

Pre-Analysis Plan - Electoral Effects of Development Aid: Experimental Evidence from Sierra Leone

Kevin Grieco, Niccoló Meriggi, Maarten Voors

December 6, 2018

1 PAP Timeline

This pre-analysis plan is filed after treatment assignment and data collection, but before analysis. The data was collected on March 7th, 2018. This data is held on a secure server, where study field managers and one PI (Grieco) had access for monitoring data quality. Other PIs will be invited to access data as soon as PAP is lodged. For this study, we have received IRB clearance from the Government of Sierra Leone, Office of the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee (SLERC 16102017).

2 Overview

This study evaluates the electoral effects of a recent public health development intervention in Sierra Leone on the 2018 election results. Less than a year before the 2018 elections, 289 villages in Kono District – Sierra Leone’s most electorally competitive district – were randomly selected to participate in a public health intervention called the *One Health Project*. The project was financed by international donors, implemented by the government of Sierra Leone, and supported by local authorities. Politicians played no role in determining which villages were selected to receive the intervention.

Scholars of distributive politics typically differentiate between programmatic and non-programmatic distribution strategies (Stokes et al., 2013). There is solid evidence that voters reward politicians for non-programmatic distribution (Golden and Min, 2013). Theoretical predictions and empirical results for electoral returns to programmatic distribution are more mixed. On the one hand, well-informed rational voters have little incentive to electorally reward programmatic distribution, given that voters receive programmatic goods regardless of the politician in office. On the other hand, voters motivated by “blind retrospection” may indeed reward politicians for programmatic distribution, responding to changes in perceived welfare (Achen and Bartels, 2004; Healy et al., 2010). Empirical studies on the electoral responses to programmatic distribution have returned mixed results (Imai et al., 2013; De La O, 2013).

Internationally financed development aid projects may not fit comfortably into the program-

matic / non-programmatic dichotomy. Even when politicians have no discretionary power over how aid is distributed, voters may be uninformed about distribution criteria (Baldwin and Winters, 2018), leaving the door open for politicians to claim credit for these projects (Cruz and Schneider, 2017; Guiteras and Mobarak, 2016). In this way, voters' false attributions may lead them to reward politicians for development projects that politicians played no role in delivering (Healy and Malhotra, 2013).

Several recent studies investigate the electoral effects of development aid. Cruz and Schneider (2017) find that development aid projects electorally benefit local incumbent politicians in the Philippines. In contrast, Blattman et al. (2016) find that randomly assigned anti-poverty programs in Uganda increase support for *opposition* party. Briggs (2018) also finds development projects hurt incumbent vote share in Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda.

We test if voters reward politicians for development aid by comparing incumbent vote shares in villages that were randomly assigned to receive the aid intervention to incumbent vote shares in villages that were not assigned to receive the aid intervention. We conducted election day exit poll surveys to obtain village-level electoral data on political offices relevant for our study population:

- President
- Member of Parliament (MP)
- Local Councilors
- District Council Chairman

We have no priors on which of these four offices will benefit most from this aid intervention. We measure the effect of aid intervention on incumbent vote share across all four political offices, correcting for multiple hypothesis testing.

3 Treatment description and timeline

Treated villages receive a One Health Intervention, a pilot program from the government of Sierra Leone meant to inform future animal health policy for the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF). The first part of this section describes how villages benefit from the One Health intervention. Given the importance of livestock for economic livelihoods, we believe it is fair to assume that the animal health services and animal disease monitoring services that comprise the One Health intervention are valued public services.¹ After, we describe key milestones in the intervention implementation.

Benefits to communities

The One Health Intervention has two goals: to increase access to basic animal health services and improve animal disease surveillance. In each treatment village, an eligible person from the

¹According to the 2015 Population and Housing Census, there are 1.8 livestock (cow, sheep, or goat) per household in Kono District. This number is likely higher in our study communities, as the intervention is based in chiefdoms with the highest reliance on livestock.

village is trained as a Community Health Worker (CAHW).² The Community Animal Health Worker was selected by one of two methods, either through a village wide meeting or directly by the Paramount Chief.³ After being selected, the CAHW underwent an intensive 22-day training session in the District capital (Koidu). Training focused on animal husbandry best practices, disease surveillance (monitoring and reporting community diseases), and treatment of basic ailments including dehydration and worms. CAHW received a certificate and ID badge signed by the Ministry of Agriculture. The training manual was specifically designed for Sierra Leone and disease surveillance modules were updated and improved after the Ebola outbreak.⁴

Training was conducted by a team of livestock officers led by a senior veterinarian and the Kono District Livestock Officer. After training, CAHWs returned to their villages and began their CAHW responsibilities. In the week after the completion of CAHW training, One Health field staff visited each CAHW in their village to facilitate a formal introduction ceremony. At the ceremony One Health field staff described the nature of the training and the responsibilities of the CAHW to village members. This was done to enhance the credibility of CAHWs and provide clear information to village members about CAHW capabilities and responsibilities.

Animal Health Services

After graduating the training program CAHWs received a “starter kit” of medicine, including: antibiotics and medication for deworming, anti-parasite, and wound care, as well as syringes and needles to administer the drugs. Additional medicines can be purchased at cost from the District Livestock Officer. The CAHW is entitled and encouraged to charge a fee for her services to cover her labor costs and restock her supply of drugs.

Disease Surveillance

CAHWs also provide disease surveillance. They are responsible for identifying, recording, and reporting animal disease that arise in the community. While no systematic data exists on animal diseases in Sierra Leone, the devastation brought by preventable animal diseases is common knowledge. New Castle Disease frequently wipes out community poultry stocks and PPR (Goat Plague) kills large numbers of goats.⁵ A disease surveillance system that provides information about village diseases in a timely manner to District Offices gives the opportunity for District MAF to respond to curb potential outbreaks.

Study Timeline

- *August of 2017:* Our field team informed study villages that they had been selected for the One Health Intervention. In the days that followed, our field team visited these villages to elicit village nominees for CAHWs.

²To be eligible for CAHW Training, selected CAHW had to pass a test of basic literacy and numeracy. It was also recommended that nominated CAHWs meet Eligibility Criteria, described in Appendix 1.

³CAHW candidates were nominated through both methods for every village, one of which was randomly selected.

⁴Training Manual available upon request

⁵Research conducted through the One Health Intervention is the first attempt to systematically capture animal diseases at a village level in Sierra Leone

- *September 2017*: CAHW started the 22-day CAHW training program. After the completion of the training, our field team visited each beneficiary community for an “Introduction Ceremony” and CAHWs started working.
- *March 7, 2018*: Election Day in Sierra Leone. We conducted exit poll surveys in Kono District

4 Study Population and Treatment Assignment

The goal of the One Health intervention is to enable collaboration between existing human health workers (CHWs) and newly trained Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs). Therefore, only villages that currently had CHWs in the seven most livestock intensive chiefdoms in Kono District were eligible for the One Health intervention. This gives us a study population of 370 villages.⁶

We randomly select 300 villages to take part in the One Health Intervention using a two-step randomization procedure. Due to frequent inaccuracies in administrative data, we verified the existence of villages before making treatment assignment. For example, administrative records may contain villages that have since relocated or merged with a nearby village or contain multiple names for the same communities.

The first step of the randomization procedure selects 325 of the 370 villages to make a village visit. Seven villages were found not to exist. This limited the overall population to 363 and the “visited” sample to 318. The second step of the randomization process randomly selects villages to receive the One Health intervention, blocking on chiefdom. Specifically, each chiefdom is assigned a quota of treatment villages based on the number of villages that exist in that chiefdom. We then randomly assign treatment within each chiefdom to achieve quotas. The table below presents the logic. For example, there were 49 eligible and existent villages in Fiama Chiefdom, of which 43 villages were visited. “Target” is the quota of villages that will be randomly drawn from each chiefdom, equal to “size” of existent villages multiplied by $300/363$. For Fiama, $(300/363)*49$ rounds to 40.

Table 1: Sampling Procedure

Chiefdom	Size	Visit	Target
Fiama	49	43	40
Gbane Kandor	24	24	23
Gbense	43	37	36
Lei	77	63	63
Mafindor	41	35	34
Soa	110	102	91
Toli	16	14	13
Total	363	318	300

⁶This excludes 11 villages previously involved in a pilot study and one village that has two CHWs.

5 Hypotheses

In this section we describe our primary experimental hypothesis and lay out two additional hypotheses for adjudicating between potential mechanisms. In addition, we discuss our plans for exploratory analysis, meant to motivate hypotheses that can be tested in future research.

Primary Hypothesis

Hypothesis 1: Voters in villages that received the One Health intervention are more likely to vote for the incumbent candidate.

Our primary hypothesis is agnostic about *why* the One Health intervention improves incumbent vote share. We explore possible mechanisms below.

Mechanism Hypotheses

We consider two mechanisms by which the One Health Intervention could increase incumbent vote share.

First, it could be that voters attribute the One Health intervention to the actions of the politician. In this scenario, the politician’s ability to bring development projects to the community is a proxy for competence of the politician. Voters in treatment villages are more likely to vote for incumbent politicians because these politicians are perceived as on average more competent and therefore more likely to supply development projects and implement other welfare improving programs in the future. This logic implies:

Hypothesis 2a: Voters in treatment villages are more likely to vote for incumbent politicians when voters attribute the development project to the incumbent politician.

Second, it could be that voters act through “blind retrospection” and are more likely to vote for incumbents when they experience welfare improvements, regardless of whether these improvements can plausibly be attributed to politicians. In this scenario, the One Health intervention produces a random positive shock to community welfare. Voters in treatment villages are more likely to vote for incumbent politicians because welfare is on average higher in treatment villages. This logic implies:

Hypothesis 2b: Voters in treatment villages are more likely to vote for incumbent politicians when they perceive the One Health intervention has created a larger positive welfare shock.

Differential effects between political offices: We have no priors on differential effects between the different political offices. Under the attribution mechanism (*H2a*) there are competing explanations for the relationship between level of political office and electoral benefits. It could be that lower level politicians are in a better position for “on the ground” credit claiming. In contrast, it could be that voters are more likely to believe that national level politicians had a say in directing the intervention to Kono District (study area) in the first place. Under the blind retrospection mechanism (*H2b*) there is no reason expect differential effects as voters do not connect welfare improvements to politicians.

Exploratory analysis for voter attribution

If we find evidence that voter attribution drives voting behavior (*H2a*), we'll conduct exploratory analysis about drivers of voter attribution along two dimensions. First, we'll examine the relationship between politician efforts at credit claiming and voter attribution. Second, voters may be more likely to attribute development projects to incumbent politicians when these politicians are supported by local traditional chiefs. Chiefs are heavily involved in the delivery of public services in Sierra Leone and across Africa (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Baldwin, 2016). When chiefs do not support incumbent politicians, chiefs may make competing claims on the development project that diminishes the voter's attribution of the project to incumbent politicians.

6 Data

Our main data source is an exit poll survey we conducted on March 7th, 2018 – election day in Sierra Leone. This dataset contains individual level responses from 1230 voters, capturing respondent voting behavior and intervention attribution. The survey instrument and implementation activities are detailed below. Our second source of data is a household survey administered in treatment villages in the October 2017, the month after intervention implementation. This survey captures respondent satisfaction with Community Animal Health Worker performance, our proxy for the project's perceived welfare benefit. Our third data source is a survey conducted with Paramount Chiefs from our seven study chiefdoms just before the elections. This information is will be used in the exploratory analysis of the relationship between voter attribution and chief support for politicians.

6.1 Exit Poll

The exit poll survey provides information on 1) voting behavior for the four contested political offices, 2) voter's perception of politician responsibility for One Health Project (attribution) 3) voters perception of politician credit claiming behavior for One Health Project, 4) demographic characteristics and voter village of residence.

The seven chiefdoms where the One Health intervention was implemented contain 86 Voter Registration Centers (VRCs), where citizens voted on election day. We randomly selected 71 VRCs to conduct exit poll surveys. Individuals from multiple villages vote at each VRC. Each VRCs can contain treatment villages that received the One Health Intervention, control villages that were eligible but did not receive the intervention, and out of sample villages that were not eligible for the intervention.

Exit poll surveys were conducted by enumerators recruited through Knowledge for Community Empowerment Organization (KoCEPO), a Kono based no-partisan civil society organization. All exit poll enumerators were also officially registered and accredited by the National Election Commission as Election Observers. The job of an election observer is to guarantee a free and fair election. KoCEPO coordinated election observers around Kono District.

Enumerators were instructed to arrive at their assigned voting station at 6am on election day. Voting stations officially opened at 7am. Enumerators introduced themselves to voting station staff, as well as any stationed police as soon as they arrived. In explaining their mission, enumerators informed voting station staff that:

- They are an Election Observer, working with KoCEPO.
- They will be conducting a research survey, under the direction of the International Growth Centre (IGC). This involves talking to people outside of the voter stations throughout the day.
- They are strictly non-partisan and are not associated with or advocating for any political party.
- All of the proper local authorities (including the Paramount Chief) have been informed.

After voting themselves, enumerators took up position 50 meters from the voter station on the path that people will use to get to the polls. Enumerators were instructed to interview every fourth person leaving the polling station, or if more than four people had passed when they were conducting the survey, the next person leaving the station. If the voting station contained multiple voting locations, the enumerator was instructed to alternate locations every hour.

6.1.1 Potential Concerns

In general, Election Observers in Kono described the Election as free and fair.⁷ For example, 99.5% of interviewed voters had their fingers inked and 98.4 % of observed voting stations allowed observers to inspect ballot boxes during the set-up process. However, election day difficulties hampered data collection in several VRCs, primarily in Gbense Chiefdom around the district capital Koidu. For example, at one voting station a candidate for Member of Parliament (MP) was observed giving out money in exchange for votes. Incidents of violence were generally not severe but worrying situations did arise, particularly in the Koidu area. One such incident involved a physical altercation between politicians at a Koidu VRC that sent the VRC into brief unrest. A voter at another VRC arrived with the stated intent of creating conflict.

Election day difficulties caused our exit poll enumerators to cease exit polling before the close of polls (5 pm) in 45 of the 71 polling stations. We outline our strategy for dealing with this in the analysis section.

Another typical concern with exit poll surveys is that the respondents interviewed during exit polls are not representative of the voting population. While we do not know demographic characteristics of voters who opted not to participate in the exit poll we can compare exit poll respondents to registered voters on age, gender, and occupation. Moreover, any representativeness issues we do encounter will not bias the results of the study, as we expect exit poll response rate to be similar across treatment and control groups.

⁷See Appendix 3: Sierra Leone Election Observation Report: Kono District, produced by IGC and Wageningen University

6.1.2 Survey Questions for Vote Choice

Enumerators directly asked respondents about their vote choice for each political position. Below is the exact text, using Local councilor as an example.

Which LOCAL COUNCILOR candidate did you vote for?

6.1.3 Survey Question for Politician Credit Claiming

After asking the respondent about their vote choice for each of the four political positions, respondents were asked if a given political incumbent engaged in credit claiming for the One Health Project. Our strategy was to ask the respondent to recall if they had heard the politician, or his associates, talking about his achievements in office. The question in the following text box was read for each political position except President (using local councilor as an example):

During the campaign period, candidates present their achievements while in office to voters.

Do you remember hearing the LOCAL COUNCILOR, or any of his people, talking about the Councilors achievements? I am talking about the Local Councilor who was in office before this last election.

Can you remember any achievements he (they) were talking about?

Then, the enumerator coded if the One Health Project was mentioned.⁸ This strategy avoided mentioning the One Health Project to the respondent.

6.1.4 Survey Question for Voter Attribution

Directly following the above question on credit claiming, an additional survey question probed if respondents attributed the One Health Project to an incumbent politician. Enumerators first asked the respondent what was the greatest achievement of the incumbent politician in office. Then, the enumerator coded if the One Health Project was mentioned. This strategy avoided mentioning the One Health Project to the respondent. The following text (using local councilor as an example) was read for each office except President:

⁸Enumerators were prompted with the following text: “Did the respondent mention the One Health Project or Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) in his/her discussion of the Local Councilor’s achievements?”

*In your opinion, what, if any, was the greatest achievement of your Local Councilor during his term?*⁹

6.2 Paramount Chief Survey

Short surveys were administered to all seven Paramount chiefs of the study Chiefdoms by experienced enumerators. Enumerators arranged in advance a time to meet with each Paramount Chief to conduct the survey. Enumerators informed Paramount Chiefs that project PIs were interested in conducting more research in Kono District and therefore wanted the Paramount Chiefs' opinions on various development issues in their chiefdoms.¹⁰

The survey asked for the Paramount Chiefs' opinions on the following topics: education, dispute resolution, safety, and government. This study uses responses to question in the section on government. Because Paramount Chiefs are prohibited from explicitly participating in national politics, these questions had to be handled with care.

Below, we reproduce the text that enumerators read before asking political questions and the text of questions to elicit chief preferences for each political office.

Text Read Prior to asking Political Questions — Now, I am going to ask you some questions about your electoral decisions. I am asking for research purposes only— your responses will help researchers to better understand democracy and voting patterns in Sierra Leone. Everything you tell me is completely confidential and will not be shared with any government body or political party. Remember, you do not have to answer any question if you do not feel comfortable.

Some people say that people in government can be very important for the development of Sierra Leone and Kono. I have some questions about your opinion on who can best bring development to Sierra Leone and Kono District.

Text read prior to eliciting preferences for each political office

- **President** In your opinion, which party is most capable of doing what is best for the people of Sierra Leone at a national level?
- **Member of Parliament (MP)** Members of Parliament can also be important for local development. In Fiamma Chiefdom there are MPs running for Constituency 28. Undoubtedly, there are many good people who could do a fine job as MP. In your opinion, which candidate is most capable of bringing development to the people of Constituency 28?

⁹Enumerators were prompted with the following text: “Did the respondent mention the One Health Project or Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) in his/her discussion of the Member of Parliament’s greatest achievement?”

¹⁰Project PIs are well known to all seven paramount chiefs, having met the chiefs numerous times, together and alone, over the past two years.

- **Local Councilor** Local Councilors also play an important role in local development. In Fiama Chiefdom, Local Councilor elections are occurring in Ward 96. Undoubtedly, there are many good people who could do a fine job as Local Councilor. In Ward 96, in your opinion, which candidate is the most capable of bringing development to the people of Ward 96?

6.3 Household Survey

In October 2017 we administered a household survey in treatment villages. The survey asked respondents about their satisfaction with CAHW performance. Specifically, enumerators asked:

How satisfied are you with how much [CAHW] helps the people of your community?

This information is used to test a mechanism hypothesis (*H2b*). Hypothesis 2b predicts that incumbent vote share will be higher in treatment villages where the One Health intervention led to larger welfare improvements.

7 Analysis

To test the **Hypothesis 1** we estimate:

$$Y_v = \beta_0 + \beta_1 OH_v + \sum_{n=2}^7 \beta_j Chiefdom_{vj} + \epsilon_v \quad (1)$$

where Y_v is the incumbent vote share in village v ; OH_v is a treatment dummy, 1 if the village v received the One Health Intervention and 0 if the village did not receive the intervention; $\beta_j Chiefdom_{vj}$ is the blocking dummy for chiefdom j , as randomization is blocked on chiefdom. ATE is recovered by summing block level ATEs (one omitted as reference category); ϵ_v is the usual idiosyncratic error term. The parameter of interest is β_1 . Hypothesis 1 predicts that $\beta_1 > 0$. Equation 1 is an experimental comparison.

We adjust for the fact that we are running more than one test on the same dataset by implementing false discovery rate (FDR) corrections.

Mechanisms

Hypothesis 2a explores the mechanism driving results in **hypothesis 1**, by investigating how individuals in treated villages make attributions about the One Health intervention. The population for this hypothesis is voters in treated villages. We estimate:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Attribution_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where Y_i is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i votes for the incumbent; $Attribution_i$ is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i attributes the One Health project to the incumbent politician; X_i is a set of individual level control values including age, occupation, and gender; ϵ_i is the usual idiosyncratic error term. Hypothesis 2a predicts that $\beta_1 > 0$. We cluster standard errors at the village level. This result is not causally identified and is used to help interpret our primary result from hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2b explores the mechanism driving results in **hypothesis 1**, by investigating the relationship between perceived welfare impacts and vote choice. The population for this hypothesis is the set of treated villages. We estimate:

$$Y_v = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Satisfaction_v + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_v + \epsilon_v \quad (3)$$

where Y_v is the incumbent vote share in community v ; $\beta_1 Satisfaction_v$ is the average respondent satisfaction with CAHW performance in village v , $\beta_2 X_v$ is a set of village-level controls including wealth, livestock stocks, and average education levels. ϵ_v is the usual idiosyncratic error term. Hypothesis 2b predicts that $\beta_1 > 0$. This result is not causally identified and is used to help interpret our primary result from hypothesis 1.

7.1 Dealing with Early Departure Exit Polls

As noted in Section 6, our enumerators stopped conducting exit poll surveys at some voting centers before polls closed at 5 PM. Given that our main outcome of interest is incumbent vote share, our enumerators early departure is an issue if the time of day is a predictor of vote choice. Specifically, we would overestimate the treatment effect in early departure VRCs if non-incumbent voters tend to vote later in the day and underestimate the treatment effect in early departure VRCs if incumbent voters tend to vote later in the day. Ultimately, this is an empirical question and we can measure the direction of bias. If needed, we will rerun our analysis on the subpopulation of unaffected villages—villages from voting centers where no early departures occurred.

References

- Acemoglu, D., Reed, T., and Robinson, J. A. (2014). Chiefs: Economic development and elite control of civil society in sierra leone. *Journal of Political Economy*, 122(2):319–368.
- Achen, C. H. and Bartels, L. M. (2004). Blind retrospection: Electoral responses to drought, flu, and shark attacks.
- Baldwin, K. (2016). *The paradox of traditional chiefs in democratic Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- Baldwin, K. and Winters, M. S. (2018). Bypass aid and perceptions of local government performance and legitimacy. Technical report, AidData Working Paper.
- Blattman, C., Emeriau, M., and Fiala, N. (2016). Do anti-poverty programs sway voters? experimental evidence from uganda. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, (0).
- Briggs, R. C. (2018). Receiving foreign aid can reduce support for incumbent presidents. *Political Research Quarterly*, page 1065912918798489.
- Cruz, C. and Schneider, C. J. (2017). Foreign aid and undeserved credit claiming. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(2):396–408.
- De La O, A. L. (2013). Do conditional cash transfers affect electoral behavior? evidence from a randomized experiment in mexico. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(1):1–14.
- Golden, M. and Min, B. (2013). Distributive politics around the world. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16:73–99.
- Guiteras, R. P. and Mobarak, A. M. (2016). Does development aid undermine political accountability? leader and constituent responses to a large-scale intervention. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Healy, A. and Malhotra, N. (2013). Retrospective voting reconsidered. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 16:285–306.
- Healy, A. J., Malhotra, N., and Mo, C. H. (2010). Irrelevant events affect voters’ evaluations of government performance. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 107(29):12804–12809.
- Imai, K., King, G., and Rivera, C. V. (Forthcoming). Do nonpartisan programmatic policies have partisan electoral effects? evidence from two large scale experiments. *Journal of Politics*.
- Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., and Brusco, V. (2013). *Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Appendix 1: Eligibility Criteria

1. English Literacy

Each candidate CAHW receives a CAHW Training Manual during the 21-day training workshop. Candidate CAHWs are required to review course modules in their training manuals and complete written exercises. This Training Manual acts as a reference guide for CAHWs operating in the field. In addition, the CAHW has the responsibility of completing a weekly disease symptoms reporting form. Both CAHW Training Manual and reporting form are in English.

2. Mathematics / Computational Skills

Many of the CAHW tasks require these skills. For example, CAHWs are trained to administer basic drug treatment to sick animals. Computational and logical skills are required to administer proper drug dosage based on estimate weight of animal.

3. Animal Rearing Experience

CAHWs are dealing with animal health on a day-to-day basis. Proposed candidates should be member of the community who have a proven interest in animals and animal rearing. Ideally, proposed candidates CAHWs are people who other member of the community already go to for animal advice or are respected as knowledgeable animal rearers.

4. Strong ties with community members and long term plans to remain in community

A CAHW can only benefit the community if she/he lives in the community. Therefore, proposed CAHWs should be people who have strong ties to the community and who plan to remain in the community.

5. A trusted member of the community

Community members will only seek assistance from the CAHW if they believe the CAHW is someone who they can trust

6. Of good health and in fit physical condition

The work of a CAHW has physical demands. For example, a CAHW must be fit enough to restrain an animal to administer drugs, to walk to visit sick animals, and to conduct surveys.

7. Available to attend all CAHW Training sessions

The CAHW training workshop is twenty-one days long. CAHW candidates must be willing and able to attend the entirety of the workshop.

Appendix 2: Enumerator Manual - Exit Poll Survey

1. Study Description

This project studies the voting behavior of citizens in Sierra Leone. On Election Day, you will be playing two roles: Research Enumerator and Election Observer. As an enumerator, your job is to scientifically record the voting behavior of citizens who vote at your station. The survey you complete on election day will help researchers at the International Growth Center (IGC) better understand voting behavior in Sierra Leone. As an Election Observer, your job is to guarantee a free and fair election necessary for a healthy democracy. The civil society organization KoCEPO is coordinating election observers around Kono District.

2. Activities You are responsible for carrying out several important tasks:

A. Arrival and Communication at the Voter Registration Center (VRC)

VRCs open at 7am. You must arrive at your VRC before 6am to observe the set up. Introduce yourself to VRC staff, as well as any stationed police, as soon as you arrive. Explain your mission. Be sure to tell them:

- You are an Election Observer, working with KoCEPO.
- You will be conducting a research survey, under the direction of the IGC. This involves talking to people outside of the Voter Stations throughout the day.
- You are strictly non-partisan. You are not associated with or advocating for any political party.
- All of the proper local authorities (including the Paramount Chief) have been informed.

After you are done communicating with VRC staff, be sure to vote yourself. Then, take up position 50 meters (150 feet) from the Voter Station on the path that people will use to get to the polls.

B. Selecting Survey Respondents

You will not be able to survey every person who comes to vote. Science

is all about having a process and following that process. Your mission is to conduct the survey scientifically, and this means you must follow the proper process when selecting survey respondents.

You will interview EVERY FOURTH (4th) PERSON who comes out of the Voter Station. You will have a notebook with you, or at least A4 paper, to keep track of how many people have voted. You need to continue to pay attention to who comes out of the Voter Station while you interview respondents. If more than four people exit the Voter Station while you are interviewing a respondent, interview the next person to come out of the Voter Station.

At some VRCs, there are several Voter Stations. You should stand outside a different Voter Station every hour, to ensure you are interviewing a representative sample of voters. For example, if VRC A has Voter Stations 1, 2, 3, and 4, you should stand outside a different Voter Station every hour. From 7am to 8am you would stand outside Station 1. From 8am to 9am you would stand outside of Station 2. And so on. Once you have gone through each Voter Station for 1 hour, you will start another round going from Voter Station 1 through the 2nd, 3rd and so on Voter Stations. Every time you complete a round, you re-start from the initial Voter Station. You will record which Voter Station people are coming from in the tablet. If the VRC is such that it is impossible to tell who is coming from which Voter Station, record 997 (meaning DO NOT KNOW) in the tablet.

IMPORTANT: You are asked to interview people continuously between the opening of the ballots at 7am and the closing of the ballot at 5pm. You will be going through several rounds until ballots close.

C. Obtaining Informed Consent

Every time you conduct an interview, you must obtain informed consent before you start the survey. What is informed consent? Informed consent is something you must read to all respondents to let them know information about the research project, how the data will be used, and their right to refuse to answer any question. The informed consent document

will be on your survey tab. Read this and ask if the respondent wishes to carry on with the survey. If he/she does not wish to carry on, you will not conduct the survey and will go on to the next potential respondent.

D. Surveying Respondents

Directions for surveying respondents is detailed below.

E. Managing Your Tablet

You will be conducting many interviews on Election Day. It is your responsibility to check to make sure that your tablet is FULLY CHARGED in the morning. It is also your responsibility to manage the tablets charge. This means keeping the brightness low and not using the tablet for personal means. Not everyone will be able to have a power bank.

IMPORTANT: If you are running out of charge, call a Supervisor in advance so a power bank can be brought to you.

F. Returning equipment

After the voting ends, you are responsible for observing the counting and tabulation of votes as observers. Once this is complete, thank the VRC staff. The next morning (the morning after Election Day), you will return to the KoCEPO office to return your tablet and any extra equipment. After your equipment is returned, you will receive the balance of your allowance.

3. Survey Guide

Section 0 – Locational Information and Informed Consent

While waiting for your next respondent, you can fill out the first section of the survey. This will merely ask for your name and where you are stationed. Constituency Number, Ward Number, Voter Registration Center (Name and Number), and Voter Station Number will be available as response options on the tablet. As you will be at the same location all day, this part of the survey should remain the same for each interview (except Voter Station Number). The survey will also ask you to take a

GPS reading of the VRC. You must do this at least ONCE during the day. Do not hold up respondents trying to take a GPS reading.

Once the correct respondent (see above for selection protocols) comes to you, you must read the informed consent page on your tablet. It is important that the ENTIRE informed consent is read to each respondent. Also, it is important to note that for any question that the respondent DOES NOT KNOW the answer, you are to select Does Not Know or type 997. For any question that the respondent is uncomfortable or REFUSES TO ANSWER, you are to select Refused to Answer or type 998. Do not force or pressure any respondents to answer questions.

Section 1 – Basic Info

Upon receiving consent, you will first ask the respondent for his/her Voter ID. Enter the Voter ID Number into the tablet. The first two questions will ask the name and age of the respondent. Enter this information into the tab. The next question asks the respondent to state his/her main occupation. The respondents main occupation is what he/she does to earn a living. Here are some key definitions:

- “Trader” refers to people who own shops or kiosks or sell things for a living
- “Professional” refers to jobs where people work in offices. Lawyers, accountants, and secretaries are all professionals.
- “Civil Servant” refers to people who work for the government.
- “Miner” refers to people who mine for diamonds, gold, or other minerals.
- “Unemployed” refers to people who do not currently earn a living in any occupation.

The last questions in Section 1 ask where the respondent lives. We want to know where the respondent spends most of his/her time. If the respondent is not sure, use this simple test: where does the respondent sleep (at night) most of the time? You should record the name of the Village and Chiefdom.

Section 2 – Voting Choices

Section 2 asks respondents about their voting choices. It is important that you be respectful in this situation. While it is perfectly acceptable to ask respondents about who they voted for, respondents are under no obligation to share this information. You must not pressure the respondent to share information that they do not want to.

Make sure you read the Enumerator Script for the section before you start asking questions. The enumerator script reminds the respondent that you are asking only for research purposes and the information they provide will be completely confidential the information is not for any political party or political candidate. Information collected will be protected and the identity of respondents will not be shared with anyone other than the researchers.

When you ask the respondent who they voted for at each position, allow time for them to give an answer. Do not prompt respondents with options right away. Only if the respondent cannot think of who they voted for should you read the possible options.

Remember, it is not your job to make judgments about who the respondent has voted for. Every citizen is allowed to vote for whom they like. As an enumerator you are there to simply observe and record it is inappropriate to share your political opinion or make judgments about the respondents opinion.

You will ask the respondent for his/her vote choice on four positions:

- President
- Member of Parliament
- District Council Chairman
- Local Councilor

The complete list of Presidential candidates, MPs, District Council Chairman, and Local Councilors will be available as response options on the tablet. The options for Local Councilor will depend on the ward of the person you are interviewing. Because you will be interviewing at one station you will have the same list of Councilor candidates for every person you interview.

As soon as you are assigned a VRC, check your tablet to make sure the Councilor candidates at your VRC are correct. If they are not, notify a Supervisor immediately.

The next two questions will refer to the achievements of the Local Councilor when he was in office. Importantly, we are now talking about the Local Councilor who was in office before the election.

First, you will ask the respondent if he/she has heard the Local Councilor or one of his spokesmen talking about his achievements while in office. Take your time in explaining this to respondents. Give respondents the example that sometimes politicians or their spokespeople go around talking about their achievements.

This will bring you to the first question. Remind the respondent that it is not important if the Local Councilor himself was talking about these achievements. It can also be the Councilors people talking for him.

If the respondent answers Yes, you will ask which achievements they were talking about. You are to enter this into the tablet as text. A follow-up question will have YOU ALONE answer whether the respondent mentioned the One Health Project or Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWs) as an achievement. Do not mention the One Health Project/CAHWs to the respondent.

In the next question, you will ask the respondent what he/she thought the Councilors greatest achievement was. Again, you will type this into the tablet as text. A follow-up question will have YOU ALONE answer whether the respondent mentioned the One Health Project/CAHWs as an achievement. Do not mention the One Health Project/CAHWs to the respondent.

You will then be asked to answer the same questions about the District Council Chairman and the Constituencys Member of Parliament.

Section 3 – Community Relations

In this section, your job is to capture information about the respondents

relationship to people who hold important positions in their community. Tell the respondent that you are going to read a list of positions. For each position, you want to know if the respondent has a direct relation to the person that holds that position. Remind the respondent that by direct relation you mean: biological mother, father, sister, brother, grandmother, grandfather, children, aunt, uncles, or cousins.

You will first record which positions the person has a direct relation to (or No if they have no such relationships). Then, you will be prompted to record the family member who holds each applicable position. For example, if the respondent says he/she is related to the Town Chief, you will say, Town Chief. Who is the Town Chief to you? Your biological mother, father, sister, brother, grandmother, grandfather, child, aunt, uncle, or cousin?

Sierra Leone Election Observation Report: Kono District

March 12, 2018

Produced by: Niccoló Meriggi (IGC Country Economist),
Luke Tyburski (WUR), and Max Eber (WUR)

Context:

In cooperation with researchers from Wageningen University and Research (WUR), the International Growth Centre (IGC) funded a team of domestic election observers to observe the conduct of Sierra Leone's March 7th polls.¹ The observers were accredited by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and were trained by the Knowledge for Community Empowerment Organisation (KoCEPO): a Koidu-based, non-partisan civil society organization. On Election Day, observers were assigned to 71 Voter Registration Centres (VRCs) across seven chiefdoms in Kono District.²

In addition to recording the conduct of the vote, observers played a dual role as enumerators, performing approved exit poll surveys.³ Despite sensitization measures aimed at a broad spectrum of stakeholders,⁴ Political Party Agents remained particularly resistant to the exit polls. To avoid escalation, it became necessary to cease exit polling at 45 VRCs and to withdraw enumerators completely from 34 sites, mostly in and around Koidu.

From the resulting data, this report breaks down the conduct of VRCs into four relevant categories: overall impressions, punctuality and preparedness, procedures, and atmosphere. In brief, observers regarded the conduct of voting and counting to be generally free and fair. Despite this, inconsistencies and delays did detract from voting across the sample of VRCs. Common issues included minor delays and interruptions, late or insufficient staff, missing or disorganized supplies at set-up, improper accommodations for disabled voters, and inconsistent access afforded to observers.

Data:

Observers were trained to submit electronic reports upon the open of polling, at midday, and at the conclusion of counting. As noted, however, observational activities were interrupted at a subset of VRCs. As seen in Table 1, below, the majority of lost data was in Gbense Chiefdom, at VRCs in Koidu and its surroundings. In sum, there remain 65 distinct VRCs for which at least one observational survey was collected.⁵

¹ Elections were simultaneously held for President, Members of Parliament, District Council Chairpersons, Local Councilors, and Mayors.

² These chiefdoms are Fiama, Gbense, Gbane Kandor, Lei, Mafindor, Soa, and Toli. These seven chiefdoms (of Kono's fourteen) were selected based on their participation in an unrelated development project associated with the researchers. This had no bearing on the conduct of the observers. The 71 VRCs selected represent a random sample of the 86 total VRCs across these seven chiefdoms.

³ The exit polls were approved by the NEC Executive Secretary and the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee.

⁴ NEC District Officers, the applicable Paramount Chiefs, the police's Local Unit Commander, the Office of National Security (ONS), and the Kono Situation Room were sensitized on the content and intent of the exit polls. Enumerators were further trained to brief VRC staff and any stationed security officers of their activities before the start of voting.

⁵ Certain indicators are specific to the AM, noon, and PM surveys (e.g. counting is only relevant for PM). As such, the total observation numbers used in percentage calculations will vary based on Table 1.

Table 1: Data Breakdown by Chiefdom

Chiefdom	VRCs Assigned	Surveys Conducted		
		AM	Noon	PM
Fiama	5	5	5	2
Gbane Kandor	5	5	5	5
Gbense	29	23	22	7
Lei	12	11	11	9
Mafindor	5	5	5	5
Soa	12	12	11	5
Toli	3	3	3	3
Total	71	64	62	36

Overall Impressions:

Observers were asked to rate the conduct of their VRC at set-up, at midday, and upon the completion of counting. Once all processes were concluded, observers were asked in the PM survey: to what extent do you agree or disagree that the conduct of voting, counting, and tabulation was free and fair at your respective VRC? **All observers either Strongly Agreed (66.7 percent) or Agreed (33.3 percent) that electoral proceedings had been free and fair.** Breakdowns of conduct throughout the day are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Overall Conduct at VRCs

Chiefdom	Conduct			
	Very Good (%)	Good (%)	Bad (%)	Very Bad (%)
Fiama				
<i>AM</i>	0.0	100	0.0	0.0
<i>Noon</i>	0.0	80.0	20.0	0.0
<i>PM</i>	0.0	100	0.0	0.0
Gbane Kandor				
<i>AM</i>	40.0	60.0	0.0	0.0
<i>Noon</i>	20.0	80.0	0.0	0.0
<i>PM</i>	20.0	80.0	0.0	0.0
Gbense				
<i>AM</i>	21.7	65.2	13.0	0.0
<i>Noon</i>	18.2	81.8	0.0	0.0
<i>PM</i>	14.3	85.7	0.0	0.0
Lei				
<i>AM</i>	54.5	45.5	0.0	0.0
<i>Noon</i>	27.3	72.7	0.0	0.0
<i>PM</i>	44.4	55.6	0.0	0.0
Mafindor				
<i>AM</i>	40.0	60.0	0.0	0.0
<i>Noon</i>	20.0	80.0	0.0	0.0
<i>PM</i>	40.0	60.0	0.0	0.0
Soa				
<i>AM</i>	41.7	58.3	0.0	0.0
<i>Noon</i>	54.5	45.5	0.0	0.0
<i>PM</i>	20.0	80.0	0.0	0.0
Toli				
<i>AM</i>	33.3	33.3	33.3	0.0
<i>Noon</i>	33.3	66.7	0.0	0.0
<i>PM</i>	33.3	66.7	0.0	0.0

Appendix 3

Of the five reports of “Bad” conduct, most indicated disorganization at the VRCs. This led to delays in the morning, and several stations with insufficient staff lost control of the voter lines. This threatened the calm atmosphere at these VRCs, as with less supervision small squabbles were more likely to escalate. This was exacerbated in Koidu, where observers in the morning estimated crowds of up to 800 waiting to vote at some VRCs.

Punctuality and Preparedness:

Voting largely began on time or within a reasonable delay. Delays were commonly attributed to missing materials or insufficient staff. A number of VRCs were further delayed by low-level disputes in line or between stakeholders. These same problems were also contributing factors in sporadic interruptions of voting throughout the day. In one particular case, voting was disrupted at a VRC for over thirty minutes due to a public argument between the Presiding Officer and a Paramount Chief.

KEY INDICATORS:⁶

- a. Percent of VRCs that opened voting by 7:30am: **75.0%**
- b. Percent of VRCs that opened voting by 8:00am: **95.3%**
- c. Percent of VRCs that opened voting by 8:30am: **98.4%**
- d. Percent of VRCs with interruptions in voting: **28.6%**

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:⁷

- a. Percent of VRCs with late staff (arrived after 6am):⁸ **35.9%**
- b. Percent of VRCs with no staff on time (6am): **1.6%**
- c. Percent of VRCs with any missing supplies:⁹ **18.8%**
 - i. Common missing supplies included the Register of Voters and voting screens
- d. Percent of VRCs that ran out of any supplies: **1.5%**
 - i. Common supplies that ran out were pens and stamps

Procedures:

While polling was generally smooth, procedures were at times inconsistent across VRCs. Notably, disabled and elderly voters were not always properly accommodated or given priority in line. Additionally, the application of electoral rules to observers and Political Party Agents was irregular across sites. For example, observers were not always allowed to sign or obtain copies of the Reconciliation and Result Forms. Moreover, not all observers were allowed to vote, despite proper accreditation. One observer was only allowed to vote after showing the Presiding Officer the relevant clause in the NEC Manual. The multiple ballots also caused some confusion, as more than one percent of voters did not receive all of their relevant ballots.¹⁰ Insufficient staffing left at least two VRCs without adequate Ballot Box Controllers at each Voter Station, resulting in less supervision of voters.

⁶ Indicators (a), (b), and (c) were assessed in the AM survey. Indicator (d) was assessed in the noon and PM surveys, and then aggregated.

⁷ Indicators (a) and (b) were assessed in the AM survey. Indicator (c) was assessed in all three surveys, and then aggregated. Indicator (d) was assessed in the noon and PM surveys, and then aggregated.

⁸ Per the NEC Polling and Counting guide, 6am was the latest acceptable time for VRC staff to arrive.

⁹ This indicates the percent of VRCs that had missing supplies at any time. Many of these problems were rectified but often caused delays.

¹⁰ This statistic is based on exit poll data, which encompasses 1,131 voters across the sample space.

In total, instances of attempts at voter fraud were confirmed at six VRCs. Observers witnessed at least five instances of voters attempting to vote on behalf of someone else: once with fake Voter IDs. Of the perpetrators, three were arrested. There was also one reported case of someone trying to vote multiple times. VRC staff identified the infraction, and the voter was turned away. Other serious infractions included a Member of Parliament (MP) candidate who was giving out money in exchange for votes at a VRC, and a Presiding Officer who was serving as the campaign manager for a major party. In the second case, NEC’s Ward Coordinator should be commended for intervening to address this conflict of interests by removing the Presiding Officer.

KEY INDICATORS:¹¹

- a. Percent of VRCs that allowed observers to inspect the ballot boxes and seals during the set-up process: **98.4%**
- b. Percent of VRCs that properly accommodated disabled voters: **91.4%**
- c. Percent of voters who had their fingers inked: **99.5%**
- d. Percent of voters who mistakenly did not receive one or more of their ballots: **1.3%**
- e. Percent of VRCs with NO cases of attempted voter fraud: **87.7%**
 - i. Attempts at buying votes: **1.5% of VRCs**
 - ii. Attempts at voting multiple times: **1.5% of VRCs**
 - iii. Attempts at voting on behalf of someone: **6.2% of VRCs**
 - iv. Instances of fraudulent ID cards: **1.5% of VRCs**
- f. Percent of VRCs that allowed observers to witness the counting process AT ALL TIMES? **97.2%**
- g. Percent of VRCs with recounts requested: **13.9%**
 - i. Percent of recounts granted: **80.0%**
- h. Percent of VRCs that allowed observers to sign the Reconciliation and Result Forms: **94.4%**
- i. Percent of VRCs that allowed observers to obtain a copy of the Reconciliation and Result Forms: **63.9%**

Atmosphere:

Table 3 outlines the various stakeholders present across VRCs. Of note, while the rate of police presence was high, there remained VRCs without a security presence. This would have lowered the conflict management capacity of these VRCs, as observers, on many occasions, witnessed police interventions successfully deescalate situations. Political Party Agents were also well represented, especially among the All People’s Congress (APC), Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), National Grand Coalition (NGC), and Coalition for Change (C4C).

In terms of abnormalities, incidents of open campaigning, violence, and breaches of the vehicular ban were low but noteworthy. Incidents of violence were generally not severe but worrying situations did arise, particularly in the Koidu area. One such incident involved a

¹¹ Indicator (a) was assessed in the AM survey. Indicators (b) and (e) were assessed in the noon and PM surveys, and then aggregated. Indicator (b) represents a percentage of the total VRCs *that had disabled voters* (as judged by observers). Indicators (c) and (d) are based on exit poll data, which encompasses 1,131 voters across the sample space. Indicators (f) through (i) were assessed in the PM survey.

Appendix 3

physical altercation between politicians at a Koidu VRC that sent the VRC into brief unrest. A voter at another VRC arrived with the stated intent of creating conflict. He was consequently arrested after initiating a disturbance.

Table 3: Stakeholder Presence at VRCs

	VRCs	Percent (%)
Domestic Observers	55	84.6
International Observers	11	16.9
Police	56	86.2
Military	9	13.8
Political Party Agents	63	96.9
<i>APC</i>	61	93.8
<i>SLPP</i>	62	95.4
<i>NGC</i>	56	86.2
<i>C4C</i>	62	95.4
Traditional Leaders	27	41.5
Media	24	36.9

In regards to campaigning violations, observers noted that several candidates were going from VRC to VRC actively campaigning. There were also several examples of people persuading others to change their votes. To compound the problem, more than one of these instances involved people trying to influence the votes of elderly or disabled voters.

KEY INDICATORS:¹²

- a. Percent of VRCs with open campaigning within 400 yards:¹³ **7.7%**
 - i. Shouting party names or slogans: **3.1% of VRCs**
 - ii. Persuading others to change their votes: **6.2% of VRCs**
- b. Percent of VRCs with breaches of the vehicular ban: **6.2%**
- c. Percent of VRCs with incidents of violence: **6.2%**

Conclusion:

Observers found the conduct of voting to be reasonably free and fair at the Kono VRCs that could be properly observed. For future polls, or in the event of a runoff, improvements could be made in the areas of staffing, organization, and sensitization on certain procedures (e.g. accommodations for disabled voters and the provision of access to observers). Lastly, conflict management will continue to be critical in Kono and should be especially emphasized in urban areas where escalation appeared more likely.¹⁴

¹² Indicators (a) through (c) were assessed in all three surveys, and then aggregated.

¹³ Per the NEC Polling and Counting guide, campaigning is not to occur within 400 yards of any VRC.

¹⁴ The authors of this report can be reached at:

Niccoló Meriggi: nmeriggi@gmail.com

Luke Tyburski: ltyburski1117@gmail.com (+232 78 59 39 50)

Max Eber: maxkeber@gmail.com (+232 79 95 15 93)