obtain the village average per cleavage, which (in expectation) will be the same in the local round robin setup. Moreover, the level of anonymity is limited because the dictator is likely to know the high-status individuals in the village. The underlying issue is that we sampled players from the same village. We therefore introduce a treatment that prompts the chiefdom (A1/2). The latter will get us closer to picking up how much a dictator gives to a random higher or lower status person – a setting similar as those in the normal attribute based games.

Second, in practice our anonymous dictator games and local round-robin games differ not only with regards to whether the identity of the receiver is revealed. Differences in game characteristics beyond receiver anonymity might exist that influence the allocation decision (e.g. the fact that the anonymous game is played only once per situation, while the local round-robin game is played $n-1$ times). We therefore introduce also treatment A5/6 in which the dictator is explicitly aware of whom he or she is playing with, which will provide us with the baseline. Average contributions in A5/6 and in the local round-robin game should be similar, and difference we can therefore attribute to differences in the game characteristics.

Finally, the treatment variations make it possible to analyze the importance of social distance for pro-social behavior:

Village-Based Discrimination Hypothesis: A1 vs A3 (or A2 vs A4): There is a difference in the contribution levels depending on whether the receiver is inside or outside the village social network.

Identity-Based Discrimination Hypothesis: A3 vs A5 (or A4 vs A6): There is a difference in the contribution levels depending on whether the identity of the receiver is uncertain versus (more) certain but not fully personally identified.

3. Statistical Analysis

In order to compare the anonymous games to the local games, we will simply compare in-group and out-group donations in each type of game and conduct a two-sample t-test. However, the round-robin data requires correction for the fact that data are “clustered” by pairs. This will be modeled using a round-robin model (see Sircar and Van der Windt 2013).

In order to analyze the data, we explicitly model the correlation structure in accordance with round-robin social relations data, which is constructed in detail in this section. We denote the donation of dictator i towards receiver j in village k as y_{ijk} . In order to detect heterogeneous donation effects by the low status/high status dyad type, we model as a stochastic variable with mean and stochastic deviation from the mean:

$$y_{ijk} = \mu_{ijk} + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$

Individuals in the population may be of the low status (L) or high status (H) type. In order to simplify the notation, we will denote a particular dyad as IJ , where $I \in \{L, H\}$ and $J \in \{L, H\}$ denote the types of the dictator and receiver, respectively (e.g., d_{LH} denotes a scenario where a low status person is the dictator and a high status person is a receiver). We model the varying mean as a function of dummy variables of the dyad type and appropriate random effects:

$$\mu_{ijk} = \bar{\theta} + \theta_{LH}d_{LH} + \theta_{HL}d_{HL} + \theta_{HH}d_{HH} + \alpha_i + \beta_j + \gamma_k$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} \alpha_i \\ \beta_j \end{pmatrix} \sim N \left(\mathbf{0}, \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_D^2 & \sigma_{DR} \\ \sigma_{DR} & \sigma_R^2 \end{pmatrix} \right), \gamma_k \sim N(0, \sigma_V^2)$$

The equation above models a separate mean for a donation from a dictator of type I to a receiver of type J , with $\theta_{IJ} = 0$ if $IJ=LL$ (i.e. the dyad: low status dictator, low status receiver). Thus $\bar{\theta} + \theta_{IJ}$ measures the level of benevolence that an individual with type I shows towards an individual of type J . The gamma term is a random effect for village k to control for any village-specific predictors that may affect the mean donation in the population. The alpha and beta terms denote a random effect for i as a dictator and j as a receiver. These random effects control for individual level characteristics that may determine an individual's willingness to donate to another individual, as well as individual level characteristics that may determine an individual's likelihood of receiving donations from another individual. Finally, dictator and receiver effects for the same individual are allowed to be correlated since it is likely that an individual that is more likely to give donations to others is also more likely receive donations from others.

The stochastic term, ε_{ijk} , needs to be modeled carefully. It is likely that if i donates more to j when i is the dictator, then j will reciprocate and donate more to i when the roles are reversed. We thus model the common covariance matrix for the error structure within each dyad, estimating separate covariance matrices for low-low status (LL), high-high status (HH) and low-high status (LH) dyads. Such a model has often been referred to as a "round robin" model due to a data structure that resembles the first stage of a sporting competition. In standard observational data, it is difficult to estimate this correlation because of biases caused by the fact that i and j select to interact with each other based on personal attributes. However, in lab experimental data, we can get clean estimates of this correlation due to the fact that the experimenter guarantees that each individual interacts with each other individual in the game. This correlation has a natural interpretation as a measure of reciprocity for each dyad type:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \varepsilon_{ijk} \\ \varepsilon_{jik} \end{pmatrix} \sim N \left(\mathbf{0}, \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_{\varepsilon\tau}^2 & \rho_{\tau} \sigma_{\varepsilon\tau}^2 \\ \rho_{\tau} \sigma_{\varepsilon\tau}^2 & \sigma_{\varepsilon\tau}^2 \end{pmatrix} \right); \rho_{\tau} \sim N(\rho, \sigma_{\rho}^2), \tau \in \{LL, HH, LH\}$$

We estimate the above equations, with diffuse priors, in the program JAGS through the R2jags package in the statistical program R. In order to estimate the data, we turn to the invariant normal representation due to Wong (1982). We will run this model for each version of the dictator game. This linear social relations model allows us to make nuanced interpretations of our data.

3.1. Location, Participants, Selection and Sample Size

Our participants are from 48 rural villages in the eastern part of Sierra Leone. We select our participants based on social status. From each village, we invite 16 villagers to participate in our experiment. Runners are sent to each village to select the participants and invite them to show up at a certain day, time and location (typically in a nearby school building). To ensure we end up with a sample of 16, we purposefully invite two additional people. If at the experiment location, all 18 people show up, we randomly select one high status and one low status person to be left out of the experiment. The person is paid a show up fee and sent home. In each village we follow a detailed protocol (see Appendix B). For the selection of participants we purposefully selected the nine most important village big men. The chief, the speaker, the imam, the women's leader and the youth leader are asked to consult together and make a list of the nine most important big men in the village. The low status people are randomly selected from low status villagers, either farmers or youth. We make sure that other high status villagers are excluded from this group.

3.2. Covariates

Because of the random assignment of participant to treatment arms, we expect the participant groups across treatment arms to be similar. In practice however it is possible that they differ simply by virtue of unlucky draws. Our main analysis takes simple differences in means between outcomes in treatment and control areas. However, we will investigate whether we have balance among the different treatment arms by analyzing six key variables. Moreover, we can control for key variables that are plausible related to outcomes even though we do not expect them to be related to treatment. In so doing we can reduce variance and generate more precise estimates of effects as well as correct for random imbalances. We will make use of the following variables:

1. Gender
2. Age

3. Income
4. Ethnicity
5. Religion
6. Migration status

4. Game Play

A detailed protocol and record sheets is included in the appendix.

5. Debriefing and Final Survey

We conduct a short final survey with each participant asking a set of questions to learn about individual characteristics. This data will inform us about which characteristics – if at all – are important for cooperation among our participants. Second, we obtain dyadic information where participants are asked to indicate their relatedness to each participant along a set of dimensions (family, production, acquaintance, social, migration). The dyadic questions allow us to: 1) learn about the subjective indicators of in-group membership, and (2) obtain network information. The precise questions can be found in [Appendix A8: Individual Survey](#). We obtain network matrices that have all participants in both the rows and the columns. We can combine this data with game behavior and infer the importance of different networks, and the position of the dictator and receiver within these networks, for pro-social behavior.

6. Participant payment

Each participant receives a flat participation fee equal to a 1000 Le (or \$0.25), and a payment based on their allocation decisions during the game and that of a randomly and anonymously matched other (equal to about 2500 Le). In total participants receive an amount equal to about half a day's wage.

7. Timing and Other

1. This document is prepared while the data collection is ongoing, and before the data has been made digital for analysis.
2. IRB: H10076 at the University of Chicago.
3. The study is implemented by the researchers themselves and not a third party.

8. Concluding Remarks

By conducting this project that places the strategic decision making under imperfect information at the core of an experiment, we hope to gain a better understanding of how social networks and individual attributes influence cooperation. Specifically, we hope to: 1) improve upon current measurements of pro-social behavior by making use and comparing outcomes of behavioral games where information about the recipient is varied, and 2) investigate a cleavage, social status, of importance to many developing countries

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10.Appendix A: Instruments

Appendix A1: Informed Consent

JOHN LIST, *Principle Investigator*

Give the informed consent form to the participant and talk it through with them.

My name is _____. I am a research associate hired by Njala University. I am here to conduct a study that will look at livelihoods and trading in villages around Gola Forest.

Before we begin, I would like to take a minute to explain why I am inviting you to participate and what I will be doing with the information you provide to me. Please stop me at any time if you have any questions. After I've told you a bit more about our project, you can decide whether or not you would like to participate.

This research is being conducted by researchers from Njala University in collaboration with Wageningen University and the University of Chicago. We will be interviewing about 1600 households in 100 villages near Gola Forest. The researchers will use the information we collect in articles that might be published, as well as in academic presentations.

Participation should take about one day. Participation in both the activities and the survey are on a purely voluntary basis. I will ask you some questions about yourself and your family. There are minimal risks to you from answering these questions. The information we collect today is private and confidential. We will not share any details from the survey about your friends or family with anyone besides the research team from Njala University and Wageningen University. These surveys will go to a secure location at Wageningen University.

If at any time and for any reason, you would prefer not to answer any questions, please feel free not to. If at any time you would like to stop participating, please tell me. We can take a break, stop and continue at a later date, or stop altogether. You will not be penalized in any way for deciding to stop participation at any time.

If you have questions, you are free to ask them now. If you have questions later, you may contact me by calling the research supervisor, Esther Richards, at 079-837708. You may also contact the researchers at the University of Chicago. Ty Turley is the student researcher responsible for this project, and he can be reached in the following ways:

Ty Turley
Department of Economics, 1126
E. 59th St. Chicago, IL 60615, USA
+1-773-702-9016, ty.economics@gmail.com

Esther Mokuwa
Research Coordinator
Njala University
079.837.708

If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this research, you can contact the following office at the University of Chicago:

Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board
University of Chicago
5835 South Kimbark - Judd 333, Chicago, IL 60637
Phone: (773) 834-7835, Fax: (773) 834-8700
Email: sbsirbwise@listhost.uchicago.edu

Appendix A2: Site Town Information Check List

NAME		CODES
DISTRICT	:	CODE: <input type="text"/>
CHIEFDOM	:	CODE: <input type="text"/>
SITE TOWN	:	CODE: <input type="text"/>
ENUMERATOR	:	CODE: <input type="text"/>
DATE	: ___/___/2013	

Check List

Activity	Checked?
Sent Bikes ahead to Treatment Villages to alert them of your arrival?	Yes / No
Got permission to use the school	Yes / No
Made sure drinking water for the villagers is available	Yes / No
Made sure the keys of the school will be handed over to the research team	Yes / No
Made sure that the school has 6 rooms. IF NOT: call us	Yes / No
Is there signal? IF YES: phone number headmaster:	Yes / No
Made sure that the village can host 16 RA's for 1 night	Yes / No

Contact table

Name	Function	Phone number
	School	
	Headmaster	
	Key holder	

Notes for research team

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Appendix A3: Village Invitation Check List

NAME	CODES
DISTRICT :	CODE: <input type="text"/>
CHIEFDOM :	CODE: <input type="text"/>
VILLAGE :	CODE: <input type="text"/>
ENUMERATOR :	CODE: <input type="text"/>
DATE : ___ / ___ / 2013	

Check list

Activity	Checked?
Received permission from chief	Yes / No
Wrote 9 <i>Taa Bakwi</i> on the Participant List	Yes / No
Wrote 9 ordinary people on the Participant List	Yes / No
Gave the invitation letter to the chief in front of the Participants List	Yes / No
Asked the test questions	Yes / No
All participants can answer the test question correctly	Yes / No
Made a copy of the participant list and has given it to the chief	Yes / No
Ask if the village has coverage and note down a phone number	

Contact table

Name	Function	Phone number

Notes for research team

--

Appendix A4: Participant List

DATE: ___/___/2013		Site Town name:		Site Town code:			
Group ID:		Village name:		Village code:			
Participant ID	Participant Name	Name of Father	Name of Mother	F=female M=male	Social status		
001							
002							
003							
004							
005							
006							
007							
008							
009							
010							
011							
012							
013							
014							
015							
016							
017							
018							

Appendix A5: Status Order Record Sheet

Date of Visit (DD/MM/YY):	/ / 2013	Treatment:	1&5 2&6 3&ADG 4&ADG		
Location:		Location Code:			
Chiefdom:		Chiefdom Code:			
Village Name:		Village Code:			
Enumerator Name:		Enumerator ID			

Status #	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
HH ID #								

Status #	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
HH ID #								

Comments	
1. Was there significant disagreement?	Yes No
2. Did people lobby for a higher spot in the social order?	Yes No
3. Did the chief and other high status people organize the order?	Yes No
4. Observations on how they decided the order:	

Appendix A6: Payment sheet

DATE: ___/___/2013		Site Town Name:					Site Town Code:		
Group ID:		Village name:					Village code:		
Participant ID	Participant Name		Amount Allocation Game	Showup fee	Silence token	Total	Signature/RTP		
001				1000		=			
002				1000		=			
003				1000		=			
004				1000		=			
005				1000		=			
006				1000		=			
007				1000		=			
008				1000		=			
009				1000		=			
010				1000		=			
011				1000		=			
012				1000		=			
013				1000		=			
014				1000		=			
015				1000		=			
016				1000		=			
017				1000		=			
018				1000		=			

Appendix A7: Allocation game Record sheet

Date of Visit (DD/MM/YY):	/ /		
Site Town Name:		Site Town Code:	
Respondent name:		Respondent ID:	
Chiefdom:		Chiefdom Code:	
Village Name:		Village Code:	
Enumerator Name:		Enumerator ID	

Use Allocation Game Order Box below to see the order in which you should ask the questions for each ID
For Questions B the table lists the starting-point of the questions.

Allocation Game Question Order Box

ID	Question Order	ID	Question Order	ID	Question Order	ID	Question Order
1	A4, B[start at #2], A6, A5, A1, A3, A2	5	A4, A2, A6, A1, A3, B [start at #9], A5	9	A4, B[start at #2], A6, A5, A1, A3, A2	13	A4, A2, A6, A1, A3, B [start at #9], A5
2	A5, A6, A1, A4, A3, B [start at #3], A2	6	A3, B [start at #11], A2, A5, A4, A6, A1	10	A5, A6, A1, A4, A3, B [start at #3], A2	14	A3, B [start at #11], A2, A5, A4, A6, A1
3	A1, A3, A6, A4, A5, A2, B [start at #5]	7	A3, A2, A6, A5, A1, B [start at #13], A4	11	A1, A3, A6, A4, A5, A2, B [start at #5]	15	A3, A2, A6, A5, A1, B [start at #13], A4
4	B [start at #7], A6, A1, A5, A2, A3, A4	8	A4, A5, B [start at #15], A3, A6, A2, A1	12	B [start at #7], A6, A1, A5, A2, A3, A4	16	A4, A5, B [start at #15], A3, A6, A2, A1

Part A Questions

Fill-out the response for the allocation game: where the number you have to write down is the number of tokens given by the participant to the receiver. For questions **A1 and A2**: remember the participants are sharing [kwekwe] with **someone from a different village in their chiefdom**.

A1 The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen <i>Taa Gbakoi</i> (T e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town speaker, etc) from a randomly chosen village in your chiefdom, not from your village.	Amount sent [kwekwe] to other	
A2 The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Nu Gbamei (e.g. farmer, youth, etc) not a <i>Taa Gbakoi</i> from a randomly chosen village in your chiefdom, not from your village.	Amount sent [kwekwe] to other	

Again, write down is the number of tokens given by the participant to the receiver.

A3 The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen <i>Taa Gbakoi</i> (T e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town speaker, etc) from your village. He or she may or may not be have come with you today from your village.	Amount sent [kwekwe] to other	
A4 The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Nu Gbamei (e.g. farmer, youth, etc) not a <i>Taa Gbakoi</i> from your village. He or she may or may not be have come with you today from your village.	Amount sent [kwekwe] to other	

Again, write down is the number of tokens given by the participant to the receiver.

A5 The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen <i>Taa Gbakoi</i> (e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town speaker, etc) from the people from your village that came with you today from your village.	Amount sent [kwekwe] to other	
A6 The person receiving the money is a randomly Nu Gbamei (e.g. farmer, youth, etc) not a <i>Taa Gbakoi</i> from the people from your village that came with you today from your village.	Amount sent [kwekwe] to other	

Part B Questions

Before you continue: make sure you have a copy of the **Participants List**.

Use the Allocation Game Question Order Box, repeated here for your convenience:

Allocation Game Question Order Box

ID	Question Order	ID	Question Order	ID	Question Order	ID	Question Order
1	A4, B[start at #2], A6, A5, A1, A3, A2	5	A4, A2, A6, A1, A3, B [start at #9], A5	9	A4, B[start at #2], A6, A5, A1, A3, A2	13	A4, A2, A6, A1, A3, B [start at #9], A5
2	A5, A6, A1, A4, A3, B [start at #3], A2	6	A3, B [start at #11], A2, A5, A4, A6, A1	10	A5, A6, A1, A4, A3, B [start at #3], A2	14	A3, B [start at #11], A2, A5, A4, A6, A1
3	A1, A3, A6, A4, A5, A2, B [start at #5]	7	A3, A2, A6, A5, A1, B [start at #13], A4	11	A1, A3, A6, A4, A5, A2, B [start at #5]	15	A3, A2, A6, A5, A1, B [start at #13], A4
4	B [start at #7], A6, A1, A5, A2, A3, A4	8	A4, A5, B [start at #15], A3, A6, A2, A1	12	B [start at #7], A6, A1, A5, A2, A3, A4	16	A4, A5, B [start at #15], A3, A6, A2, A1

Circle which ID number (1, 3, 5, etc.) you started with in this interview.

Put an "X" through the ID code of the person you are speaking to.

Fill out the response of the participant below for each person listed on the Participants List

HH ID# (circle which one you start with)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Amount kwekwe with other																

***HAVE YOU ASKED BOTH PART A AND PART B QUESTIONS??

[Enumerator opinion] In how far did the participant understood the activities: _____

[CODES: 1 (not at all) – 10(understood completely)

Appendix A8: Individual Survey

Date of Visit (DD/MM/YY):	/ / 2013										
Site Town Name:			Site Town Code:								
Respondent name:			Respondent ID:								
Chiefdom:			Chiefdom Code:								
Village Name:			Village Code:								
Enumerator Name:			Enumerator ID								
1. Age:			2. Gender	M F							
3. Farm size (bushels of upland rice planted last year)			4. Number of people in your household								
5. How many chickens do you own?			6. Do you have a zinc roof?	Y N							
7. If everyone in your village was on a ladder with ten steps, and the higher you are on the ladder the richer you are, what step are you on?											
8. Ethnic group:	1 Mende 2 Gola 3 Fula 4 Temne 5 Loko 6 Madingo 7 Kono 8 Vai 9 Other: _____										
9. Can you read and write?			10. Arabic education	Y N							
11. Position in community	1.Village Chief 2.Division Head 3.Woman leader 4.Town speaker 5.Youth leader 6.Societal head 7.Religious leader 8.Elder 9.Trader 10.Farmer 11.Student 12.Other _____										
12. Religion	1.Christian 2.Muslim 3.ATR 4.Christian/ATR 5.Muslim/ATR 6.Other: _____		13. Are you considered a stranger in the village you live in?	Y N							
14. Were you born in the village you live in> -> if yes go to question 17	Y N		15. Year you arrived in the village								
16. Why did you move to the village you live in now?											
17. Did you leave your village during the war	Y N		18. Did someone in your family die due to the war?	Y N							
19. Are you related by blood to any chiefs?	1. Paramount Chief 2. Section Chief		3. Village Chief 4. Other: _____	5. No							
20. Do you think one of your family members could become a town chief?	Y N		21. Are you a trader?	Y N							
22. If yes, what do you trade?											
23. How often do you go to a market day (i.e. Ndowai)?											
1.Almost every day		2.Few times a week		3.Few times a month		4.Few times per year		5.Once or less than once per year		6.Never	
24. If you go to a market, do you bargain for lower prices?	Y N		25. Do you sell anything that you produce or grow? -> if "No" go to question 28		Y N						
26. If yes, what do you sell?			27. If yes, how do you decide the selling price?	1.I have no choice—only one price at the market 2.I want to sell at the price everyone else is selling at 3.I want to sell for a little less than others to sell more 4.Other:							

DYAD CHARACTERISTICS

The next questions ask about the relationships between participants.

Take the **Participants list** and ask which other participant fall into that category. For example ask: **Of all the other participants in the market activity you just did, is any of them your friend?** (Instead of asking the question over and over again for each participant; Is participant (ID1) a friend of you? Is participant (ID2) a friend of you?)

Put Y for YES and N for NO unless otherwise indicated

Put a cross to the column this household is.

Start every question with: *“Of all the other participants in the market activity you just did,.... “*

HH ID #	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
28. Who is related to you by blood (parent, sibling, cousin)?																
29. Do you farm with someone from their household?																
30. Who do you meet and talk to at least twice a week?																
31. Do you often share or borrow food/money with any of their household?																
32. With whom were you displaced to the same area during the war?																
33. In your opinion this person is: [put: H = Taa Gbakoi, high status; L = Nu Gbamei, low status]																

Math test

If they do not know or cannot answer then write “NO”

34. If you buy 8 loafs of bread for 500 Le each, how much do you have to pay?	
35. If the price of a buttercup of rice is 1000 Le and went down by 10%, how much would you have to pay?	
36. How much is 12 + 15	
37. How much is 13-7	
38. How much is 12 x 4	

11. Appendix B: Instructions

Appendix B1: Schedule of Activities before a Visit

1. A week before the visit

- Packing list
 - i. Invitation letter (Njala University)
 - ii. Pens
 - iii. 10 white buttons
 - iv. 40 black buttons
 - v. Bikers signing sheet
 - vi. Financial overview sheet
 - vii. Light
 - viii. Phone credit
 - ix. Time table
 - x. Map
- A research assistant is sent to each village with a letter from Njala University explaining the activity. The letter includes an invitation to participate in the activity and invites 18 villagers.
 - i. Ensure that potential participants understand they must be available the whole day and will not be paid until the end of the day before proceeding with participant selection.
- The RA obtains permission from the Town Chief to conduct the activities. We will only proceed with permission from the chief.
- The RA proceeds to select the participants. The RA ensures that in each village:
 - i. Select the **nine** most important village big men or *Taa Gbakoi*: the chief, assistant chief, division heads, religious leader (imam), societal head, women's leader or elders.
 1. To make the selection, ask all High status [Taa Bakoi] to form a social status line up. Select the **nine** highest ranking individuals that are willing and able to attend. As a priority the Town Chief, Town Speaker, and Imam should all be in the participant list (even if the imam is not in the highest 9, by default they are invited)
 - ii. Randomly select **nine** villagers/farmers
 1. For the randomization, please invite all villagers that are not big men, so farmers and youth. It may be the case that there are some high status individuals who were not selected as one of the nine in the previous exercise. They should NOT be included in the pool of villagers/farmers/youth. High status individuals not selected as one of the nine most important people in the village simply have no chance of being invited.
 2. Put nine white buttons in a (non-see through) bag and as many black buttons as there are people remaining.
 3. Explain that they come forward one by one to draw a button. If they get a white button this implies they can participate.

- The RA writes down the names of all 18 people, their gender, father's name, mother's name, and social status on the **Participants List** – *Make sure to collect the white buttons once the name is written down.*
 - The RA invites all 18 people to be present at the school in location X and time Y (see **time table**).
 - The RA tells the participants not to send a representative and that they will be compensated for their time and will receive a small snack as well as a token of appreciation.
 - Ask control questions
 - i. When is the activity? What time?*
 - ii. Where is the activity?*
 - iii. How much time will you spend there?*
2. A day before the visit
- Wherever coverage is available, call the contact person listed on the forerunner's Treatment Village Checklist Sheet as a reminder that they should be present at the Site Town the following morning to participate in the activities.

Appendix B2: Schedule of Activities during a Visit

1. Packing list
 - Tape and markers
 - Buttons
 - Pens
 - Participants List
 - Record sheets:
 - i. Exit survey
 - ii. Allocation game record sheet
 - iii. Status Order Record Sheet.
 - iv. Payment sheet
 - v. Randomized Allocation Game pairs for pay-outs
2. When groups arrive, the team leader will again explain the purpose to the Town Chief (or highest ranking representative) of each group and obtain his permission to conduct the activities. We will only proceed with permission from the chief.
3. For the villages where all invited people showed up, check if you have at least 8 Taa Gbakoi and 8 Nu Gbamei.
4. Ask all present villagers to separate themselves into High status [Taa Bakoi] and Low status [Nu Gbamei]. If there are more than 8 in each group:
 - For High status [Taa Bakoi] ask them to form a social status line up. The 9th person in line is thanked for coming, paid 5,000, and returns home. **If the 9th person is the Imam (and no other Imam remains in the group) then the Imam remains and the next lowest individual in the line returns home.
 - For the Low status [Nu Gbamei]: If all 9 low status [Nu Gbamei] are present, let all remain and partake in the assignment of ID numbers in order to determine which participant returns home.
5. Randomly assign ID numbers to each of the two groups:
 - Place wood cubes numbered 1-8 into a non-see through bag. Invite each high status [Taa Gbakoi] one by one to draw a cube. Whatever number is on the cube drawn is that participant's ID number
 - Record the participant's name, parents' names, gender, and status in the corresponding row of the **Participants List**.
 - When all high status [Taa Gbakoi] have been given an ID, repeat the process with low status [Nu Gbamei] with cubes numbered 9-16 plus one blank cube if 9 low status [Nu Gbamei] showed up
 - The participant who drew a blank cube are thanked and told they will not be participating in the day's activities but will receive LE 5,000 as compensation for coming to the Site Town.
6. For each group complete the **Participants List**, write down each person's name as well as the name of their father and mother for their respective ID. Each RA team assigned to a group copies the **Participants List** so that each research assistant has a copy.
7. Have every participant wear a sticker with their ID code.
8. When all participants of the group have arrived give a brief introduction to the participants

9. Explain the procedures of the day and what they can expect
10. Implement Survey and Allocation Game.
 - Conduct **Individual Exit Survey** with all participants.
11. Debriefing for Allocation Game:
 - Ask if players truly understood the game, record on scale of 1 – 10 how well you feel they understood the game. Remind the participant to keep their actions secret.
12. Social line up:
 - Tell the participants: *Thank you for your great patience and cooperation. We have enjoyed working with you. Please line up in order of who is the most influential, second most influential, etc. in your village. The order you line up in is the order in which we will pay you privately the money you won today.*
 - Record a brief note about how they decide the queue order on the **Status Order Record Sheet**.
 - Record the order in which they line up on the **Status Order Record Sheet**.
13. Throughout, use the **Notes** section of each record sheet to record general observations of interest to the research team.
14. Pay the participants using the **Payment sheet** and the **Randomized Allocation Game Pair pay-out sheet**, add show-up fee of Le 1000 and if appropriate the silence tokens and thank them for their participation. Ensure that no participant receives less than Le 8,000 for the day.

Appendix B3: Allocation Game and Survey Instructions

1. Do a brief game explanation to the group. Explain:
 - i. We will give you tokens; each token is worth 1 block. There are 25 tokens, so all together the tokens are 2,500 Leones.
 - ii. This is your money and there is no obligation to share.
 - iii. We will ask questions about sharing.
 - iv. Ask practice questions:
 - *How much is each token worth?*
 - *How much money are the tokens worth all together?*
 - v. Sometimes we will tell you the name of who you are sending the money to. Sometimes we don't tell you the name of who you are sending the money to.
 - vi. We will never tell the receiver or anybody what you send.
 - vii. If you send everything, send nothing, send some, we won't tell the receiver.
 - viii. Ask practice questions:
 - *Will you always know who you are sharing with?*
 - *Will the receiver know how much you sent?*
 - *Do you have to send money to the receiver? Can you send all your money to the receiver?*
 - ix. Do not tell anybody what you send or do not send.
 - x. You are given a silence token worth 10 block (1,000 Leone). At the end of the day you can get 10 block if you still have your silence token.
 - xi. If you talk about the game we take away your silence token.
 - xii. You will be paid based on one of your choices and a show-up fee.
2. Make sure you stress:
 - that their choices are anonymous and private
 - that they do not have to share equally, they can give as much or as little as they like
 - that for each question the game starts again
3. Each research assistant takes a participant to an isolated area and conducts the **Allocation Game** using a completed **Participant List**
4. There are two parts in the game:
 - **Part A Questions** with 6 questions and **Part B Questions** with 15 questions
 - The questions should be asked in a random order. See **Allocation Game Question Order Box** on record sheet
5. For **Part A** Questions tell the participant:
 - We will give you tokens, each token is worth 1 block. There are 25 tokens, so all together the tokens are 2,500 Leones.
 - This is your money and there is no obligation to send [Kwekwe].
 - You will be paid based on one of your choices. This could be any of the choices you make, so pay attention to all questions. For which choice you will be paid depends on chance.
 - For **Questions A1 – A6** tell the participant:
 - i. Here are 25 tokens.

- ii. For **Question A1** say:
 - a. The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Taa Gbakoi (e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town speaker, etc.) from a randomly chosen village in your chiefdom, not from your village.
 - b. We will not tell you who the Taa Gbakoi is, and they do not know who is kwekwe the money or how much you kwekwe.
 - c. How much do you want to kwekwe from this money given to you?
- iii. For **Question A2** say:
 - a. The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Nu Gbamei (e.g. farmer, youth, etc.) from a randomly chosen village in your chiefdom, not from your village.
 - b. We will not tell you who the person is, and they do not know who is kwekwe the money or how much you kwekwe.
 - c. How much do you want to kwekwe from this money given to you?
- iv. For **Question A3** say:
 - a. The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Taa Gbakoi (e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town speaker, etc.) from your village. He or she may or may not have come with you today from your village.
 - b. We will not tell the other person who is kwekwe the money or how much you kwekwe. You will not know who that other person is.
 - c. How much do you want to kwekwe from this money given to you?
- v. For **Question A4** say:
 - a. The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Nu Gbamei (e.g. farmer, youth, etc.) from your village. He or she may or may not have come with you today from your village.
 - b. We will not tell the other person who is kwekwe the money or how much you kwekwe. You will not know who that other person is.
 - c. How much do you want to kwekwe from this money given to you?
- vi. For **Question A5** say:
 - a. The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Taa Gbakoi (e.g. village chief, an imam, a division head, a societal head, a town speaker, etc.) from the people from your village that came with you today from your village.
 - b. We will not tell the other person who is kwekwe the money or how much you kwekwe. You will not know who that other person is.

- c. How much do you want to kwekwe from this money given to you?
 - vii. For **Question A6** say:
 - a. The person receiving the money is a randomly chosen Nu Gbamei (e.g. farmer, youth, etc.) from the people from your village that came with you today from your village.
 - b. We will not tell the other person who is sending [kwekwe] the money or how much you send [kwekwe]. You will not know who that other person is.
 - c. How much do you want to send [kwekwe] from this money given to you.
- 6. For **Part B Questions** tell the participant:
 - We will give you tokens; each token is worth 1 block (or Le 100). There are 25 tokens, so all together the tokens are 2,500 Leones.
 - This is your money and there is no obligation to share [kwekwe].
 - I have a list of names here with people from your village. To help identify the person I will also read out the have the name of the person's father and mother.
 - I will ask you for each of them how much of the 25 tokens you are willing to send [kwekwe] to that person.
 - For each person you are sharing [kwekwe] a new set of 25 tokens.
 - The other person will never know who you are.
 - We will never tell that person how much you send [kwekwe].
- 7. After the **Allocation Game** is complete the research assistant completes the **Individual Survey** with the participant.