Bypass Aid and Local Accountability Informational Intervention II
Pre-Analysis Plan for Spring 2017 Survey

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Background

Data collection for this study will take place in Uganda. The data collected under this study will complement data collected in Uganda in January 2016. The pre-analysis plan for the original data collection was registered with EGAP (ID 20160113AB, available at http://egap.org/registration/1673).

In this document, we both reference the previous pre-analysis plan and discuss our intentions to analyze a combined version of the two datasets.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

We are interested in how information about the foreign funding and non-government implementation of local development projects affects the attitudes and behaviors of citizens in communities benefitting from foreign aid projects.

We will conduct an informational intervention that varies the information that we make available to respondents about the entities responsible for funding and implementing local development projects. By varying whether respondents are informed of the true implementer and funder of local projects, the study aims to measure the effects of information about foreign funding and non-government implementation of local development projects on: (a) perceptions of local development projects, (b) the willingness of citizens to hold politicians accountable, (c) the willingness of citizens to hold service providers accountable, and (d) the competence/legitimacy that citizens attach to government institutions. We summarize each of these research questions below.

> ***Project Perceptions***
> Do citizens perceive projects in their community differently when they are given information that those projects are foreign funded and/or NGO-implemented? Do these reactions vary systematically across members of the community?
>
> ***Electoral Accountability***
> Do citizens show higher or lower support for local elected representatives if they have information that development projects in their area are foreign funded and/or NGO-implemented? Do citizens believe that politicians help facilitate the work of foreign donors and NGOs? What do they think that politicians do to facilitate such projects?
>
> ***Local Government Competence and Legitimacy***
> Do citizens believe their local government is more or less capable and legitimate when they receive information that local development projects are funded by donors and/or implemented by NGOs compared to when they believe that they are funded by their own government and/or implemented by their own government?

Service Accountability
Do citizens demonstrate higher or lower willingness and ability to oversee projects that they believe are funded by international donors and/or implemented by NGOs as compared to projects that they believe are funded by their own government and/or implemented by their own government?

In the pre-analysis plan for the January 2016 data collection, we presented competing hypotheses for these outcomes. Based on our initial results and additional theorizing, we describe here a theoretical framework that specifies relationships between the various outcomes of interest and characterizes the circumstances under which we expect to see positive and negative effects of information about bypass aid on electoral accountability. Two structural variables inform our predictions about the marginal effects of the information that we provide on electoral accountability: citizens' degree of political connections, and the degree to which politicians are perceived to be responsible for acquiring foreign-funded and donor-implemented projects.

We start from the observation that public service delivery in many poor countries is considered highly politicized, and people with stronger political connections are perceived to benefit more from state services than those without such connections. As a result, we expect citizens' perceptions of non-governmental projects will vary depending on whether they are political insiders or political outsiders.

Project Perceptions
We hypothesize that donor-funded and/or NGO-implemented projects will be perceived to be more neutral than government-funded and government-implemented projects. Therefore, political outsiders should prefer donor-funded and/or NGO-implemented projects and should generally perceive such projects in a more positive light as compared to projects that they think originate with the government.

Electoral Accountability
Because of baseline politicization of public service delivery, we expect that political insiders and political outsiders will express different levels of support for politicians as a result of being informed that projects are donor-funded and/or NGO-implemented. Our hypotheses here, however, are conditional on the degree to which government actors are perceived to play a role in securing foreign-funded/non-governmental service delivery. On the one hand, if potential voters believe that they will have access to services delivered in a more impartial fashion, voters will no longer need to vote in the "right" way in order to secure access to services (Weitz-Shapiro 2014; Larreguy, Marshall, and Trucco 2015), and we should see reduced intentions to vote for the incumbent.

On the other hand, if the political incumbent is perceived as deserving credit for facilitating the presence of foreign-funded/non-governmental projects in the local community, then information about such projects may also increase support for the incumbent among voters who value higher quality and more professionalized service provision. Such a pattern might be particularly visible among political outsiders if they think that incumbent politicians have chosen to "tie their hands" by working with more neutral external actors. In this way, donor-funded and NGO-implemented projects may increase support for incumbents even while decreasing the politicization of services (cf. De La O 2015).

Local Government Competence and Legitimacy
In a world where citizens give credit to governments for having secured local development projects from foreign and/or non-governmental actors, we expect to see perceptions of government competence improve when citizens learn about the foreign funding and/or non-state implementation.

This, in turn, may have consequences for citizens' perceptions of government legitimacy. On the one hand, legitimacy might originate in perceptions of performance (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009), and insofar as the government is being credited with having performed well by having acquired external funding or having worked with a non-governmental entity to bring about implementation, our informational treatments will result in improved perceptions of government legitimacy.

Additionally, legitimacy is about perceptions of procedural fairness (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009). Insofar as information about foreign funding and/or non-government implementation may lead individuals to believe that there is more fairness in local service delivery, this may also affect perceptions of government legitimacy, although we would expect this effect to be concentrated among political outsiders.

Service Accountability
We also expect variation across political insiders and political outsiders in terms of their willingness to engage in accountability actions vis-à-vis the development projects that we study (e.g., reporting misconduct in the project). If political outsiders view foreign-funded and/or NGO-implemented projects to be outside of traditional partisan networks, then they should be more likely to take action against project problems that they observe, whereas this will not necessarily true of political insiders.

Research Design

As in the January 2016 study, we enumerate the survey in Ugandan sub-counties that are home to development interventions funded by Japan's Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects Program (GGP) and implemented by non-

governmental organizations.[3] For the current survey, we will include nine GGP projects that were commissioned in 2017. For the nine sub-counties, we select the parish (or in two cases, the two parishes) in which the project is located or that is reported to benefit most from the project. We will randomly select households in these parishes, and then interview either an adult male or an adult female who is at home at the time of the survey within the selected households.[4]

Respondents in the household survey have been randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups indicated below; the randomization (described below) is stratified by respondents' village and gender.

(1) Information about project but no attribution of responsibility for funding or implementation	(2) Information about project and source of funding but no information about implementation	(3) Information about project and institution responsible for implementation but no information about funding	(4) Information about project, funding source, and institution responsible for implementation
N=499	N=245	N=251	N=247

The exact phrasing for the informational treatments will depend on the specific project in the parish where the survey is taking place. All respondents will initially be told something in the following form (where the specific project description and photos vary with the project, while the monetary amount is constant across projects):

> *"There has been a project for improvement of access to safe water that built rain-harvesting tanks in this parish. The project cost around 350 million Ugandan shilling. Here is a photo of one of the rain-harvesting tanks that was constructed as a result of this project."*

As indicated, we will show a photograph of the project in question to the respondents.

Immediately after hearing this information and seeing the image, we will solicit from these individuals their prior information about the project. We will ask them:

> Before I gave you this information, had you previously heard of this project?

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[3] We include under this classification endline service providers, such as schools and hospitals, so long as they are non-profits or community-run.
[4] Whether a male or a female is to be interviewed for a given household will be pre-specified in the sampling protocol; see the description below.

Who do you think funded the project?

What makes you think that ____ funded the project?

I'm just curious. How certain or uncertain are you that your answer, ____, is correct?

Who do you think was in charge of managing the project funds and using them to run the project?

What makes you think that ____ was in change of managing the project funds and using them to run the project?

I'm just curious. How certain or uncertain are you that your answer, ____, is correct?

For individuals assigned to treatment group (1), there is no further treatment, and we will proceed to ask the outcome questions. This group, therefore, serves as a control group that has been exposed to information about a project and that has been asked about their views of who funded and implemented the project but that has not been told the true information about funding and implementation.

Individuals assigned to treatment group (2) will be told the initial information and asked their beliefs about funding and implementation. Then they will be given additional information about funding in the following form (where the specific information about what the project does varies with the project):

> *"I wanted to give you some additional information about the groups involved in providing the rain-harvesting tanks.*
>
> *The Funding for the project came from Japan. Here is a photo of the Japanese ambassador signing off on funding."*

As indicated, they will see an image of the Japanese ambassador signing a document. This image will be the same for all projects.

Individuals assigned to treatment group (3) will be told the initial information and asked their beliefs about funding and implementation. Then they will be given additional information about implementation in the following form (where the name and description of the implementer varies with the project):

> *"I wanted to give you some additional information about the groups involved in providing the rain-harvesting tanks.*
>
> *Community Awareness and Response on AIDS (CARA), an NGO, ran the project. Community Awareness and Response on AIDS was responsible for managing*

project funds and is in charge of day-to-day operations. Here is a photo of the organization's signboard."

As indicated, these respondents will see an image representing the implementing organization (i.e., the sign outside the office of the organization). These images have been collected during a series of site visits.

Individuals assigned to treatment group (4) will be told the initial information and asked their beliefs about funding and implementation. Then they will be given the additional information about funding and implementation contained in treatments (2) and (3) in that order but without the repetition of the introductory phrase:

> *"I wanted to give you some additional information about the groups involved in providing the rain-harvesting tanks.*
>
> *The Funding for the project came from Japan. Here is a photo of the Japanese ambassador signing off on funding.*
>
> *Community Awareness and Response on AIDS (CARA), an NGO, ran the project. Community Awareness and Response on AIDS was responsible for managing project funds and is in charge of day-to-day operations. Here is a photo of the organization's signboard."*

As indicated, respondents in treatment condition (4) will see both the photo of the Japanese embassy official and of the implementing organization's signboard.

After a set of outcome measurements having to do with electoral accountability and government competence and legitimacy, we remind respondents of the information that we have given them before asking a block of questions about project perceptions.[5]

For all four treatment conditions, we begin with text similar to the following:

> *"Remember the project for the improvement of access to safe water that I told you about. It built rain-harvesting tanks in this parish."*

For treatment conditions (2) and (4), we then say:

> *"The project was funded by Japan."*

For treatment conditions (3) and (4), we say something in the following form (with the name of the implementer depending on the specific project), where respondents

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[5] This repetition of the information contained in the treatment was not a part of the January 2016 survey.

in condition (3) hear this information directly while respondents in condition (4) hear it after hearing the information about funding from Japan:

> *"The NGO Community Awareness and Response on AIDS (CARA) ran the project."*

For conditions (2) through (4), we again show respondents the relevant pictures.

The information revealed in each community will reflect the true funder and the true implementing partner for all projects (i.e., the informational treatments do not involve deception). Our sample includes only communities with projects funded through the GGP grant-giving mechanism of the Japanese Embassy. This allows us to hold the funder and the amount of funding for each project constant, while the implementing partner will vary by community.

Outcome Measures

Project Perceptions

We ask four kinds of questions about the local development projects around which we structure the investigation. First, we ask direct questions about the quality of the project. Second, we ask a direct question about the availability of the service that the project ostensibly provides. Third, we ask a set of questions about the level of partiality in the implementation of the project. Finally, we measure respondents' willingness to contribute to the project using both a direct question and a behavioral game.

With regard to project quality, we first ask generally about access to the service that the project provides and then, later in the survey, we ask a set of specific questions about the project itself.

> In your opinion, how good or bad quality is the project for ____?

> In your opinion, how helpful is this project in helping meet the needs of people in this community?

> If you needed to ____, how likely do you think it is that you personally would receive assistance from the project?

> How likely or unlikely do you think it is that the project will be helping to meet the needs of people in this community in 10 years?

In order to see whether our informational treatments change how people view service delivery more generally, we ask:

If you or someone in your household needed to get access to [clean water], how likely or unlikely do you think it is that you would be able to get access to [clean water]?

To specifically measure the <u>perceived politicization or partiality of project benefits</u>, we ask the following series of questions, where we randomize the order of asking about either the sub-county (LC3) chairperson or the president:

How important do you think political affiliations and political connections are for getting access to this project?

Do you think that voting for the LC3 chairperson [the president] makes people more likely or less likely to receive assistance from this particular project, or does vote choice not matter for receiving assistance from this project?

Finally, we include both a direct question and a behavioral measure that reflect <u>willingness to contribute to the project</u>.

The direct question asks,

How likely or unlikely would you be to contribute money, labor, or materials to the project?

At the conclusion of the survey, in a behavioral measure modeled on Blair (2017), we give money to the respondents and offer them the opportunity to donate money back. Respondents are initially told,

"Thank you for taking the time to answer our questions. We have 2500 USh for you. We have been speaking about community needs during this survey."

Respondents are then randomly assigned to hear one of four different appeals. These appeals have been randomly assigned orthogonal to the initial treatment condition but stratified on informational treatment condition:

"Separately, we are collecting money for a fund to help needy people in this parish [OR for the project ____], and we would like to give you the opportunity to donate some portion of your payment to this fund. [Remember, the government of Uganda promotes the importance of making contributions to help the needy.] The decision to donate is up to you."

We will record the exact amount of the 2,500 Ugandan shilling that the respondent chooses to donate. All funds collected during the survey will be donated to the NGO responsible for the GGP project in the area where the funds were collected.

The amount of funding received in the conditions where the project is specified relative to the conditions where it is not serves as a measure of affect toward the project   We will examine variation in this difference across our informational treatment conditions.

Electoral Accountability

The initial set of questions following the informational treatments has to do with perceptions of politician performance. We ask both about the sub-county (LC3) chairperson and the MP. We will randomly vary whether the respondent is asked first about the LC3 chairperson or the MP.

> Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way your LC3 chairperson [MP] has performed his/her role over the past year?

> If elections were being held today, how likely or unlikely would you say you are to vote for your current LC3 chairperson [MP]?

Later in the survey, we ask a prospective vote choice question about voting for the incumbent president. This question is positioned later in the survey because of concerns about the sensitivity of the question.

We also directly ask respondents about the extent to which the existence of the project in their community should be expected to enter into people's voting calculus:

> Do you think that – because of this particular project – people in this parish should be more or less likely to vote for the LC3 chairperson [the MP; the president] in the next election, or does this particular project not matter for vote choice?

In order to understand the results that we find for the prospective voting intention questions, we ask a series of diagnostic questions about who deserves credit (or blame) for the project helping (or failing to help) people in the community (depending on how the respondent has answered an earlier question) and about the role of the sub-county (LC3) chairperson, the MP, and the president of Uganda in the project. The order of these questions in terms of the official being asked about is randomized.

> Who deserves the credit/the blame for the fact that this project helped some/did not help people in this community?

> Do you think your LC3 chairperson [your MP; the president] took actions that made sure the project helped people in this community?

What type of actions do you think your LC3 [your MP; the president] chairperson took?

LC3 chairpeople [MPs] have different responsibilities. What do you think is the most important responsibility of your LC3 [MP chairperson]?

You earlier said that you voted for ____ in the LC3/MP election. What was the main reason why you voted for that person?

Local Government Competence and Legitimacy

We ask questions both about perceptions of government competence and government legitimacy. In addition, the behavioral measure (just described) provides insight into perceptions of government legitimacy.

Our outcome questions about <u>governance competence</u> begin with questions about how well the local and national governments are performing in the area associated with the project. We randomize whether the respondent is asked about the local or the national government first. The specific question wording will vary depending on the service that the project provides. For example:

How well or poorly would you say your local [national] government is performing in addressing access to [clean water]?

We also ask a more general question about respondents' perceptions that the local government can be effective:

Imagine that many of the local market places had been badly damaged due to bad weather. How likely or unlikely do you think it is that the local government could fix the problem?

We measure <u>government legitimacy</u> as respondents' willingness to comply with the local government. The first set of questions involves a scenario in which respondents are asked to pay for increased local fees:[6]

Do you pay license fees to the local government for a bicycle, cart, business, market stall or these sorts of things? Please respond truthfully, as your individual answers will be kept confidential and we will not report them to the government or any other organization.

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[6] The willingness to pay fees may also be affected by the availability of aid as a substitute for local financing in the budget, and responses to this particular set of questions may reflect both perceptions of government quality and these sorts of substitution effects.

[If yes:] If your local government slightly increased the license fees charged for bicycles, carts, businesses, market stalls or these sorts of things, how likely or unlikely would you be to pay the increased fees?

[If no:] Imagine you did pay these fees. If your local government slightly increased the license fees charged for bicycles, carts, businesses, market stalls or these types of things, how likely or unlikely would you be to pay the increased fees?

We also ask about willingness to comply with the local government in terms of attending a government-organized meeting:

Imagine the local government asked citizens to attend a meeting on preventing the spread of an infectious disease but could not provide any compensation for attending. How likely or unlikely would you be to participate?

We also ask an abstract question about the legitimacy of the government collecting taxes:

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The government has the right to make people pay taxes.

Finally, we embed a behavioral measure of legitimacy in the donation game described above and inspired by Blair (2017). To measure government legitimacy, we compare donations depending on whether respondents are reminded of the government's encouragement of this action. Differences in donations when we reference the government versus when we do not serve as a measure of general government legitimacy. We will study variation in this difference across our informational treatment conditions.

Service Accountability

The survey also contains a set of questions having to do with accountability in the context of the GGP project around which the survey instrument is based. We ask two key outcome questions:

If you noticed that resources intended for the project were being misused would you contact someone to report this?

How likely or unlikely do you think it is that your actions would stop the misuse of resources?

We also include several diagnostic questions after the initial question about being willing to report misuse:

[For respondents who would contact someone:] Who would be the first person that you would contact?

[For respondents who would not contact someone:] What is the reason why you would not report the misuse of resources?

How likely or unlikely would you think it is that resources intended for ____ could be misused?

In addition, we ask a question about respondents' willingness to engage in a monitoring action vis-à-vis the project:

How likely or unlikely would you be to attend a meeting where the use of funds for ____ was described to the community?

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Our main expectation is that the non-government implementation informational treatment will lead political outsiders to perceive the projects as being of higher quality, and therefore potentially give differing levels of credit to politicians.

In order to distinguish political outsiders from political insiders, we rely on pre-treatment measures of partisan identification (and whether or not they correspond to the partisan identification of the local sub-county (LC3) chairperson) and retrospective voting history:

May I know, do you consider yourself a member of any political party? To which political party do you belong?

Did you vote in the 2016 local government elections? May I ask for whom you voted for LC3 chairperson in the 2016 election?

Did you vote in the 2016 national elections? May I ask for whom you voted for MP in the 2016 election?

We did not ask a question about presidential vote choice because of the greater sensitivity of this question. We used similar measures in the analysis of the January 2016 data.

We also measure respondents' perceptions of the politicization of service delivery in the GGP project sector in a pre-treatment question:

Think about ___ provided by the government in this community. How important do you think political affiliations and political connections are for individuals getting access to this service?

We will use this question both to look for variation in responses to the non-government implementation informational treatment across those who perceive more or less clientelism in local service delivery and also to create a sub-county level measure of the perceived prevalence of clientelism against which we can look for variation in the size of treatment effects.

Alternative Explanations for Heterogeneous Effects

We hypothesize that political outsiders react positively to information about non-government implementation because they perceive that they are more likely to be able to access the service. Here we consider two alternative hypotheses: that political outsiders respond to the information that something is or is not linked to the government through a partisan lens and that political outsiders are more likely to absorb information than other respondents.

That respondents would interpret information through a partisan lens is not that far removed from the main claim that we are making (i.e., that political outsiders will view non-government service delivery as less politicized and therefore more likely to deliver services to them), but we seek to distinguish a logical deduction about the partiality of service delivery (i.e., clientelism) from an instinctual partisan halo.

In part, we will use the outcome questions about the politicization of service delivery described above for this purpose.

In addition, we attempt to measure basic partisan reactions to references to "the government" with a question about a government policy unrelated to the GGP projects around which the study is based (specifically, "the government's Information and Communications Technology (ICT) policy"). This question is positioned pre-treatment in the survey questionnaire. If interpreting the world through a partisan lens drives the treatment effects that we observe, then we would expect to see political insiders and political outsiders reacting differently to this question. If we do not see differential reactions to this question, this helps us to think that respondents are inferring differences in the operation of service delivery because of the informational treatments.

Another possibility is that political outsiders process information differently from other respondents. In the January 2016 data, we found that political outsiders were more educated than political insiders. To check for the possibility that these subgroups are absorbing information from our treatments differently, we will look for differential response rates for manipulation check questions that we ask at the end of the survey.

Randomization

Randomization was performed in advance of the survey going into the field.

Within each sub-county included in the sample, we calculated the total per-village sample in proportion to the village's population as a percent of the total parish(es) population.[7] The number of respondents sampled across all villages within a sub-county sums to 138. Within each sub-county, we sample equal numbers of men and women.

We define randomization strata based on gender and village. Within each strata, we randomly order observations and assign the four treatment conditions in blocks of five, with two respondents being assigned to condition (1) for each respondent assigned to each of conditions (2), (3), and (4). Any residual observations in a stratum are randomly assigned to one of the possible permutations of treatment assignments that corresponds to the number of residual observations.

Analysis

We will test our hypotheses related to providing information about the role of foreign funding and non-government implementation in local development projects by comparing responses to post-treatment questions and behaviors among subjects in the following treatment arms:

Effect of learning a project was donor-funded: (1) vs. (2) and (4)
Effect of learning a project was NGO-implemented: (1) vs. (3) and (4)

If significant numbers of respondents have correct and certain priors, we will also run the analysis dropping these respondents.

Combined Analysis

This survey has been designed to replicate key elements of the survey that we fielded in January 2016. Therefore, we intend to combine the two survey datasets and conduct a unified analysis of the data for outcomes measured in both surveys. The hypotheses included in this document, however, have been developed subsequent to analysis of the January 2016 data. Therefore, we intend to present analysis that is strictly limited to the new data in combination with any analysis of the combined data.

Project Funding

We have secured support from the following grants and funding sources for this project:

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[7] In two of the nine cases, we sample from two parishes.

- AidData (onward granting of USAID funds)
- Yale University Institution for Social and Policy Studies Field Experiment Initiative

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