Repairing Information Underload: The Effects on Vote Choice of Information on Politician Performance and Public Goods in Uganda
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Overview

Democracy relies on citizens’ learning what officials do with the public’s trust and then rewarding good performance with longer tenure or punishing bad outcomes with ouster. But does this process work in low-information and semi-democratic environments? Importantly, can the process be improved through mobile technology?

To find out, we plan an innovative randomized control trial around the March 2016 Ugandan elections in which we will audit local public services and then transmit information to citizens via SMS-text messaging in the run-up to their voting for local offices. The study will allow us to learn whether new information that public services in a given sub-county perform better (or worse) than other nearby locales causes an increase (or decrease) in votes for incumbents compared to placebo information devoid of political content. We will also learn whether informed voters become more involved in the political process after receiving information.

Background and Project Goals

The quality of governance and the elections process in Uganda is hampered by corruption and other problems. Yet Ugandan citizens evince relatively high levels of political awareness, with more than 83 percent able to correctly state the names of their Member of Parliament in open-ended prompts. Nearly two thirds of Ugandans listen regularly to the radio, where news programs are frequent (Milner et al. 2014).

However, research on decentralization in Uganda has revealed that many citizens lack knowledge of the basic functions of local governments, which has hindered citizens’ ability to participate in decision-making and hold local officials accountable (Natamba et al. 2010, p. 16). We thus rely on SMS text messaging to deliver information about local public services. SMS is cost-effective and scalable and allows us to personalize information and obtain real-time responses. Moreover, cell phone access is nearly universal in Uganda.

We propose a randomized control trial in Uganda to learn how information about districts’ management of budgets, sub-counties’ supply of public services, and the provision of the information privately or collectively affects candidate support, political participation, and vote choice. The study will focus on the March 2016 elections for local sub-county (LC III) and district (LC V) chairs and councillors. We will use a full-factorial design to learn about the effects of the different types of information on citizen attitudes and political behavior.

Our study builds on a rich literature examining the relationship between political information and accountability. In environments with greater transparency, voters should be more likely to reduce reliance on informational shortcuts, for example the tribe or family of the councillor (Keefer and
Vlaicu 2008; Golden & Min 2013), and instead take into account the programmatic performance of politicians when deciding how to vote. Compelling experimental evidence suggests that information about performance and the provision of public goods affects voting behavior under certain conditions (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Banerjee et al. 2010; Humphreys and Weinstein 2013). Yet we remain ignorant about the mechanisms underlying these findings.

Taking into account these findings and working within the broader EGAP Metaketa, this project will evaluate several factors that might explain when and why some information treatments are more impactful than others. Our first treatment arm evaluates the effect of information about the financial accountability of local councils on voter behavior. We will use information from Uganda’s Office of the Auditor General to create measures of relative fraud and mismanagement, which we will provide to citizens via text messages. The second treatment arm evaluates the effects of information regarding public services on voter behavior. We expect that information on the comparative quality of public services will influence voting because information is directly linked to voters’ own well being (Banerjee, Kumar, Pande and Su 2011). We will use data on primary schooling collected by Twaweza and data on other types of public services collected by Twaweza or us. Our third treatment arm varies the saturation of the aforementioned information in a locale to allow us to identify the effects of generating common knowledge.

**Theory**

Our starting point is a model of rational voting in which voters calculate the utility of their voting decisions based upon a retrospective evaluation of the behavior of incumbent and challenger candidates (Fearejohn 1986; Besley 2006; Coate and Conlin 2004). Voters have priors about the probability that incumbent and challenger candidates are of their preferred type, which are associated with some symmetrically distributed error term. When voters receive new information about the performance of the incumbent candidate, they will update their prior about the type of the incumbent and reduce the uncertainty about their prior. These changes will in turn alter the utility of voting, turnout, and clientelism.

**Effects on Voting**

The effects of the signal on incumbent vote share will depend upon whether the signal increases the probability that an incumbent is of the voter’s preferred type. A good signal should increase this probability and increase incumbent vote share. A bad signal should do the opposite. The mechanism is that individuals’ perceptions of the efficacy and integrity of the sub-county and district chairpersons and councillors will change after they learn this new information. These effects are going to be conditional on the voter’s prior: a credible signal that is divergent from a voter’s prior is likely to have a stronger effect on voting behavior than one that does not diverge.

**Effects on Turnout**

In this class of models, turnout for ethical voters is increasing in a voter’s utility of an incumbent victory relative to a challenger victory (e.g., Coate and Conlin 2004). This utility is largely a function of a voter’s priors about challenger and incumbent types. Under some basic assumptions, a credible signal that improves a voter’s confidence in the distribution of types will increase the utility of voting, on average. This follows from the fact that credible signals about
candidate characteristics will increase the average expected difference between the types of
challengers and incumbents (see Banerjee, Kumar, Pande and Su 2011 for a proof). More
generally, any information that increases the variance in the utility of an incumbent victory and a
challenger victory will increase turnout. This implies that novel bad information about
incumbents will tend to increase turnout among opposition supporters and decrease turnout
among incumbent supporters (and conversely with respect to good information).

Effects on Clientelism
There are several mechanisms by which one might theorize an effect of information on
clientelism (i.e., vote buying). We focus on two in this project. First, information effects will be
stronger for voters who have not received clientelistic benefits from candidates. Most models
assume that vote buying is an attempt to compensate a voter for her disutility of voting against
her preferences (e.g., Dixit and Londregan 1996). As such, when a voter has not received
clientelistic benefits, she should be more likely to vote according to her preferences. Above, we
have argued that information helps voters determine whether a candidate is of the voter’s
preferred type. Second, information will cause people to be less likely to condition their voting
decisions on vote buying. A signal that increases the variance of the perceived distribution of
candidate types should also increase the costs of vote buying, on average. Thus, the same level of
inducements from candidates will have less of an effect in terms of inducing a citizen to vote.

Effects Conditional on Individual vs. Common Knowledge
Thus far, we have considered how information affects different outcomes, holding constant the
level of information that citizens in a village will be given via the treatments. However, the level
of common knowledge in a locale may condition the ability of citizens who receive information
about poor performance to organize. When information is provided to more people in a locale, it
will create common knowledge, which we hypothesize will generate stronger effects.

Hypotheses

Voting and Voting Mediators:
H1a: Positive information increases voter support for incumbent politicians.

H1b: Negative information decreases voter support for incumbent politicians.

H2: Information effects -- both positive and negative -- are stronger when the gap between
voters’ prior beliefs about candidates and the information provided is larger.

H3: Positive (negative) information increases (decreases) voter beliefs in candidate integrity.

H4: Positive (negative) information increases (decreases) voter beliefs in candidate efficacy.

Turnout:
H5a: Positive information increases voter turnout.

H5b: Negative information decreases voter turnout.
H6: Positive (negative) information about an incumbent increases (decreases) voter turnout among incumbent supporters relative to opposition supporters.

Clientelism:
H7: Information effects -- both positive and negative -- are stronger for voters who have not received clientelistic benefits from any candidate.

H8: Information -- both positive and negative -- will cause people to be less likely to condition their voting decisions on vote buying.

Individual vs. Common Knowledge:
H9: Informational effects are stronger when information is provided to more people in a locale.

Fieldwork

Local enumerators will conduct our fieldwork. Our fieldwork, as well as the impact and the sustainability of the project, will be strengthened by our partnership with the independent East African initiative, Twaweza. Twaweza works on enabling children to learn, citizens to exercise agency, and governments to be more open and responsive in Uganda. Twaweza has extensive experience and a world-respected practice of learning, monitoring, and evaluation. We will work with Twaweza to build upon its flagship program, Uwezo, Africa’s largest annual citizen assessment to assess children’s learning levels across hundreds of thousands of households. We will do so by collaborating with Twaweza on how to send via SMS on at least one of Uwezo’s measurements of the quality of primary schooling as part of the sub-county public service quality index. We will also consult with Twaweza about the most appropriate measures of responses to this information.

We are still developing the other public services about which will provide information. We are considering using one or more of the following public services: water access, road quality, waste removal quality, and health services. Data on the provision of these services could come from public service audits conducted by our enumerators or from Uwezo.

Treatments

We will provide one of several pieces of information via cell phone SMS and USSD messages to voters in our catchment polling areas. In a full-factorial RCT, we will assign treated respondents to one or more of the following conditions:

(1) **Budget Accountability Treatment**: Our first information treatment will provide details about irregularities in the district council budget. The Uganda Office of the Auditor General conducts a yearly audit of LC V and LC III council budgets. This audit is intended to validate that all revenue from the councils can be properly accounted for, proper procurement methods were used, and contracts were delivered on time and without shoddy workmanship. Treated respondents will receive information about irregularities in their district and how the level of irregularities compares to other districts.
(2) Public Services Treatment: The second information condition focuses on the quality of public services, as discussed above. Treated respondents will receive information about public services in their district/sub-county and how the level of irregularities compares to other districts/sub-counties.

(3) Placebo Treatment: To avoid instrumentation bias, we will use a placebo condition. Placebo respondents will receive only general information about the importance of quality public services or clean budgets.

(4) Saturation Treatment for Budget Accountability: Our fourth treatment condition deals with how subjects receive information. To test the effect of common knowledge, we will randomly assign locale to receive either 90% or 10% saturation of treatment information as a proportion of subjects.

Sampling and Randomization Design

We use a nationally representative sample of districts (LC V) and then polling stations using a hierarchical sampling procedure. We use the sample of 28 districts selected by Twaweza’s Uwezo project to measure educational outcomes based on independent testing of school children. The sample of districts is nationally representative and stratified by region of the country. Within each of these 28 districts, we identify a 30 polling station that fall within the randomly selected enumeration areas in the 2014 Uwezo study.

Within each district, 15 polling stations will be assigned to the high density (80% of subjects) budget accountability treatment and 15 polling stations will be assigned to the low density (20% of subjects) budget accountability treatment. Within each polling station, subjects will be randomly assigned to receive information about budget accountability based on the proportion of the polling station level assignment. The other subjects will receive a placebo message about current entertainment news designed to maintain interest in the platform, with the goal of avoiding unequal attrition between treatment conditions.

For all polling stations in the sample, half of subjects will be randomly assigned to receive repeated information about the public service that deem most important when they decide how to vote, as stated in their responses to pre-treatment survey questions. The goal of this treatment is to overcome potential challenges in previous studies about information and political behavior that provide subjects with information that they might not deem salient. The other subjects will receive a placebo message about current entertainment news designed to maintain interest in the platform, with the goal of avoiding unequal attrition between treatment conditions.

Within each of the sampled polling stations, we aim to collect at least 100 mobile phone numbers by calling groups of people together during our initial visit and announcing the project. We will obtain consent to send information and conduct self-reported surveys during the course of the experiment at these meetings. The pre-treatment and post-election surveys will be conducted via call center, which based on pilot testing will enable us to reach our target of 56 participating subjects per polling station for reasons of power.
Since the polling stations selected into our experimental sample may be contiguous, we will obtain district maps for all of the sampled districts and calculate the probability of that polling station being exposed to spillover from contiguous polling stations. In robustness checks, we will analyze the effect of spillover of the treatments using an inverse weighted probability of exposure to spillover that is not randomly assigned.

**Power Analysis**

We have completed a power analysis for the main effects using randomization inference blocked at the polling station level. We make a number of conservative assumptions to arrive at our participation target per polling station:

1. That we are measuring a binary outcome;
2. We have no covariate data (conservative);
3. We have no pre-treatment outcome data (conservative);
4. Intra-cluster correlation in vote choice will behave as in the 2011 LC V elections;
5. The effective sample size for analysis of information type is half because good news and bad news will drive outcomes in different directions, requiring subgroup analysis;
6. Only subjects with incorrect beliefs will experience a treatment effect when provided with information and only half of subjects have incorrect beliefs; and
7. One-tailed hypothesis tests because of directional hypotheses per #5.

We obtain 0.80 power with alpha = 0.05 and treatment effect size at 0.05 only for subjects having incorrect beliefs and no treatment effect for subjects with correct beliefs at 56 participating subjects per polling station. Based on previous experience with response rates surveys enumerated by call center of approximately 60%, we aim to sign-up 100 subjects in-person when we visit polling stations and obtain informed consent.

**Covariate and Outcome Measurement**

We will use two surveys to evaluate the effects of information on vote choice (see appendix). We will use a post-election survey conducted by call center to evaluate the effects of information on vote choice, voting motivations, and voter perceptions. We will use these surveys to measure (1) votes for sub-county and district council chairpersons, (2) perceptions and knowledge of the performance of sub-county and district chairpersons and councillors, (3) vote buying and motivations for voting, (4) engagement with elected officials, and (5) voter turnout.

Before assigning any of the subjects to treatment, we will also conduct a survey via a call center to collect background information about the subjects. In particular, we will ask about: vote choice in the prior LC III and LC V elections; participation in other types of political activities; party identification; perceived vote-buying in the last election; intention to vote in the upcoming election; the perceived effort exerted by incumbent local officials; preferred candidates at the LC III and LC V levels; and political efficacy. In addition, we will ask questions about how services in their area compare to national and regional averages and the financial accountability of politicians so that we can assess how information affects people who receive information differs from their priors. Other questions will assess subjects’ access to reliable information about public services and financial accountability, their political knowledge, and the salience of public
services and financial accountability to them. Demographic questions measuring respondents’
gender, income, education level, ethnicity, and other items will also be included.

The pre-treatment measures will serve several purposes. First, we will use them to create
subgroups for our heterogenous treatment effects. Second, we will use them to balance treated
and control units as part of a matching strategy for evaluating heterogenous treatment effects.
Third, we will use them to assess balance across treated and control units in our experimental
conditions, and potentially to re-weight our sample.

Estimation Strategy

Given that this experiment is based on an information treatment, the sample average treatment
effect is not relevant. Information can bring either good or bad news, which theoretically should
drive behavioral and attitudinal outcomes in different directions. Additionally, the degree to
which individuals perceive and respond to information as good or bad news depends on their
prior beliefs about the content of the information treatment and the salience that they attach to
that particular piece of information.

The treatment effect of information is thus likely to be heterogenous with respect to the prior
beliefs of individual subjects about candidate quality. If we define $P_i$ as each subject’s pre-
treatment belief about the quality of the incumbent candidate, where the true value is $Q_j$,
measured on the same scale as $P$, we can then model heterogeneous treatment effects by:

$$y_{ijh} = \alpha + \beta_0 P_i + \beta_1 (Q_j - P_i) + \tau_1 t_j + \tau_2 (t_j \times (Q_j - P_i)) + v_j + \epsilon_{jh}$$

where $t_j$ is the treatment assignment at the $j$th polling station and $v_j$ is a polling station fixed
effect. To avoid modeling assumptions, we will use randomization inference blocked at polling
station level for our main analysis of direct effects. We will assume the sharp null hypothesis for
the outcome at the individual level. We will then exactly replicate our two-stage randomization
procedure where polling stations are assigned to the appropriate density condition and then
subjects within each polling station are assigned to receive information at the assigned polling
station density. For our main analysis, we will only consider the subgroup of subjects who have
incorrect beliefs about each information condition. We will also analyze subjects who receive
good news and bad news about some dimension of politician performance as separate subgroups.
To estimate average treatment effects (ATEs) and the relevant sampling distribution, we use
average within-polling station ATEs over the entire sample used for each subgroup analysis.

Based on the distribution of pre-treatment survey data, we may be able to more effectively form
within-polling station blocks to increase the efficiency of our estimates. At this stage, we outline
only our general approach to estimate. We will file a supplement to this pre-analysis plan that
more specifically describes our estimation strategy after we collect pre-treatment data from
subjects but before we assign treatments.

For more complex heterogeneous effects, we also plan to use logistic regression for model-
assisted randomization inference, with standard errors $\epsilon_{jh}$ clustered by polling station and district.
We will also estimate models that control for other relevant individual- and district-level
characteristics, such as socioeconomic status and political attitudes, which could also affect voter
behavior. We will include the specific procedures in a supplement to this pre-analysis plan after
we collect pre-treatment data from subjects but before we assign treatments.
Appendix

Baseline Survey:

Controls and Moderators:

What sub-county (LC III) do you live in?

What village (LC I) do you live in?

(*M13) What is your sex? (1) female, (2) male.

(*M15) Would you say that you share the same ethnic group as your incumbent district councilor? (1) yes, (2) no, (3) not sure

(*M17) How many years of education have you completed?

(*M18) In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other Ugandans? Would you say they are (1) much worse, (2) worse, (3) the same, (4) better, or (5) much better?

(*M19) On a scale of one to seven, where seven means you are very attached to [incumbent district councilor’s party], and one means you are not very attached to [incumbent’s party], what degree of attachment do you feel for [incumbent’s party]?

(*M19 adapted) On a scale of one to seven, where seven means you are very attached to the incumbent district councilor, and one means you are not very attached to the incumbent, what degree of attachment do you feel for the incumbent district councilor?

(*M20) Did you vote in the last district elections? (1) yes, (2) no, (3) cannot remember, (4) no answer.

(*M20) Did you vote in the last sub-county elections? (1) yes, (2) no, (3) cannot remember, (4) no answer.

(*M21) Did you vote for the incumbent in the last district elections? (1) yes, (2) no, (3) cannot remember, (4) no answer.

(*M21) Did you vote for the incumbent in the last sub-county elections? (1) yes, (2) no, (3) cannot remember, (4) no answer.

If the district elections were held today, would you vote for the incumbent? (1) yes, (2) no, (3) not sure, (4) no answer.

If the sub-county elections were held today, would you vote for the incumbent? (1) yes, (2) no, (3) not sure, (4) no answer.
Please tell me if you agree or disagree with this statement: “people like you can do things that have an influence on the actions of your district and sub-county councilors”? (1) Strongly disagree (2) Disagree (3) Agree (4) Strongly agree

(*M22) How likely is it that the incumbent, or someone from their party will offer something like food, a gift or money in return for your vote in the upcoming election? (1) not at all unlikely, (2) somewhat unlikely, (3) somewhat likely, (4) very likely.

Mediators:

(*M5 adapted – Example public services question) How much effort do you think your sub-county councilor puts into providing community (Bulangi Bwansi) roads compared to other sub-county councilors (1) much more effort, (2) a little more effort, (3) a little less effort, or (4) much less effort?

(*M5 adapted – Example public services question) How much effort do you think your district councilor puts into providing local government roads, water access, and primary schools compared to other district councilors (1) much more effort, (2) a little more effort, (3) a little less effort, or (4) much less effort?

(*M5) How much effort do you think your district councilor puts into managing budgets and contracts without irregularities: (1) much more effort, (2) a little more effort, (3) a little less effort, or (4) much less effort?

(*M6) How surprised would you be to hear from a credible source about corruption involving your sub-county councilor? Would you be: (1) very surprised, (2) somewhat surprised, (3) not too surprised, (4) not surprised at all?

(*M6) How surprised would you be to hear from a credible source about corruption involving your district councilor? Would you be: (1) very surprised, (2) somewhat surprised, (3) not too surprised, (4) not surprised at all?

*Salience & Source:

(*M23) I am going to read you a list of activities in which your district councilor could be involved. Tell me about which of these activities you would most like to receive information: (1) how well the councilor performs his/her duties in the district council, (2) whether the councilor has engaged in corruption, (3) whether the councilor has been accused of committing a crime, (4) whether the councilor is effective at delivering services and bringing benefits to this community.

(*M23 adapted) How important is it that your district councilor manages budgets and contracts without irregularities when you decide how to vote? (1) not important, (2) not very important, (3) somewhat important, or (4) very important?
When you decide how to vote for your district official, rank in order of importance the public services you take into account, with 1 being the most important: (a) the literacy and numeracy levels and the attendance rates of pupils in your district’s government primary schools, (b) access to a public protected water point, and (c) quality of local government roads.

Your sub-county is responsible for the quality of community (Bulangi Bwansi) roads. How important is it that your sub-county’s roads are of good quality when you decide how to vote? (1) not important, (2) not very important, (3) somewhat important, or (4) very important.

How much confidence do you have in Auditor General of Uganda: (1) none, (2) not very much, (3) some, (4) a lot, (5) not sure?

How much confidence do you have in Ugandan non-governmental organizations: (1) none, (2) not very much, (3) some, (4) a lot, (5) not sure?

How does your LC V’s record of accounting for its expenditures and contracting compare to the average record of LC Vs to account for their expenditures and contracting? (1) much better, (2) better, (3) a little worse, (4) much worse.

How certain are you about your response to this question? (1) very certain, (2) certain, (3) not certain, (4) very uncertain.

How do you consider the quality of the government primary schools provided by your district councilor to compare to the average quality of government primary schools provided by districts across Uganda? (1) much better, (2) better, (3) a little worse, (4) much worse.

How certain are you about your response to this question? (1) very certain, (2) certain, (3) not certain, (4) very uncertain.

How do you consider the community (Bulangi Bwansi) roads provided by your sub-county councilor to compare to the average quality of community roads provided by sub-counties in your district? (1) much better, (2) better, (3) a little worse, (4) much worse.

How certain are you about your response to this question? (1) very certain, (2) certain, (3) not certain, (4) very uncertain.

How do you consider the water access provided by your district councilor to compare to the average water access provided by districts across Uganda? (1) much better, (2) better, (3) a little worse, (4) much worse.
(*M11) How certain are you about your response to this question? (1) very certain, (2) certain, (3) not certain, (4) very uncertain.

Election-level features:

(*M26) How likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you vote, even though there is supposed to be a secret ballot in Uganda? (1) Not at all likely (2) Not very likely (3) Somewhat likely (4) Very likely

(*M27) How likely do you think it is that the counting of votes in this election will be fair? (1) Not at all likely (2) Not very likely (3) Somewhat likely (4) Very likely

Treatments and Placebo

Example public services treatment in sub-county (LC3):
Message 1: In your sub-county, public services for the overall quality of community roads was [78] out of 100.
Message 2: The average quality of community roads in your district was [50] out of 100.
Message 3: According to measures taken by a “rough-o-meter,” your sub-county had [smoother] community roads than most sub-counties in your district.
Message 4: In your sub-county, community roads are [BETTER] than average.

Example financial irregularity treatment (LC5):
Message 1: The Auditor General conducted a financial audit of your LC V in 2014 to make sure your council could account for its expenditures and contracts.
Message 2: Unaccounted for expenditures and contracting problems are often indicators of fraud and poor quality services.
Message 3: In your district, the auditor found issues with UGX [21.3 million] from its budget of UGX [73.5] million. This means [29]% of the budget had problems.
Message 4: For example, the auditor found [2 contracts were paid for but not delivered, payments to deceased staff and overpayment on 1 contract].
Message 5: On average LC Vs were able to account for 80% of their expenditures. Your district council’s financial accountability was [WORSE] than other district councils.

Collective treatment:
The level of common knowledge in a locale may condition the ability of citizens who receive information about poor performance to organize collectively. To test the effect of collective information, we will randomly assign polling stations to receive either 90% or 10% saturation of treatment information as a proportion of subjects. This will allow us to test whether information about budgets and public services has a larger effect at the individual-level when more people in the group are informed and hold common knowledge that nearly all others have.

Example placebo:
The financial integrity of district councils and the quality of public services delivered by sub-county councils are important.
Endline Survey

(*M8) In the week before the election, did you hear the incumbent district councilor or someone from their party making statements about the financial accountability or quality of primary schools in the district? (1) yes, (2) no, (3) not sure.

(*M8) In the week before the election, did you hear the incumbent sub-county councilor or someone from their party making statements about the quality of county road or access to well water of the sub-county? (1) yes, (2) no, (3) not sure.

(*M3) Did you vote in the March 2016 elections for district and sub-county councilors? (1) yes, (2) no.

(*M1) If you did vote, did you vote for the incumbent [i.e., the councilor elected in 2011] for district councilor? (1) yes, (2) no.

(*M1) If you did vote, did you vote for the incumbent [i.e., the councilor elected in 2011] for sub-county councilor? (1) yes, (2) no.

(*M3b) If you did vote, what color paint was on the walls of the room your polling place? (1) white, (2) brown, (3) blue, (4) green, (5) yellow, (6) orange, (7) none-brick, stone, or unpainted wood, (8) not sure. [answer options are still being finalized]

(*M7 adapted) If you did vote, please choose the items that were important to you when deciding which candidate to vote for district councilor: (1) ethnicity, (2) provides benefits to you, (3) provides benefits to district (4) makes good policies, (5) provides quality public services, (6) has integrity, (7) is endorsed by others.

(*M7 adapted) If you did vote, please choose the items that were important to you deciding which candidate to vote for sub-county councilor. (1) ethnicity, (2) provides benefits to you, (3) provides benefits to sub-county (4) makes good policies, (5) provides quality public services, (6) has integrity, (7) is endorsed by others.

Since we first contacted you, did your incumbent sub-county councilor increase his/her effort to improve the quality of public service delivery for county roads and well water access? (1) no increase, (2) a little increase, (3) a lot of increased effort.

Since we first contacted you, did your incumbent district councilor increase his/her effort to improve the quality of financial accountability? (1) no increase, (2) a little increase, (3) a lot of increased effort.

Since we first contacted you, did your incumbent district councilor increase his/her effort to improve the quality of primary schools? (1) no increase, (2) a little increase, (3) a lot of increased effort.
Would you be willing to express anonymously any concern you have about the fiscal accountability or quality of a public service to your responsible district or sub-county councilor? (1) yes, (2) no, (3) not sure.

Manipulation checks:

(*M30) In 2014, was your district council’s financial accountability compared to the average of other district councils. (1) better, (2) worse, or (3) not sure?

(*M30) In 2014, were the quality of community (Bulangi Bwansi) roads in your sub-county compared to the average of other sub-counties in your district: (1) better, (2) worse, or (3) not sure?